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The United States Air Force is an organization 
operationally focused on gathering, processing, and 
utilizing vast quantities of information, so much so that 
it added “cyberspace” to its core missions of air and space 
in 2005.  Service leaders have argued that a USAF 
information revolution – its entrance into the “Information 
Age” – began as early as the first computers in the 1940s 
or as late as the proliferation of networks in the 1990s.  
Upon close inspection, however, it becomes clear that such 
assertions overlook decades of information operations and 
management, and overemphasize the concept of a single 
information age.  This dissertation illustrates how the Air 
Force’s information age has origins dating back to the 
Civil War-era, a half-century before the development of the 
first air service.  Through reviewing methodological and 
technological changes in information operations, it becomes 
clear that the post-World War II “information age” grew 
from numerous early service efforts to improve the quality, 
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     By all accounts, the United States Air Force today is 
optimally organized for the gathering, processing, and 
utilizing of vast quantities of information.  It runs its 
global, networked information environment through every 
installation – and every electronic device – in its 
possession and aims to develop the most information-
dominant warfighting capability in existence.1  Service 
leaders believe that “[w]ith today’s technology, 
information and communications can be optimized like never 
before, and timely information alone can make or break a 
mission’s success.”2  This emphasis on electronics, 
communications, and data processing – colloquially known as 
“The Information Age” – has brought a new technological and 
methodological dimension to a military service formerly 
preoccupied with the speed and capacity of its aircraft, 
                                                          
1 "Air Force Space Command," U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet, 
accessed July 1, 2013, http://www.af.mil/information/ 
factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=155.  
 
2 "Air Force Careers," Cyberspace Operation Officer, 





not its data pipelines.  Since the 1990s, “orchestrating 
the process of getting the right information, putting it 
into a usable form, and getting it where it needs to go in 
a timely manner” has become a major theme in Air Force 
thinking.3   
     The current “Information Age”, however, has origins 
that stretch back many decades into the past.  The purpose 
of this dissertation is to examine the evolution of 
information handling in the half-century leading up to the 
development of the air service and subsequently down 
through and beyond the establishment of the USAF.  I review 
the methodological and technological changes that occurred 
as the organization out of which the air arm grew, and the 
air arm itself, sought to improve the quality, quantity and 
delivery of information.   
     The “Information Age” is a term many are familiar with 
yet few can precisely define.  This lack of precision has 
not stopped those military and technology experts who 
attest that the United States Air Force’s history goes 
hand-in-hand with the emergence of the “Information Age”, 
especially in the context of the development of the first 
                                                          
3 Glenn C. Buchan, Information War and the Air Force: Wave 





organizationally-useful computers in the 1940s and the 
expansion of USAF computer operations in the following 
decades.4  By 1970, after all, the air service was 
officially the largest computer user of all federal 
agencies in the U.S. government and its information 
requirements and developments made it a technological 
leader among its sister services.5 
     Asserting or implying that the “Information Age” began 
with the rise of the modern computer, however, is open to 
challenge. Some have argued that particular technological 
developments in the 19th Century or even the 18th Century 
heralded its coming, while others have claimed that such an 
age only occurred with the growth of the internet in the 
1990s.6  More helpful in the concept of multiple ages of 
                                                          
4 See Gordon T. Gould, Jr. "Computers and Communications in 
the Information Age." Air University Review, May-Jun 1970, 
accessed May 01, 2011, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/ 
airchronicles/aureview/1970/may-jun/gould.html (date 
accessed: 12 Dec 12); and Neufeld, et al., Technology and 
the Air Force: A Retrospective, 313. 
 
5 Gould, Jr. "Computers and Communications in the 
Information Age." 
 
6 See Nico Stehr, "Theories of the Information Age," 
in Historical Developments and Theoretical Approaches in 
Sociology, by C. Crothers, vol. II (Oxford: Eolss 
Publishers, 2010); James Essinger, Jacquard's Web: How a 
Hand-loom Led to the Birth of the Information Age (Oxford: 




information, and the recognition that every “age” evolved – 
sometimes in complex ways – out of what came before.7  This 
is certainly the case with respect to information and the 
U.S. Air Force.  As for “information” itself, the meaning 
is also subject to debate.8  In this dissertation, I treat 
it as a single piece, or a collection of pieces, of 
knowledge, intelligence, or fact, whether it be as small as 
a single data figure on a ledger or as vast as a multi-
volume statistical report.   
     The dissertation unfolds as follows: 
 Chapter 1:  The Dawn of an Information Age, 1859-1919.  
In this first chapter, I demonstrate how numerous 
modifications in the Army’s information environment in 
this period were not part of a centralized, 
coordinated strategy by the service’s senior leaders 
but instead the product of independent decisions made 
at all echelons to support unit-level interests.  By 
                                                          
7 Richard J. Cox, "The Information Age and History: Looking 
Backward to See Us," The Information Age and History: 
Looking Backward to See Us,” accessed March 03, 2013, 
http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/2698/1/r_cox_1.html. 
 
8 See "Information Definitions," Merriam-Webster, accessed 
June 06, 2013, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/ 
information; "Information," Oxford Dictionary - Online, 
accessed June 06, 2013, http://oxforddictionaries.com/us/ 
definition/american_english/information; Nico Stehr, 
"Theories of the Information Age"; and Richard J. Cox, "The 
Information Age and History: Looking Backward to See Us." 
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exposing the origins and outcomes of these changes, I 
show how this information transformation was 
unsystematic and occasionally myopically-focused.  
Regardless of their origin, the results of these 
changes were often beneficial as the organization 
struggled through its reconstruction and 
reorganization.  In doing so, the Army found it could 
standardize its processes, refine its decision-making, 
and justify its actions and relevance in the face of 
bureaucratic opposition. 
 Chapter 2:  Information Standardization, Data 
Mechanization, and Statistical Control, 1907 - 1947.  
This chapter demonstrates how information management 
and application played an essential role in the 
development and operation of a budding air service.  I 
discuss the myriad devices, from aviation-specific 
forms to inventory and reporting systems, which 
developed the information capabilities of the Army’s 
air units in order to help organize and employ forces 
both in-garrison and at war.  As the air arm grew, 
these devices provided more timely and expansive 
information generation and processing for the 
service’s logistical and administrative functions as 
well.  Throughout this chapter, I explain why this 
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information evolution occurred and demonstrate how 
information was pivotal to the growth of the Air Force 
and its technological development. 
 Chapter 3:  Early Air Force Computing and Mechanized 
Data Management Programs, 1947-1955.  In this chapter, 
I focus on the origins of Air Force computing and 
mechanized data management and how important 
individual initiative was to the service’s success.  I 
explore how, through the dedication and tenacity of a 
number of key individuals, change across the service’s 
information environment was produced in this period.  
All this is displayed by focusing specifically on the 
early years of the Air Force and the contributions and 
advances that helped shape the service’s operational 
and organizational information landscape.     
 Chapter 4:  The Origins of a Data Automation System, 
1953-1968.  In Chapter 4, I address the development of 
the groundbreaking Standard Base Supply System (SBSS) 
program.  This chapter covers the discussions and 
events that led to the SBSS becoming the Air Force’s 
one-and-only supply system by the highpoint of the 
Vietnam War.  I further explore the important aspects 
of the program’s evolution that help illuminate the 
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critical programs that followed soon after the SBSS 
began.   
This structure will illustrate the extent to which the 
computer-driven air force “information age” was part of an 
evolutionary process dating back to the years after the 
Civil War; decades during which one information system, or 
set of systems, succeeded and often overlapped with 
another.  As will become clear, though use and integration 
of the computer in the mid-20th Century marked a major 
milestone for the Air Force, the roots of service 
information gathering and processing can be found in a 









The Dawn of an Information Age – 1859-1919 
     Long before the formation of a distinct aviation 
branch, its parent organization – the U.S. Army – spent 
decades developing the information processes and procedures 
that helped define its operating environment coming out of 
the Civil War.  Through orders, manuals and regulations, 
elements of the Army made conscious efforts to uniformly 
apply these practices throughout their standard routines.  
At the same time, the interest in applying emerging 
information technologies and business machinery grew in 
importance, both at the unit level and at its headquarters.  
By the time the Aeronautical Division became a reality in 
August 1907, information was already a critical mission 
resource.  Operationally and administratively, information 
application grew evermore intertwined into the 
organization’s functions and training capability, 
especially given the increase in overall departmental 
paperwork.9  As America entered World War I in 1917, the 
                                                          
9 Direct quotations include: “[i]ncreasing the mere paper 
work has always overweighted (sic) our army and stood in 
the way of the comfortable supply of the soldiers,” found 
in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1899., vol. 1, 
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regulations directing the collection, recording, storage, 
exploitation, and transmission of information were not just 
a function of daily operations; instead, the information 
required often defined these operations as well.10     
     The necessity for information in Army operations began 
in earnest decades earlier.  In 1881, the complete 
Regulations of the Army of the United States were codified 
and published into one document under the orders of the 
Secretary of War.  This massive anthology, well over 1300 
pages in length, contained every order, law and regulatory 
article required of America’s land-based military 
organization fifteen years into its post-war 
reconstruction.  With more than 300 pages of governing 
edicts and over a thousand pages of forms and corresponding 
                                                          
series 3 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899), 
481, and “[k]nowledge of paperwork is fair; efficiency in 
that direction is increasing.  None of the medical officers 
had any experience in paperwork prior to the Spanish-
American War,” from Annual Report of the Surgeon General, 
United States Army, to the Secretary of War (Washington: 
Surgeon General's Office, 1899), 146. 
 
10 For example, in the 1916 version of Manual for the 
Quartermaster Corps, the fuel (coal) accounting procedures 
listed in the supplies and property regulations of the 
Quartermaster Corps dictate the use of Q.M.C. Forms 210 and 
203 to account for total coal credits and debits [see 
Manual for the Quartermaster Corps, United States Army, 
1916. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917), 336].  
In short, these specific forms defined the process as they 
were specific to the requirement and not a general form 
applied as such.  
10 
 
direction, this compendium was the War Department’s most 
comprehensive set of directive guidance in existence.  From 
implementing military discipline to operating national 
cemeteries, Regulations is an exhaustive document in both 
its breadth and depth.11   
     Collections like Regulations provide readers with 
insight into the Army’s operational and administrative 
control methodology for a given period.  These collections 
are especially helpful when exploring more specific and 
detailed topics as they often provide the baseline 
information required for historical investigations.  
Therefore, when examining the information environment that 
predated the air arm, there may be no better documents for 
encapsulating all of the Army’s important and oftentimes 
interconnected data management policies and procedures.  In 
fact, with more than three-quarters of Regulations 
dedicated to Army-specific guidance for forms, reports, and 
registers, this particular document may look to some as 
much an information manual as it does a regulatory one.12     
                                                          
11 Regulations of the Army of the United States and General 
Orders in Force on the 17th of February, 1881. Codified and 
Published by Order of the Secretary of War...(Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1881). 
 
12 Regulations of the Army of the United States and General 
Orders in Force on the 17th of February, 1881. 
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    With such a strong emphasis on information collection 
and transmission in this one document, it is surmisable 
that such a systematic and thoughtful display of regulatory 
control is representative of an integrated and organized 
data management strategy developed by the service’s senior 
leadership.  Likewise, it is just as reasonable to conclude 
that these information interconnections were both planned 
for, coordinated and vetted through each Army branch’s and 
staff department’s chain of command.  However, herein lies 
the crux:  not only is Regulations of the Army of the 
United States not indicative of such conclusions, but these 
conclusions are in fact invalid themselves. 
     Regulations was not a display of the Army’s 
organizational abilities and operational foresight, was not 
indicative of a service-wide coordination process, and 
certainly was not the end result of an efficiency study 
determining the best way to collect and distribute Army 
information.  In reality, the War Department created this 
document in hindsight and under orders from Congress.  On 
the direction of the Appropriations Act of June 23, 1879, 
and under the advisement of the Judge Advocate General, the 
Secretary of War ordered the Adjutant General of the Army 
to codify and publish all applicable regulations and orders 
12 
 
in one complete volume.13  A board of five senior officers 
convened shortly after the congressional mandate to examine 
the codification with orders to remove errors, 
inaccuracies, misinterpretations, repetitions, 
contradictions, or any relevant defects…but there were no 
orders or discussion regarding the design of the service’s 
information process nor were any of these five officers 
experts in all the relevant elements covered in the 
volume.14  Therefore, although it may appear that 
Regulations was a major step forward for information 
control, in reality it was only a nominal step in 
organizing a chaotic regulatory library and correcting the 
information mistakes of the past.   
     Regulations is a microcosm of the Army’s information 
strategy during this period – a kluge of directives and 
processes established separately and unified without 
strategic forethought or vetting.  Although there were 
significant changes to the information environment between 
the Civil War and World War I, many of these changes 
originated at either the branch- or unit-level and were not 
                                                          
13 Ibid, vii. 
 
14 William Winthrop and Charles McClure, A Digest of 
Opinions of the Judge-Advocates General of the 




part of any master plan to manage the service’s data.  
Unfortunately, efforts like Regulations help feed 
overgeneralizations and misinterpretations that exist 
regarding the coordination and responsibility associated 
with these changes.15  It is only through a more thorough 
                                                          
15 There is no evidence to suggest that the Army ever cross-
coordinated all of its information policies and procedures 
between each of its organizations.  This misconception is 
typically inferred by those who read branch histories or 
historical summations that draw lines of distinction 
between specific information requirements when in reality 
these lines were often blurred.  At times, these 
conclusions are drawn by authors who make broad 
generalizations about either the lines of responsibility or 
the coordinated approval of these processes.  For example, 
in Keith E. Bonn’s Army Officer’s Guide, the author makes 
the statement that the Adjutant General Corps, which acts 
on behalf of the Commanding General of the Army, 
“historically [has] been given the responsibility for 
developing Army personnel and administrative policies and 
programs” [Keith E. Bonn, Army Officer's Guide  
(Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 2005), 156.].  However, 
given that a number of personnel and administrative 
information processes were also under the direction of both 
the Quartermaster and the Surgeon General, this statement 
is misleading.  A thorough review of the Army and 
individual branch regulations, reports, manuals and 
publications published between 1865 and 1919 clearly shows 
examples where branches established reporting or data 
recording requirements without the authority of the 
Commanding General of the Army.  In fact, there was such 
discord between line and staff organizations that the two 
were consistently at odds, especially considering that the 
line worked directly for the Commanding General and the 
staff for the Secretary of War.  In one notable instance, 
Commanding General of the Army General William T. Sherman 
noted that he had “no authority, control or influence over 
anything but the (line organizations)” [See American 
Military History. (Washington: Center of Military History, 
United States Army, 1989), 263.].  Although there were 
moves to create staff organizations before the end of the 
14 
 
examination of the Army’s information history in this 
period that the true origins of these changes can be 
uncovered. 
     Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to 
demonstrate how the numerous modifications to the Army’s 
information environment in the half-century following the 
Civil War were not part of a centralized, coordinated 
strategy by the service’s most senior leadership.  It will 
show that these changes were actually driven by a series of 
independent decisions made throughout the service at all 
echelons, often to support the finite interests of 
subordinate units.  However, by exposing both the origins 
and outcomes of these changes, this chapter also shows that 
while this information transformation was unsystematic and 
occasionally myopically-focused, the results often proved 
beneficial to an Army struggling through reconstruction and 
reorganization so that it could standardize its processes, 
refine its decision-making, and justify its actions and 
relevance in the face of bureaucratic opposition. 
  
                                                          
century, the integration of a formal General Staff – pushed 
by then Secretary of War Elihu Root in 1899 – helped add a 
more sophisticated layer of organization and control of the 
Army that helped alleviate several of these coordination 
issues prior to World War I.     
15 
 
The Army Environment 
     As the Civil War came to an end, a new chapter in the 
United States Army began.  The military, whose purpose and 
size were debated in the years leading up to the war, faced 
similar uncertainty in the post-war landscape.  With no 
central purpose to match its previous wartime mission, the 
Army continued to struggle with both its size and its 
mission.  For decades following the war, the Army 
encountered a number of critical challenges including the 
occupation in the South, the French threat in Mexico, 
hostilities in Indian Territory, growing constabulary and 
civil engagement duties, and a number of small wars 
throughout the world.  However, perhaps no challenge quite 
defined the changing Army as did post-war demobilization 
and reconstruction.16    
     The Army’s challenge during demobilization and 
reconstruction was five-fold.  First and foremost, the Army 
had to survive Congress.  Following the Civil War, many 
congressional leaders sought to minimize the role of the 
military, which in extreme cases meant rendering the armed 
                                                          
16 See Paul J. Scheips, Darkness and Light, the Interwar 




services altogether useless.17   Congressmen from both 
parties questioned the validity of newer post-war Army 
roles, such as constabulary services, asset protection, and 
election security.  By the mid-1870s, some went so far as 
to claim that less than half of the Army was engaging in 
legitimate purposes at all.  This “spirit of 
unfriendliness” concerning the Army continued toward the 
end of the decade, even as the nation’s military demands 
began to increase.  In those years, some in Congress (along 
with their staff) saw the military as a resource drain 
whose expenditures had grave economic consequences, 
including driving up inflation.  This period was marked by 
Army leaders and their congressional supporters struggling 
to find ways to defend the service’s existence against its 
numerous critics, leaving the War Department in what one 
general officer called a “condition of constant panic.”18  
     Second, this congressional backlash produced a force 
significantly reduced from its wartime strength.  Although 
                                                          
17 Although many were Democrats from the southern states who 
held animosity against the Army following it post-war 
occupation, numerous Republican senators also voted for 
increased military cutbacks…oftentimes for economic 
reasons.  See Charles A. Byler, Civil-military Relations on 
the Frontier and Beyond, 1865-1917 (Westport, CT: Praeger 
Security International, 2006), 25-29. 
 
18 Byler, Civil-military Relations on the Frontier and 
Beyond, 1865-1917, 25. 
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the Army had been barely 18,000 strong prior to the Civil 
War, service leaders felt its missions in post-war America 
warranted a much more significant force.  The result was 
quite the opposite.  By the time the first Reconstruction 
Acts were passed in 1867, the volunteer army had nearly 
ceased to exist.  In mid-1866, just over 11,000 of the one 
million-plus U.S. soldiers who ended the war were still in 
uniform, many of whom were either whites serving in 
occupation duties or colored troop regiments.19  Despite the 
Army’s reconstruction-era duties, Congress only authorized 
a maximum strength of 56,815 in 1867, which was cut to 
27,442 by 1876.20  This figure remained relatively constant 
until the end of the century.  Congress hardly deviated 
thereafter despite numerous attempts to raise and lower 
troop strength and appropriate funding.  It was not until 
the turn of the century and the reorganization of the Army 
that authorized numbers began improving.21       
                                                          
19 By November 1865, over 800,000 troops were already 
discharged and home.  See Scheips, Darkness and Light, the 
Interwar Years, 1865-1898, 281-282. 
 
20 Many of the reconstruction duties had to do with the 
occupation of the South, but not all [see Scheips, 282, as 
well as Jerold E. Brown, Historical Dictionary of the U.S. 
Army (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), 39]. 
 
21 Scheips, Darkness and Light, the Interwar Years, 1865-
1898 and Byler, Civil-military Relations on the Frontier 
and Beyond, 1865-1917.  
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     The third challenge was the professionalization of the 
military.  The post-war era was an introspective period in 
which senior service leaders reviewed the Army’s core 
missions and foundational requirements in order to best 
determine its future.  From this came the perceived need 
for an Army professional development system for officers.  
This system involved the founding of numerous postgraduate 
technical and developmental schools that educated officers 
on both branch-specific and command skills.  School 
development and a stronger officer corps in turn created a 
requirement for the mass publication of professional Army 
journals.  Through reading occupation-centric titles such 
as The Journal of the United States Artillery and The 
Military Surgeon, and military-centric publications such as 
United Service and Army and Navy Journal, officers in the 
field kept themselves professionally up to data and 
followed their service’s major proceedings.  However, at 
the unit level, professionalization also meant the 
codification of unit processes and programs.  Professional 
competence meant more at the unit level than mere schooling 
in the operational arts or keeping pace with the latest in 
military politics or programs.  Instead, the military took 
its lessons from the Civil War by better-defining its 
19 
 
operational requirements and processes to ensure unit 
activities remained consistent across the service.22 
     The fourth challenge was the disconnectedness between 
Army staff and line organizations.  Even before the Civil 
War, Army line organizations (e.g. artillery, infantry, or 
cavalry) served the Commanding General of the Army whose 
role it was to organize, train and equip each unit with the 
single focus of combat efficiency.  They were the 
“professional” Army, armed and ready to fight and win the 
nation’s wars.  Supporting the line organization were the 
staff departments (e.g. ordnance, signals, engineers) which 
were devoted to the more scientific and technical aspects 
of the service.  While the Commanding General controlled 
and disciplined the Army’s territorial line commands, the 
Army conducted its fiscal affairs through its staff 
departments via the Secretary of War.  Naturally, the 
situation was rife with potential friction and animosity, 
something which did not improve during the war nor in the 
dramatic drawdown that followed.  In 1874, as Congress yet 
again attempted to reduce the size of the Army, Commanding 
General William T. Sherman noted that he thought certain 
staff officers were “no more soldiers than the men at the 
                                                          
22 Matthew Motten, "Who Is a Member of the Military 
Profession?" Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 62 (2011), 14-17. 
20 
 
Smithsonian.”23  Although reconstruction did not solve the 
disconnection, its clarity in the post-war Army defined 
these issues for the senior leadership as well as the 
congressional leaders who oversaw their performance.24 
     Finally, demobilization and reconstruction 
significantly affected the technical development of the 
Army, both in positive and negative ways.  On one hand, the 
period was replete with technological expansion and 
scientific applications.  The use of railroads for 
logistical and communication purposes, the advancement of 
breech-loading rifles and artillery, the development of 
both field- and long-range telegraphy and telephony, and 
eventually the militarization of lighter-than-air aircraft 
are all examples of Army advances in the era.  On the other 
hand, the period was also marked by staunch military 
conservatism, a lack of fiscal resources and personnel, and 
a national resistance to the technical developments of war.  
The military lagged behind both industry and its European 
counterparts on many technological and scientific fronts.  
                                                          
 
23 American Military History. (Washington: Center of 
Military History, United States Army, 1989), 263. 
24 For more information on issues between the line and 
staff, see Scheips, Darkness and Light, the Interwar Years, 
1865-1898; and Joseph G. Dawson, The Late 19th Century U.S. 
Army, 1865-1898: A Research Guide (New York: Greenwood 
Press, 1990), 9-15. 
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These mixed results put the Army in a difficult situation 
leading into the twentieth century, showing that the Army 
would not and could not keep up with industrial or peer 
competitors so long as it lacked the proper resources and 
maintained its persistent isolationist state.25  
     These five demobilization and reconstruction 
challenges not only helped define the Army during this 
period, but also clearly influenced its actions and 
decisions.  With service brass and even some congressmen 
clamoring for additional personnel and fiscal resources, 
often to no avail, leaders across the Army took it upon 
themselves to better their environment and their units any 
way they could.  These improvements included changing the 
way they processed and distributed their information.  
Branch leaders often took it upon themselves to redesign 
their area’s key processes and then formalize their 
application throughout the Army, even if that meant writing 
their own regulations.   
                                                          
 
25 Scheips, Darkness and Light, the Interwar Years, 1865-
1898; Byron Farwell, The Encyclopedia of Nineteenth-century 
Land Warfare: An Illustrated World View (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2001), 48-135; Rebecca Robbins Raines, Getting the 
Message Through: A Branch History of the U.S. Army Signal 




Early Army Information Processes 
     While there were a number of military information 
advancements throughout the nineteenth century, few periods 
provide such a vivid picture of informational progress as 
did the period of the American Civil War.  In many ways, 
the Civil War was an information war, prosecuted by both 
sides using both old and new methods of communication, 
reconnaissance, intelligence, data collection and 
reporting.  In fact, several of the war’s methodological 
and technological developments were groundbreaking in that 
their integration into unit operations permeated nearly all 
aspects of operational endeavor.  These developments 
included the founding of two new military communications 
units, the addition of both tactical and strategic 
telegraph communication applications, the addition of new 
short-range visual signaling, an increased use of military 
and commercial messenger services, photographic 
communication and reporting, and lighter-than-air aerial 
reconnaissance and communications ventures.26  Thanks to a 
                                                          
26 The two new military communications units were the Signal 
Corps, founded in 1860, and the Military Telegraph Corps, 
founded in 1861.  The tactical (or short line) telegraph 
was part of the Signal Corps attempt at using the Beardslee 
Magneto-Electric Telegraph while the strategic (long line) 
telegraphs were a greater function of the Telegraph Corps.  
The new short-range visual signaling system, called the 
“wig-wag,” was developed by the first Army Signal Officer, 
23 
 
growing reliance on information in military operations, the 
Army’s information environment following the war looked 
very different from the one in place just a few years 
earlier. 
     As part of the service’s post-war reform process, 
leaders in the post-war Army sought to further develop how 
the organization would maintain and transfer its data.  
With indicators such as the Annual Report of the Secretary 
of War and its numerous sub-reports, the importance of 
information to senior leaders was unmistakable.27  These 
reports overflowed with quantitative and qualitative 
information gleaned not only from headquarters units but 
also from the Army’s remaining field units.  Obtaining what 
was necessary for such documents required higher echelon 
units to dictate exactly what information they needed as 
                                                          
Albert Myer, and was the rationale for the Signal Corps 
created in 1860.  See Rebecca Raines, Getting the Message 
Through. 
   
27 Examples of these reports include the numerous Annual 
Report of the Secretary of War volumes, as well as the 
individual annual reports to the Secretary of War.  For 
reference, see Annual Report of the Secretary of 
War (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1881), Annual 
Report of the Chief of Engineers to the Secretary of War 
upon the Improvement of Cumberland River, Tennessee and 
Kentucky, and of Obion and Forked Deer Rivers, 
Tennessee. (Washington: s.n., 1896); Annual Report of the 
Chief Signal-Officer to the Secretary of War. (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1873). 
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well as how units should document and transmit this 
information at each installation.  By and large, these 
methods assumed several dominant standards that remained 
consistent until the World War I.  They included the use 
of:  
 Registers (ledgers, record books) to record operations 
at military installations and between units throughout 
the Army 
 
 Standardized forms or documentation formats to 
annotate the transfer and documentation of information 
 
 Either handwritten or mechanically-written documents 
and correspondence 
 
The Army used orders and regulations to dictate the 
service’s priorities for administrative processes.  For a 
service fighting for clarity in a period of national and 
organizational transition, these standards represent but a 
portion of its attempt to regulate its operations during a 
period of change and conflict.   
     Among these standards, the best documented is official 
record bookkeeping.  Formally maintaining official records 
grew out of the establishment of the War Department in 1789 
and became an important organizational function.  For 
decades before and after the Civil War, the Army’s primary 
means of information documentation continued to be the 
compilation of operational and administrative data in 
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record books, also referred to as ledgers or registers.  
Coming in numerous shapes and sizes, these records remained 
the primary method for documenting and filing information 
across the spectrum of Army processes ranging from 
personnel matters to logistics to combat maneuvers.  
Additionally, although the Government Printing Office 
maintained the capability to produce formalized, printed 
copies of Army data beginning in 1861, the original ledgers 
remained overwhelmingly handwritten.  Even as new 
technologies allowed for recording improvements, the Army 
remained faithful to the ledger system well into World War 
I.28        
     Requirements for Army registers are strewn throughout 
War Department regulations of the age and derive from the 
requirements of the various service branches.  By the late 
nineteenth century, these document books were an 
inescapable part of standard Army administration and record 
keeping procedures.  For instance, in 1895, the Army 
required that all stations maintain a series of “books of 
record” at each location, to include an order book, 
                                                          
28 The Government Printing Office was created in June 1860 
by Congressional Joint Resolution 25 but did not begin its 
operations until March 1861. See James L. Harrison, 100 GPO 
Years: 1861 - 1961; A History of United States Public 
Printing (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010).       
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letters-received and letters-sent books (both with 
corresponding index books), and a post council 
administration book.29  Additionally, individual branches 
such as the Quartermaster and Adjutant General required 
ledgers that included a morning report book, guard report 
book, and a Post Exchange council book.30  Meanwhile, at 
lower levels on post, divisions and companies also 
maintained their own records to preserve order and document 
administration.  At the company level, for example, 
registers included a separate company order book, books of 
letters and sent, company council book, sick report book, 
clothing book, morning report book, a descriptive and 
deposit book, and a duty roster.  In some cases, these 
ledgers became so extensive they even included descriptive 
books of all public animals on post.  By the end of the 
nineteenth century, the Army appeared committed to using 
registers as its means of systematically documenting the 
major activities at each of its posts around the world.31  
                                                          
 
29 Regulations for the Army of the United States, Appendixes 
No. 8. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1895), 29. 
 
30 Regulations for the Army of the United States, Appendixes 
No. 8, 29. 
 
31 Ibid.  
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     Beyond documenting the standard logistical events at 
each location, each station was additionally responsible 
for maintaining a standardized and comprehensive store of 
directives and regulations.  The War Department required 
that post record clerks diligently maintain all downward-
directed orders and instructions to ensure each location 
operated alike.  Army commanders, as required by 
regulations, insisted all existing orders, letters and 
correspondence affecting company personnel be likewise 
maintained to ensure information standardization.32  
Meanwhile, this uniformity across installations allowed for 
a level of information homogeneity that made station and 
unit data readily available to headquarters echelons.  By 
either inquiry or up-channel reporting, this process 
permitted senior leaders access to subordinate data by way 
of rolls, reports, and returns on a regular basis.  For 
branches such as the Quartermaster and Adjutant General, 
keeping operations uniform across the department became 
paramount, and Army leaders wrote additional regulations 
standardizing information recording to ensure 
correspondence between units remained consistent.  Record 
book documentation and regulations, however, were not 
                                                          
 
32 Ibid, 37. 
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enough.  What often predicated this data recording, and 
other times stood on its own, was the application of 
standardized information forms.33  
     Official Army forms, typically numbered for simplicity 
of reference, were often pre-printed documents used by 
units or installations to provide or annotate information.  
Although the term form usually represented the paperwork 
itself, the terms form and format were often synonymous in 
that the specified verbiage on a document form could 
instead be written by hand on blank paper.  Overall, the 
meaning and importance of forms over time were often the 
guiding principles of administrative processes throughout 
the Army.  For example, one Army publication emphasized 
that:         
The ultimate end for which a company is 
created and maintained is to render perfect 
service on the field of battle. To attain 
this end many things are required and a 
realization of the correct proportion, each 
bear to the other is necessary….[efficiency 
in paperwork] is required by law and 
regulations and can not be slighted, nor 
done in a slip-shod manner.  If it is done 
thoroughly and accurately at first, it ends 
there....The instructions on the blank 
forms have the same weight as regulations 
and should be followed explicitly.34   
                                                          
33 See Regulations of the Army of the United States and 
General Orders in Force on the 17th of February, 1881 and 
Regulations for the Army of the United States, Appendixes 





Prescribed forms and formats in Army administrative 
operations were nothing new in the service, some dating 
back to the earliest years of the War Department.  In fact, 
early departmental regulations at the turn of the 
nineteenth century make specific reference to blank forms 
designed to illicit specific information from field 
commanders.35  As the military matured, the use of these 
forms grew even more prevalent and dynamic.   
     With improved reproduction devices and the formation 
of the Government Printing Office by the early 1860s, the 
department increased its capability to provide blank forms 
to the Army posts across the nation.36  In addition, the 
mass printing of Army regulations amplified the use of 
standard forms as they became a more integral part of 
normal administrative operations.  All this ensured a 
                                                          
34 Fifty Forms, Company and Regimental U.S. Army Paper Work, 
with Instructions and Sample Forms (to Date, July 1, 
1918) (Tacoma, WA: Pioneer Bindery & Print., 1918), 3. 
 
35 An Act Establishing Rules and Articles for the Government 
of the Armies of the United States: With the Regulations of 
the War Department Respecting the Same, to Which Are Added, 
the Several Laws Relative to the Army, the Militia When in 
Actual Service, Volunteers, Rangers, Ordnance Department, 
and the Quarter Master's and Commissary General's 
Department. (Albany: Webster’s & Skinners, 1812), 115. 
 
36 James L. Harrison, 100 GPO Years: 1861 - 1961; A History 
of United States Public Printing.       
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greater level of consistency in the department’s 
information gathering efforts.  For example, beyond the 
standard record keeping logs of the post Quartermaster, the 
Army required supply customers to complete specific 
requisition forms to ensure requests were officially 
transmitted, logged, and acted upon.  Army Regulations from 
1861, 1881, 1895, and 1916 all dictate similar paperwork 
requirements for managing logistical stocks regardless of 
station.37  Despite the vast changes in the military over 
more than fifty years, form requirements prior to World War 
I closely mirrored those of the Civil War.  Although the 
forms were subject to change based on the branch or 
division from which they derived, the requirement for their 
use hardly changed at all. 
     The importance of detailed record keeping and form 
management in this period cannot be understated.  Depending 
                                                          
 
37 See Theodore S. Case, Quartermaster's Guide Being a 
Summary of the Army Regulations of 1863, and General Orders 
from the War Dept. from May 1861 to April 10, 1865 Which 
Affect the Quartermaster's Dept., with All General Orders 
from the Quartermaster General's Office to April 10, 
1865. (St. Louis: P.M. Pinckard, 1865); Regulations of the 
Army of the United States and General Orders in Force on 
the 17th of February, 1881 (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1882); Regulations for the Army of the United 
States, Appendixes No. 8, and Manual for the Quartermaster 
Corps, United States Army, 1916. (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1917). 
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on the specific Army branch, service directives frequently 
dictated that unit leaders account for their activities and 
resources to higher echelons on a regular basis.  These 
accounts, filed either in periodic written reports or form-
derived bookkeeping statements, were often later compiled 
into much larger volumes that were sent to either senior 
military agencies or congressional committees.  The task 
was often arduous and time consuming, but was nevertheless 
a mandatory requirement for commanders across the War 
Department.  Of all the branches and units requiring data 
for operations and reports, few organizations exemplify 
this requirement more than the Army’s Quartermaster. 
     The Quartermaster’s responsibilities in the 19th 
Century remained relatively true to its Continental Army 
origins in 1775.38  As the sole provider of logistical 
support to the Army, its mission was naturally 
administratively intensive.  Therefore, its reports and 
corresponding forms required a great deal of clerical work 
and administrative forbearance. For instance, general 
orders required each branch officer to file an end-of-year 
Quartermaster Report by the close of each fiscal period.  
                                                          
38 "Quartermaster History," US Army Quartermaster School, 




The report was demanding; by order, it required narrative 
summaries, resource compilations and calculations, and 
personal assessments of condition and readiness for nearly 
all logistical matters under the officer’s purview.  
Moreover, regulations required the report include 
additional logistical data encapsulated in thirteen 
distinct branch forms.39  These forms, labeled Forms A 
through M for simplicity, covered public funds, 
quartermaster property, clothing and equipage, 
transportation costs, lost or captured materiel, telegraph 
systems, and property sold at public auction.  Upon 
completion, orders required the officers to file these 
reports in specific fashion without deviation – on half-
sheets of “fools cap” paper, written only on one side and 
fastened uniformly at the top.  With the vast amount of 
required data, standardization remained key in the post-war 
Army, even if only for convenience in filing.40 
     With forms providing so much data at each location, 
the final information challenge concerned recording.  
Whether the documentation medium was a record ledger, an 
                                                          
39 General Orders, Quartermaster General’s Office 
1868 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1869), 60-89. 
 




official memorandum, or a blank personnel request form, the 
options regarding printing method changed dramatically in 
the mid-1870s with the invention and consumer production of 
an industry-ready typewriter.41  Once these machines became 
commercially available and operationally viable, Army units 
had their choice of “writing,” either by hand or machine.  
Without any regulatory requirement to use one or the other, 
it became incumbent upon each unit to either acquire these 
machines or continue documenting and corresponding in 
longhand.  The absence of service-directed guidance for 
typewriter purchases (or other administrative machines, for 
that matter) meant funding for these devices was deficient.  
For commanders, the choice of documentation method was 
their decision to make.  Therefore, despite the creation of 
standardization methods such as registers and forms, how 
information was recorded ensured that department-wide 
consistency remained elusive. 
    By and large, administrators continued to rely on 
handwriting as their primary means of data recording and 
correspondence going into the twentieth century.  Since the 
War Department never mandated mechanically-produced 
writing, handwritten record books, personally scripted 
                                                          
41 Charles Edward Weller, The Early History of the 
Typewriter (La Porte, IN: Chase & Shepard, Printers, 1918). 
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correspondence and hand-scribed orders remained a principal 
form of Army documentation for decades in the post-
Reconstruction military.  The compilation of data at each 
military station remained essential to its daily 
operations.  Equally important was the delivery of the 
written word both on post and across locations.  As it 
happened, Army regulations of the late nineteenth century 
stressed the importance of written reports, directives and 
correspondence.  In fact, many regulations of the period 
stipulated that the appropriate transmission of information 
either be originated or finalized in handwriting, without 
exception.42  Even as late as 1915, Army disbursing 
regulations required handwriting and prohibited the use of 
mechanized printing or stamping when filling out certain 
forms.43  Additionally, most pre-bound ledgers could not 
accommodate machine-entered data given their construction 
and configuration.  Handwriting may have been antiquated, 
but it remained an important method of communicating 
information well into the twentieth century. 
                                                          
42 Regulations for the Army of the United States, Appendixes 
No. 8, Manual for the Quartermaster Corps: United States 
Army : 1916 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917). 
 
43 General, Property, and Disbursing Regulations, Signal 
Corps., United States Army.  
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      With the establishment of these critical 
documentation methods, the United States Army determined 
its own administrative, information processing future, 
though without any unified, central guidance from its 
commanding general.  Meanwhile, the draw of administrative 
machines – most specifically, the typewriter – quickly 
became a factor in the information processes of both the 
military and the national government.  As the 19th century 
drew to a close, machines that could “write” or “compute” 
were fast becoming part of the public conscience despite 
the challenge of injecting them into military operations.  
Whether or not the Army applied these devices in its 
information environment was no longer the military’s 
concern alone.  Its ability to adapt to the most modern 
administrative methods of the day became an issue both 
inside the War Department and out.   
Early Army Information Machinery 
     At the same time leaders throughout the Army were 
shoring up information procedures, several additional 
variables came into play as the both staff and line 
branches examined the future of their administrative 
environment.  These variables centered on the potential 
usefulness of machines, ones specifically designed to 
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complement the growing information requirements found 
throughout the industrialized world.   
    Beginning in the 1870s, the pages of local and national 
publications were often strewn with advertisements praising 
workplace improvement products.  Amidst the announcements 
for specialized office furniture, groundbreaking 
communication devices, and innovative writing utensils were 
some for the latest industrial consumables: mechanical 
office equipment.  Office machine manufacturers used these 
ads to boast how their products possessed the capability to 
improve workplace efficiency, generate sales volume and 
increase output production.  From the paper-roll and 
standard-type typewriters to damp-leaf and papyrograph 
copiers, the promise of these information instruments 
enticed administrators and bookkeepers from across the 
industrial landscape to seek business improvement through 
their use.44 
     Industrial corporation leaders found themselves 
debating the utility of these and other office improvement 
products.  The possibility of enhancing accounting, 
statistical, and information management techniques proved 
                                                          
44 For the best source of these advertisements, see The 
Cosmopolitan, March-August 1886, 1-415, with specific 
reference to pages 403-418. 
37 
 
alluring to many corporations, but especially to those with 
a large administrative overhead.  Organizations 
administratively responsible for a multitude of resources 
could clearly benefit from automation and mechanization if 
all the advertisements were to be believed.  The popularity 
of these products in this era underscores the imagination 
several of certain inventors, entrepreneurs, and companies, 
each seeking success in increasing the documentation, 
reproduction, and data calculation capabilities of office 
machines in the latter half of the nineteenth century.  
Likewise, instruments such as the mechanical typewriter, 
mimeograph printing machine, electrical data tabulator, and 
arithmometer and comptometer mechanical calculator all 
provided organizational leaders with the potential for 
achieving an increase in capability.   
     The question facing United States Army commanders, 
meanwhile, was choosing which innovations to apply, if any 
at all.  In the decades following the Civil War, the 
nation’s military attempted to settle into a more 
conventional rhythm.  Branch organizations such as the 
Adjutant General, Surgeon General, and the Quartermaster 
spent a great deal of time and effort standardizing their 
administrative activities and practices to best control the 
information of the Army in garrison.  Despite record books 
38 
 
and standardized forms serving as a baseline for military 
administrative procedures, individual War Department units 
began looking to mechanical advances to improve their 
information processes, especially those in the areas of 
logistics, health management, administration and personnel.  
Innovative equipment capable of dramatically improving the 
quality of unit correspondence, interaction, and 
information maintenance proved especially intriguing to 
those units whose very livelihood depended on the accurate 
and reliable transfer of information.  By the last decade 
of the century, much to the delight of magazine 
advertisers, the typewriter’s relative absence in Army 
doctrine was fast being overshadowed by the willingness of 
soldiers to test these mechanical devices in their units. 
     The Army’s use of the typewriter prior to 1890 was 
sporadic at best.  In fact, mention of mechanical 
typewriters in service documents before that time is 
incredibly sparse, highlighting a general lack of interest 
amongst service leaders in promoting their use.  In 1874, 
Quartermaster General of the Army Brigadier General 
Montgomery C. Meigs examined the first production model of 
Sholes and Glidden’s typewriter and saw its utility for 
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future army administration.45  Thereafter, though, Army 
records of the era that specifically mention “typewriter” 
refer more often than not to a person holding a clerical 
position.46  Other documents do, however, place increased 
emphasis on the printing of official documents as opposed 
to the reliance on those accomplished by hand, thereby 
signifying a shift toward preference for data recorded in 
typeset.  This in turn led to individual unit purchases of 
typewriters.  As the haphazard purchasing and utilization 
of typewriters increased throughout the service, it became 
incumbent upon War Department leaders to ensure future 
                                                          
45 Erna Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Army: A History 
of the Corps, 1775-1939 (Washington: Center of Military 
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Cunningham Meigs," Scientific American 66 (1892), 71. 
 
46 Reports of Committees of the Senate of the United States 
for the First Session of the Fiftieth Congress, 1887-
88 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1888), 130; 
Register of the War Department: January 1, 
1889. (Washington: [s.n.], 1889), 139, 154, 176. Testimony 
before the Joint Commission to Consider the Present 
Organizations of the Signal Service, Geological Survey, 
Coast and Geodetic Survey, and the Hydrographic Office of 
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Public Service in Said Bureaus, (Washington: Government 
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Investigate the Methods of Business in the Executive 




equipment use fell within an Army operational standard.  
Therefore, the Army began issue regulations.47 
     The Army’s initial attempt to regulate and record 
typewriter usage appears in various War Department 
directives published in the latter half of the 1880s.48  
Over the next several decades, thousands of typewriters 
from a myriad manufacturers were unsystematically acquired 
by headquarters and field units depending on their needs 
and resources at the time.  Between 1892 and 1920, Army 
reports and directives show a steady increase in typewriter 
usage, especially in administratively heavy organizations 
such as the Quartermaster Department, Office of the Surgeon 
General, Adjutant General, Corps of Engineers, and Signal 
Corps.  Moreover, throughout this period, calls for 
typewriters, typewriter stands, paper (both letterhead and 
                                                          
47 This information derives from Annual Reports of the War 
Department (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1885), 
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plain), ribbons, machine oil, brushes, and cases are 
scattered throughout the requirements of field units.49  
Since administrative machine usage remained predominately 
unit-based, shifting from handwritten records to a more 
formal, typewritten form of documentation varied from unit 
to unit.  When to change across the board, as well as how 
and why, would all become questions for a War Department 
consistently in transition. 
    Prior to World War I, perhaps the clearest indication 
of the typewriter’s acceptance in the Army is found in the 
regulatory vernacular itself.  Towards the end of the 
nineteenth century, administrative doctrine utilized the 
term “writing” in an all-encompassing fashion, implicitly 
refusing to a draw distinction between handwritten and 
mechanized print-based correspondence.  While it was 
implied that Army clerks should have access to typewriters 
                                                          
 
49 For a sample of this guidance, see Property and General 
Regulations of the Signal Corps, U.S. Army. (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1898); Manual for the 
Quartermaster Corps, United States Army, 1916. (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1917); General, Property, and 
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Army. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1915); 
Manual for the Medical Department (Washington: Government 
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Engineers to the Secretary of War [upon the] Improvement of 
Cumberland River, Tennessee and Kentucky, and of Obion and 
Forked Deer Rivers, Tennessee. (Washington: s.n., 1896). 
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by the early twentieth century, there was no standing 
requirement for most paperwork to be typed.50  As late as 
1916, the Manual for the Quartermaster Corps directs 
soldiers to complete supply forms and correspondence by 
dictating they “so state in writing,” “write upon the 
discharge” and “write the words,” with no mention of which 
writing method – handwritten or typewritten – to utilize.51  
Meanwhile, regulations further stated that blank forms 
contain spaces “of such size as to permit [information] 
being typewritten on an ordinary machine,” yet said nothing 
explicitly about these spaces being filled with typed 
information.52  Thus, although the Army grew more accustomed 
to machine-written documentation, typewriter use remained a 
matter of individual preference influenced by industrial 
standards and marketing campaigns.  
     On occasion, it did become necessary for operational 
Army regulations to mention the typewriter by name.  
Although infrequent in the context of the voluminous amount 
of directives issued during this period, these certain 
                                                          
50 James Alfred Moss, Army Paperwork: A Practical Working 
Guide in Army Administration (Menasha, WI: G. Banta, 1917), 
214. 
 
51 Manual for the Quartermaster Corps, United States Army, 
1916, 234, 311-324. 
 
52 Ibid, 58. 
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regulations aimed to provide guidance concerning typewriter 
use within Army organizations.  For instance, Army courts 
martial instructions specify that if a typewriter is used 
that the court must utilize a “copyable ribbon” when 
practicable to save time and labor when making copies.53  
Other regulations, meanwhile, set strict limits on 
typewriter use.  By direction of the Secretary of War, 
typewriter use was prohibited among payroll disbursing 
officers when filling out checks due to the belief that 
typewriter ink could be erased and/or changed more easily 
than ink on handwritten checks.54  In another case, the 
Quartermaster General ruled in 1912 that certain expense 
accounts “must be made out in ink” and would not be 
accepted if typewritten.55 
     In fact, at the start of the twentieth century, the 
verb “type” had not yet entered the Army’s administrative 
lexicon.  Instead, the service still used the verb “to 
write” in its regulations to signify the act of typing as 
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55 General, Property, and Disbursing Regulations, Signal 
Corps., United States Army. (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1915), 24. 
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well as handwriting, along with the more specific phrase 
“written on the typewriter.”56   
    Before America’s entry into World War I in 1917, the 
Army refrained from any service-wide programmatic 
acquisitions of typewriters.57 Although thousands of 
typewriters were bought in bulk by various units inside the 
War Department as the Army prepared for war, there was no 
centralized buying program or single headquarters 
oversight.  Thus, there was no unilateral allegiance to a 
specific machine or manufacturer.  Nonetheless, individual 
unit bulk purchases became significant for the typewriter 
companies.58  In fact, many manufacturers eagerly used their 
service contracts as marketing tools in their advertising 
campaigns.  Periodicals from this period show contract 
flaunting was not only a matter of pride but also the 
result of extensive market competition.  Oftentimes, it was 
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not enough to merely boast about contract possession; it 
was equally important to explain why a product was chosen 
over its competitors.  As a result, typewriter contracts 
made both the news and the advertising pages of periodicals 
and magazines of the day.   
     Examples of such flaunting ranged from prideful 
expressions of technological superiority to outright 
bragging over the impact of one’s product.  As an example, 
a Smith Premier Typewriter Company’s advertisement boasted 
in 1892 about receiving an order from the War Department 
for 150 machines.  Claiming that "improvement is the order 
of the age," Smith Premier asserted that this order was the 
largest typewriter contract signed by any government or 
corporation to date and was based upon the company’s “many 
improvements and superior mechanical excellence…over all 
other typewriters.”59  Just a year later, a Densmore 
Typewriter Company ad explained how War Department units 
had also adopted its product into daily operations, 
approving of their performance to the point that they 
renewed the contract two years later.60  By World War I, 
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industry leaders such as the Corona Typewriter Company had 
published advertisements boasting of their involvement in 
the nation’s war effort.  The company claimed that 
"countless Coronas are in daily use in many sectors of the 
great battle-fields…their ready portability, made possible 
by their light weight and compactness, appeals [to] the 
officer whose orders must be legible.”61  Although the Army 
left few details about typewriter use before the war, the 
typewriter classifieds of the day were rife with 
application examples.  For those outside the service, these 
advertisements were perhaps the only written notice of the 
Army’s adoption of the typewriter into daily information 
operations.   
     Congress, however, once World War I was over, grew 
increasingly concerned over how many typewriters the Army 
had actually purchased . . . and why.  In an address to the 
Congressional House Subcommittee on Appropriations in 
February, 1920, Army Major Charles Arrighi of the 
Quartermaster Corps reported that as of June 30, 1919, the 
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Museum, Fort Jackson, SC. 
47 
 
War Department maintained 47,748 typewriters in their 
administrative arsenal – 35,024 in use and another 12,724 
in stock or storage.62  With an Army projected as needing 
nearly 275,000 men following additional post-war 
reorganizations, the Major predicted the War Department 
would require approximately 28,588 typewriters for 
administrative utilization in the Army of the future, or 
roughly 1 for every 10 soldiers.  Moreover, he estimated 
that a requirement also existed for another 20,000 
typewriters for vocational training.  With an average life 
span of only three years, typewriters had in fact become an 
essential commodity at each Army post around the world.  It 
was Major Arrighi’s job not only to account for the number 
of machines in the service but also to report on their 
condition, utilization, and potential reuse.  Prior to the 
war, purchases of more than a hundred machines were 
considered major acquisitions by Army organizations.  In 
the post-war Army, however, usage and replacement 
requirements meant that acquisitions now ranged in the 
thousands with little slowing in sight.63 
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     What brought Arrighi to Congress was not so much the 
number of typewriters in use but rather the number 
apparently going to waste.  Representative William R. Wood 
(R, Indiana) led the congressional appropriations inquiry 
in which Arrighi, two additional Army officers and a senior 
civil servant carefully justified the number of typewriters 
required by the War Department in peacetime.64  At issue was 
the element of machine waste with three major categories 
under contention:  machines purchased during the war but 
unpacked and unused; machines used and operational but no 
longer in use; and machines broken and repairable but in 
storage while new machines were purchased.  On February 12, 
1920, Representative Wood challenged the United States Army 
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to articulate its official plans for the administrative use 
and care of its typewriters…but the Army simply did not 
have a coherent answer.  According to Arrighi, War 
Department leaders initially surmised that perhaps a ratio 
of one typewriter per 75 soldiers was appropriate, but that 
figure was inaccurate as it failed to account for the 
civilian workforce requirement.  Additionally, this ratio 
was devised for an operational Army, thus additional 
training and recruitment requirements would skew that 
number tremendously.  Overall, it became clear to Wood and 
his committee that there existed no coherent plan for 
typewriters in the Army and that thousands of these 
machines were going to waste, either being bought without 
reason or purchased with appropriate intent but not 
utilized or reutilized properly.  Despite his incredulous 
and unprofessional tone, Wood had uncovered a longstanding 
truth about the Army’s strategic administrative plans for 
the typewriter – there were none.65    
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     For his part, Wood seemed bent on teaching the Major 
and his associates a hard lesson in fiscal responsibility 
and program management.  With an Army preparing for a 
dramatic drawdown and serious economic constraints, the 
inquiry was certainly well-timed.  After questioning 
individuals from the Quartermaster’s Requirements Division, 
Purchase and Storage Divisions, and an agent of the Office 
of the Director of Sales, Wood was unable to extract a 
coherent answer concerning the Army’s administrative 
strategies and requirements.  Based on testimony, the Army 
possessed few valid calculations determining the clerical 
support required either per individual or per unit.  It 
merely based its projections on previous organizational and 
administrative experience.  Moreover, estimates submitted 
never determined if all clerks or administrators even 
required typewriters, or if there existed a more valid 
ratio or correlation between such men and machines.  The 
Army also grappled with the issue of whether its non-
clerical personnel required typewriters at their location, 
and if so, how many?  All told, the notional data presented 
by the four War Department representatives never satisfied 
the appropriations committee.  Instead, the testimony of 
Arrighi and three other officials only proved the Army’s 
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inability to discern between haphazard information 
processes and valid administrative principles.66 
     While the Army had no coherent strategy for typewriter 
use, the war did manage to become the impetus for one 
strategic decision regarding the service’s office 
equipment.  Of the information machinery improvements made 
in and around World War I, one of the most important was 
the centralization of Army purchasing.  Beginning in August 
1918, the service’s Purchases Office in Washington, DC 
became the clearinghouse for all office machine-related 
acquisitions through the end of the war and beyond.  In 
fact, between August 15 and November 11 of 1918 alone, the 
Army centrally approved the purchase of 23,378 machines of 
various kinds for use throughout the service.67  For the 
first time since they appeared in the marketplace, 
typewriters and other administrative devices could no 
longer be purchased on the whim of an individual unit.  
Moreover, the Army required that requesting organizations 
provide appropriate justification to the Director’s office 
for any administrative requirement they had.  Although the 
War Department had no official service-wide procurement 
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program at the time, this purchasing centralization managed 
to at least unveil the Army’s unit-level administrative 
necessities to its most senior echelons.  Furthermore, it 
forced the financially strapped postwar service to 
investigate alternative methods for fulfilling these 
mission-essential requirements, most notably the use of 
unused and reusable equipment.68   
     While reusing equipment was not new in the military, 
the coordination of such a process was.  In combination 
with the new centralized acquisition process, this new 
approach allowed the Army to capitalize on a centralized 
surplus accountability system that operated both inside the 
Army and out.  Inside the Army, the Supply Section in the 
office of the Director of Purchase, Storage and Traffic 
became the arbiter of service-wide machine management, 
determining how best to redistribute excess typewriters and 
other equipment stored throughout the country.  Originally, 
the Army installed the office in December 1918 under 
wartime authority to dispose of surplus property acquired 
during the “war emergency.”69  Following the war, rather 
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than contracting for new equipment straight away, the 
process tightened to ensure all new equipment requests were 
first reviewed by headquarters and then, after 
crosschecking the Army’s surplus registers, filled with 
devices held in excess.  If no machines were available, the 
Army looked outside the organization to the General Supply 
Committee of the Treasury.  There, the department 
maintained its own ledger of government-wide surplus 
machines and redistributed them as applicable.70  In both 
cases, in an effort to recover money spent in the frenzy of 
wartime preparation, any remaining excess machines were 
sold to other government agencies, or even to industry, in 
an effort to recover the costs of war.71   
     For the Army, the combination of equipment operations 
and maintenance, future requirements management, and 
service-wide distribution and redistribution of equipment 
resulted in a centralized office equipment management 
program designed to save money in a manner Congressman Wood 
and the appropriations committee had expected.  Their 
concern, however, was that the process took place too late 
in the Army’s purchasing scheme.  Moreover, they were not 
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convinced it worked as advertised in the first place.  With 
such a high volume of typewriters purchased in such a short 
amount of time, it is quite possible Army managers lost 
sight of both the purchasing and destiny of this equipment, 
much as the committee surmised.  Luckily, other 
administrative machines purchased during the same period 
were not nearly as abundant and could thus be better 
tracked.  Therefore, the Army was able to more accurately 
account for and regulate these machines.  Administrative 
records from the post-war Army depict an organization with 
a growing interest in information devices beyond the 
typewriter.  As it happened, the War Department’s 
complement of office equipment grew to include a plethora 
of devices designed to calculate, duplicate and record 
information, demonstrating a concerted effort to improve 
the information capability at the headquarters- and the 
unit-level alike.72 
     As mentioned, purchased quantities of these “other” 
administrative machines were much smaller than with 
typewriters of the era.  In fact, they represented less 
than two percent of the total administrative machine 
                                                          




stockpile in the War Department as of January 1920.73  
Still, their impact on the Army’s tactical and strategic 
information processes was invaluable at the time.  Despite 
their small number, these machines exposed soldiers to an 
even broader range of mechanization.  Instead of the usual 
power production or transportation machinery soldiers had 
grown accustomed to as part of the Machine Age, Army 
professionals were instead considering a relatively unique 
premise during this period:  the automation of manual 
information processes and data tabulation.  This 
information mechanization opened the aperture for a newer 
way of thinking about data recording and manipulation, in 
turn affecting administrative actions and organizational 
decisions.   
     Of the nearly 800 non-typewriting administrative 
devices in the Army at the end of 1919, the most prevalent 
by far was the mimeograph machine.  With over 560 of these 
mechanical units in place throughout the Army, the device 
became a primary means of document reproduction outside of 
the Government Printing Office (GPO).  Post-war mimeographs 
had evolved from their first marketable versions in the 
1880s, but their replication method of ink transfer 
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mechanisms and stencils remained similar in most latter 
models and proved to be an extremely compact and 
expeditious method of duplicating.  Derivative of Thomas 
Edison’s “Autographic Printing” patent in 1876, these 
devices grew in popularity due in part to their benefits 
over alternative methods, predominately tremendous cost 
savings and a lower skill requirement for users.74  Besides 
bearing the burden of unit reproduction needs, use of the 
mimeograph was vital to the Army’s rejuvenated periodical 
program.  By 1920, alongside more than a hundred circulars 
and bulletins reproduced by either the GPO or other service 
methods, the Army produced publications founded after the 
war using mimeographs.  Periodical reproduction by 
mimeograph spread well beyond typical users such as the 
Quartermaster and the Surgeon General.  Instead, 
participating branches now included chemical warfare, 
infantry, recruiting, motor transport, and even a budding 
new organization called the Air Service.75  Mimeographs made 
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document reproduction viable and affordable for individual 
unit needs, once again highlighting the capabilities of 
innovative equipment.     
     The next largest category of these office devices 
after document production tools was what congressional 
leaders called “computing” equipment, most notably adding 
machines, calculating machines, and comptometers.76  These 
early computational mechanisms made up nearly twenty 
percent of the War Department’s non-typewriting 
administrative machine stockpile with adding machines being 
the most prevalent.  With large volumes of calculable data 
in areas like finance, supply, personnel, and ordnance, 
units across the Army sought to purchase computational 
device to ease the numerous arithmetic duties required of 
soldiers who compiled statistical data or reported 
complicated statuses.  Although adding machines were the 
most common device in the Army, calculating machines and 
comptometers had greater capability, often performing all 
four arithmetic functions and even more depending on 
sophistication and design.  In all, by the end of 1919, the 
Army owned 130 of these computing machines in twelve of 
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fourteen regional zones across the country.77  For the two 
zones supposedly without them, the answer is simple:  the 
Army only counted machines purchased by the service in 
their reporting figures.  Units that leased this equipment 
were another matter entirely.   
     While a number of Army organizations believed they 
required some form of computing device, War Department 
headquarters was often not convinced.  At costs ranging 
from $125 up to $1,000 depending on complexity, these were 
incredibly expensive items given their sometimes limited 
impact on the unit.  Beyond the Army’s own skepticism, 
members of Congress additionally questioned the validity of 
military unit requirements, even accusing the Army of 
wasting machines already purchased and creating 
irresponsible requirements through which to acquire them in 
the future.  In fact, Congressman Wood moaned that “every 
fellow who has half a dozen figures to add up thinks he 
must have a computing machine to do it.”78  For their part, 
the Army’s Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Director 
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of Purchase, Storage and Traffic Division closely 
scrutinized these requirements following their takeover of 
the program in 1918.  In fact, staff members took pride in 
disapproving a significant amount of these requisitions, 
with no more than a dozen machines actually being purchased 
between November 1918 and February 1920.   However, this 
does not account for the machines leased by individual 
units.  In those circumstances, the requirement did not 
require centralized approval and thus was not part of the 
Army’s calculations at all.79  The end result, as reported 
to Congressman Wood and his panel in 1920, is a data set 
skewed by the nuances of the Army requisition system.  For 
years, the Army calculated their office equipment usage 
based on the purchase of such equipment.  The leasing issue 
remained an unresolved War Department data point for years 
to come.          
     In the end, what is missing from post-war records and 
congressional testimony is the complete extent of the 
Army’s mechanized office equipment following the World War 
I.  Records from the Director of Purchase, Storage and 
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Traffic Division in 1919 and 1920 show that besides the 
typewriter, mimeograph, and computing machine totals, the 
War Department owned an additional 100 addressographs, 
Dictaphones, duplicating machines, Ediphones, billing 
machines, and mimeoscopes.  Added together, this figure – 
approximately 49,000 individual devices in all – presumably 
accounted for all of the Army’s purchased office equipment 
during this period.  In fact, this was the data reported to 
Congress following the war.  However, upon a more thorough 
review of Major Arrighi’s figures, supplementary Army 
records confirm the Army used more mechanized devices than 
these initial figures indicate.  Besides these machines, 
the Army also owned a separate suite of mechanical office 
devices designed to enhance record keeping and other office 
services.  The number and range of these devices, which 
included bookkeeping machines, stamping machines, letter-
opening machines, sealing machines, perforators, presses, 
multigraphs, electrotyping and etching machines, are 
further evidence that by the end of World War I, Army units 
had certainly embraced the mechanization of administrative 
functions throughout the service.80 
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     Representative Wood’s assertion that soldiers were 
overeager to obtain mechanized administrative equipment may 
have been accurate, but nonetheless highlights the genesis 
of a new era in military information; that is, one of 
seeking more detailed information in larger quantities 
through mechanical and electrical data devices.  Wood’s 
accusation bears testimony to the fact that members of the 
Army sought out new and purportedly better methods for 
obtaining and exploiting information, whether it was 
necessary or not.  This desire to harness modern 
technological advances in an effort to ease an 
administrative burden has its origins in the period between 
the Civil War and World War I.  Very little of this was 
downward-directed by Army leadership at the time.  Instead, 
it was bottom-up, driven by the desire and curiosity of the 
average user.  It was that desire and curiosity that helped 
advance perhaps the most important innovation of the era 
and one that inevitably led to the more familiar beginning 
of the “information age” – the first computer.  The device, 
originally named the electric enumerator, would eventually 
change forever the way the Army looked at data compilation 
and manipulation.  More commonly known today as a punched 
                                                          




card tabulating machine, this groundbreaking device grew to 
become a catalyst for transformational information changes 
throughout the military and government over the next 
quarter century.   
 
Data Mechanization Systems: the Electric Enumerator and 
Data Tabulation 
 
     While Arrighi and Wood argued about the equipment 
totals required for the Army of the future, one thing was 
certain:  they only discussed the machines as individual 
office items and never considered a larger, more 
comprehensive data mechanization system.   On one hand, 
ledger books and forms got soldiers thinking about how to 
better record information, while typewriters and 
mimeographs got them thinking about how to improve its 
quality and quantity.  Even computing machines, to use the 
colloquial congressional term, looked to improve the speed 
and accuracy of data manipulation but always in a very 
singular, individualistic way.  What escaped the 
congressional testimony in 1920 was any conversation about 
capturing large volumes of information, assembling and 
organizing it, and then presenting it in a meaningful 
fashion – all with one device.  Such a device was well 
known in government circles as it had made headlines with 
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its publicized use by the Bureau of the Census beginning in 
1890.  What had been missing from the appropriations 
conversation was what was missing from the Army’s strategic 
vision for information – a data mechanization system.  The 
fact that the Army was already a pioneer in the use of such 
a system apparently escaped the attention of all concerned, 
soldier and civilian alike.   
     This effort began in earnest in 1888.  As the 
challenge of managing large amounts of quantifiable data 
grew in significance, industry leaders understood that 
incremental additions of mechanical calculators and 
enumerators were not an end solution.  What was needed was 
a system capable of somehow capturing and manipulating 
substantial volumes of data while reducing the amount of 
human intervention involved in the process.  In 1890, one 
such solution made the front cover of Scientific American 
magazine, the inside text boisterously detailing the 
success story of that year’s American Census and the 
incredible time-saving device labeled as the world’s first 
“electrical numerating system.”  This innovation was not 
news to the Army Surgeon General’s office.  Two years 
earlier, a senior member of the Vital Statistics Branch had 
recognized this system’s capabilities and its potential 
applications for health and mortality records.  The 
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system’s inventor was Herman Hollerith, and his primary 
product – the punched card tabulator – would lead to his 
co-founding of information behemoth International Business 
Machines (IBM) only a few decades later.  This machine 
would almost singlehandedly set the foundation for 
information collection and exploitation for the next fifty 
years.81    
    Hollerith’s journey began years before the Army called 
on his assistance.  Long before his tabulator took on both 
the Surgeon General and the Census Bureau projects, the 
inventor shopped his innovation across several northeastern 
states shortly after applying for his first patent in 1884.  
He began his quest modestly, designing his first device to 
“simplify and thereby facilitate the compilation of…various 
kinds of statistics.”82  Originally a paper tape-driven 
system akin to the telegraph, it soon became obvious that 
any long-term utilization required a more durable 
documentation medium.  Thus, he rejected his earlier tape-
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based system in favor of a medium more closely resembling 
that used by French weaver and inventor Joseph Marie 
Jacquard and his famous loom – i.e., the punched card.83  As 
the decade progressed, Hollerith looked for customers 
requiring large volume statistical computation, eventually 
finding several in the New York area railroad and health 
industries.  Working with the health departments in 
Baltimore, the state of New Jersey and New York City proved 
fortuitous as the device clearly had other health-related 
applications.84  Moreover, thanks to a preexisting 
relationship with one of the Army’s senior officers in the 
Vital Statistics Branch, news of his successes did not have 
to travel far.85  As unit leaders sought to prioritize the 
importance of preventive health statistics, they recognized 
the potential in Hollerith’s system.  By 1888, the decision 
was made to address the inventor formally.86 
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     Approaching Hollerith as the year drew to a close 
illuminated two primary concerns harbored by the Vital 
Statistics branch:  capability and cost.  First, the Army 
wanted to ensure the device not only worked as advertised, 
but also could handle the sizeable data fields their 
records and analyses required.  To accomplish this, 
Hollerith had to change the design of his punched cards to 
allow aggregate combinations, thus permitting more detailed 
data in greater numbers.  Then, in an effort to prove the 
solution’s effectiveness, he would have to test the new 
system using historical data from his New York City 
application.  As time would show, both the card redesign 
and testing platform worked to the Army’s satisfaction.  
Still, there remained the issue of cost.  Spending money on 
a relatively unproven technology was a risky proposition 
for such a small branch deep inside a resource-constrained 
Army.  Accordingly, the inventor applied a different albeit 
common business model – an equipment lease – to allow the 
Surgeon General of the Army to keep costs down while 
keeping interest up.87  The Army’s total lease cost was only 
$1000 per unit, plus the cost of the punched cards 
themselves.  In September 1888, the War Department agreed 
                                                          




to the lease and contracted with Hollerith for the 
compiling of medical and casualty statistics.  Although 
this was only a small application almost completely out of 
the purview of most Army leaders, it was nevertheless 
incredibly significant; after all, regardless of its scope, 
it was the earliest known implementation of this technology 
in the military.88   
     For the next several months, Hollerith focused his 
efforts on installing and preparing the system in the Vital 
Statistics office.  In January 1889, he wrote a letter 
informing the War Department that the tabulating equipment 
installation was complete and ready for application.  Over 
the next several months, members of the unit worked with 
Hollerith to apply prior health department lessons to the 
challenges faced by the Surgeon General.  By April, Captain 
Fred C. Ainsworth, the officer in charge of all medical 
records and statistics for the Surgeon General's office, 
appeared pleased with the capabilities of the punched card 
system.  In fact, although he was hesitant to endorse the 
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machine for Hollerith’s entrance in 1889’s Exposition 
Universelle in Paris, France, he did state the machines 
thus far were operating to his satisfaction.  Despite the 
general acknowledgment of success, Ainsworth still held 
reservations about their overall usefulness.  Matters 
worsened when a few months later, the War Department 
directed the Surgeon General to consolidate all Civil War 
volunteer medical records and muster rolls with all pre-
existing medical records in the Vital Statistics office, a 
task that helped form a new and independent Record and 
Pension Division.  By July, the Army had prepared over 
50,000 cards for the project, although it understood that 
such a large amount of data would require additional 
tabulating equipment.  As Hollerith’s contract was up for 
renewal, the question arose whether or not the Army would 
continue with the inventor’s system or go back to manual 
compilation.  In July, he received his answer: Ainsworth 
endorsed his contract and the Army renewed the arrangement 
until June of 1890.89   
     Despite the apparent success of the early punched card 
system, the Army soon realized it no longer truly required 
such mechanization, especially given the small number of 
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troops remaining on active duty.  In the early 1890s, the 
total number of military personnel on active duty dropped 
to a meager 27,000, thus abating the need for a complex 
tabulation system like Hollerith’s.90  Even with the 
apparent capabilities of a data compiling system, the Army 
felt transcribing each information incident from a report 
card to a statistical ledger remained a more realistic and 
cost-effective option than one requiring automation.91  
While the ledger system lingered well into the First World 
War, the advantages of card-based accounting continued to 
be an optional and functional component in Army information 
management.  Moreover, although the Vital Statistics Branch 
discontinued its use at the time, the application of 
punched card systems was no longer confined to a single 
office.  Even though the Surgeon General of the Army was 
Hollerith’s only viable and paying contract in early 1889, 
his fortunes soon changed.  By the time the Tenth Census 
began a year later, industry knew well of his system’s 
capabilities and possibilities.  Moreover, the exposure 
from the Scientific American article, not to mention the 
magazine’s cover dedicated to Hollerith’s innovation, gave 
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the inventor a running start into this new and budding 
industry.92  The Army may have temporarily halted its 
punched card operations, but the world did not.  It would 
take more than a quarter-century for the service to catch 
back up to the industrial standard.  
     The Army’s history of punched card systems between the 
end of the Vital Statistics project and the beginning of 
the World War I is one of extraordinarily limited use and 
sparsely documented implementation.  Without a directive 
from the War Department, individual attempts at applying 
this burgeoning technology proved relatively insignificant, 
which was ironic given the success of tabulators in 
industry during the same period.  Army historians maintain 
that until 1917, the implementation of tabulating machines 
was minimal at best.93  As war loomed on the horizon, 
applications in place remained nearly absent.  Official 
histories recount only one small tabulator installation in 
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the Surgeon General's Personnel Division used for locating 
specially trained officers and another in the Ordnance 
Department used for data compilation at its depots.94  
Meanwhile, veterans of Hollerith’s original implementation 
in 1889 were anything but pleased with the potential return 
of tabulators to the Army, even cautioning their superiors 
against further use.  They warned about card preparation 
issues, insufficient and ineffective data calculations, and 
an overall sense of time wasted in integrating a system 
that more often worked better by hand.95  Despite their 
reservations, the Division leaders understood something had 
to be done.  With Congress declaring war against Germany on 
April 6, 1917, the requirements of mobilization 
necessitated a better way to manage the flood of 
information set to pour into the Army.96   
     This deluge of information, of course, was originally 
precipitated by the mass of individuals mobilized to 
support the war effort.  When Congress enacted the 
Selective Service Act into law on May 17, 1917, the volume 
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of Army personnel data expanded like never before.  Over 
the next four months, nearly 10 million males between the 
ages of 21 and 30 completed their registration for military 
service.  Within the next year, another 14 million 
registered after the entry age widened to include men up to 
45.97  The job of tracking the medical condition of recruits 
fell, as expected, to the Army Surgeon General’s office.  
Unbeknownst to many in the organization at the time, this 
mission was about to transform into a landmark endeavor 
that included “the largest studies of men done so far by 
data mechanization equipment.”98  Of all the data tabulator 
applications in this wartime era, few are more indicative 
of an information sea change than the systems put in place 
to handle the Army medical establishment’s information 
crises at the start of the war.   
     In October 1917, the Medical Records section of the 
Surgeon General’s Sanitation Division was charged with the 
mammoth responsibility of processing, maintaining and 
distributing all Army sick and injured records of both 
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current soldiers and new recruits.99  The section bore the 
additional responsibility of preparing, compiling, and 
analyzing all Army medical statistical data for the 
numerous Surgeon General reports and analyses provided 
regularly to the War Department.100  That year, Major 
General William Gorgas, the Army Surgeon General, 
recognized that not only was the current method of hand 
data compilation inadequate, but that future uses of the 
Medical Records section required a more robust and capable 
mechanically-based information apparatus.101  With no time 
to waste, a “punch-card system” was installed with the 
requisite tabulating and sorting machines in tandem.  The 
capabilities of the Hollerith devices completely opened the 
aperture for what statistical data the Medical Records 
Section could provide the Army.  For the second time, the 
Surgeon General’s office was attempting to utilize 
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Hollerith’s data tabulation system for medical record 
administration.  This time, the volume of personnel data 
generated made this application a far more useful effort.102 
     With millions of recruits undergoing physical and 
psychological examination, the responsibility for compiling 
and analyzing this data fell to records personnel in the 
Surgeon General’s office.  Taking full advantage of the 
compiled data, the organization not only reviewed and 
evaluated the physical and mental limitations annotated in 
patient records, but also employed the information for 
manpower utilization and anthropological analysis.103  In 
fact, in some cases, the analyses went so far as to include 
a measurements study of soldiers’ physical characteristics 
as a precursor to standardizing and ordering uniforms.104  
At one time, the volume of material nearly reached two 
million records of those selective servicemen sent to 
military encampments.  As anticipated, data tabulators 
could more efficiently break down demographic and 
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physiological information in a manner almost unthinkable 
without mechanization.  In fact, such information became so 
detailed that the Army created reports that included 
“Defects Found in Drafted Men,” which broke down military 
rejection statistics by state, urban and rural 
environments, and another 156 population sections grouped 
into series of occupational, physiographic, and racial 
statistics.105  After thirty years, Army leaders had finally 
found an effective use for Hollerith’s data tabulators. 
     Between America’s entry into the war and the Armistice 
in November 1918, the availability and application of data 
tabulators increased significantly throughout the 
government, including the military.  Demand was so great, 
in fact, that federal officials required tabulators be 
diverted from commercial customers to federal agencies 
throughout the war emergency period.106  Behind this edict, 
of course, was the War Industries Board, the controlling 
agency for nearly all war supply activities.  The Board 
presided over the country’s purchases, industrial 
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production, raw material allocation, transportation and 
communication during the war.  To account for it all, they 
acquired and applied a host of data tabulators, the 
backbone of the organization’s statistical support.107  In 
fact, punched cards and tabulating equipment became so 
prevalent that, as Hollerith’s biographer wrote, “the 
punched card [became] a daily fact of life for thousands of 
clerks marshalling the nation’s food supply and other 
resources.”108  Authors Frederick Bohme and J. Paul Wyatt 
echoed this assertion in their book 100 Years of Data 
Processing: The Punchcard Century by claiming that “the 
nation implemented hundreds of these machines throughout 
its military, federal departments and public bureaus.”109  
Clearly, these devices were no longer a clerical oddity in 
American government organizations.  Instead, they were an 
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integral component of numerous information processes across 
the nation’s administrative landscape. 
     However, the statements above pertain to the 
government as a whole and not the military specifically.  
This distinction is important, for although the 
government’s data tabulator application rate did increase 
significantly, and that figure does include the military, 
the portion of that increase relative to the armed services 
is markedly small.  Thus, it is critical that historians be 
cautious in referencing the punched card tabulator’s 
significance during this period.  Despite a number of 
generalizations to the contrary, the military was not part 
of the industrial leading edge of this phenomenon, nor was 
it even a primary user during the Great War.  That 
distinction belongs instead to the insurance and railroad 
industries which almost singlehandedly kept Hollerith in 
business during this period.  Claims of ubiquitous data 
mechanization throughout the War Department’s information 
processes at this time are erroneous as well.  While there 
are indeed several cornerstone cases, including those in 
the Surgeon General’s office, the Army did not fully 
appreciate the capability and potential of data tabulators 
in this period.  The aforementioned uses of data tabulators 
are oftentimes referenced by authors attempting to closely 
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correlate the military and punched card usage during World 
War I.  Unfortunately, this small number of cases pales in 
comparison to the massive use of manual card-based data 
processes used throughout the Army leading into 1919.  In 
short, while the military remained involved with data 
tabulators during this period, to claim the existence of 
any widespread usage or monumental program is to distort 
the historical facts of the period.  
     Although the War Department was obviously not the data 
mechanization catalyst prior to the end of the war, the 
Army and its government and industrial colleagues did 
manage to lay fertile ground for its future information 
processes.  Thus, for Herman Hollerith and other tabulator 
companies, the time for widespread mechanized data 
compilation was clearly within sight.  With organizations 
across the public and private sectors jumping at the chance 
to implement these information mechanization devices, 
tabulator earnings tripled by the height of the war.110  
Hollerith, who decades before was trying to solve a simple 
problem in the Census Bureau, had almost single-handedly 
launched arguably the greatest information improvement 
device of the era.  Moreover, by the end of the war, the 
                                                          




seemingly insatiable appetite of government and industry 
leaders for more elaborate statistical analyses and more 
comprehensive data manipulation meant that the age of 
information had finally, and unequivocally, arrived.     
Data Transfer and Communications Systems of the Period 
     Beyond the processes and machines that dictated what 
information the Army thought was important as well as how 
they compiled and exploited it, a final factor worth 
examining was how the Army transferred its information from 
one participant to another.  As previously mentioned, the 
Civil War was a catalyst for numerous advances in 
battlefield communication, such as the wig-wag signaling 
system, field telegraph machines, and horse-drawn “flying” 
telegraph lines.  Following the war, the federal government 
disbanded the Military Telegraph Corps and gave the reins 
of the War Department’s communication system over to the 
Army Signal Corps.  In doing so, the application of the 
telegraph and its operational uses became more than just a 
Signal Corps concern; it became an Army information 
problem.  Now that the war was over, it was up to the Army 
to discern how to best utilize the telegraph, and why.111   
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     Prior to 1880, the military did not heavily regulate 
telegraph usage, regardless of whether it was through 
military or commercial channels.  By and large, telegraph 
applications were often sporadic and became a function of 
necessity, proximity, and cost, especially for those units 
based in the West.  In 1881, with the publishing of 
Regulations of the Army of the United States, the Army 
finally brought all telegraph procedures into one document 
and created strict guidelines for their application.  For 
example, the Army officially announced in Regulations that 
the telegraph was not intended to be a primary means of 
communication; that was saved for mail or messenger 
service.  Instead, under the charge of the Chief Signal 
Officer of the Army, soldiers were only to use the 
telegraph in “cases of urgent and imperative necessity, 
where the delay of the mail would be prejudicial to the 
public interest.”112  By these directives, the Army 
practically prohibited telegraph use, especially for non-
emergency reporting and information requests from higher 
echelons.  To the Army in peacetime, telegraph messaging 
remained reserved for official and immediate communication 
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purposes only.  Over time, however, growing Army 
requirements necessitated more expedient information 
transfer.  By the end of the decade, the rules and 
regulations put in place in 1881 were under scrutiny by 
both the Signal Corps and their telegraph clientele. 
     Over the next several years, the telegraph emerged 
from its emergency-only status to become an integral part 
of primary service communications.  In both 1892 and 1899, 
the Chief Signal Officer confirmed this notion in the 
Corps’ own set of regulations that controlled what was 
acceptable in modern Army telegraphy.113  For example, in 
the 1899 version, the directives stated that the realm of 
legal telegraphic operations included “[a]ll business of 
the War Department, its officers and agents, and telegrams 
authorized by competent authority, and all ‘official 
messages’ of the several departments of the Government.”114  
The Army tested this notion in their 1895 regulatory 
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anthology (printed in 1899) by directing that commanders 
notify the Adjutant General by telegraph of specific 
personnel actions ranging from positional appointments to 
escorting a legally insane soldier.115  Further examples 
extended primarily to the post quartermasters, especially 
in cases where the speed of information delivery was time 
dependent.  By the end of the century, the telegraph was no 
longer an administrative rarity for Army field units.  
Instead, as expounded upon in Signal Corps regulations, it 
was an integral part of the information landscape.116 
     Meanwhile, back in the 1880s, a new communications 
device – the telephone – began to interest soldiers on 
staff and in the field alike.  With thousands of telephones 
in public service by 1887, Chief Signal Officer General 
Adolphus Greely recognized the importance of the device to 
future service operations.  In doing so, he formally 
acknowledged the telephone’s military possibilities in 1889 
by including the technology in his annual report to the 
Secretary of War.  There Greely reported that the 
telephone, along with the telegraph, heliograph, and the 
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electric flashlight, were all “potent factors in civilized 
warfare” and condemned the Army for not applying more money 
into the research, development, and practice of these 
various devices.117  By 1893, years of politicking paid off 
as Congress issued General Order 20 approving and 
appropriating resources to the Signal Corps to purchase and 
maintain telephone equipment.  Although its application was 
still not widespread in the service, the potential uses of 
the telephone were characteristically undeniable to those 
who witnessed its capabilities.118 
     Five years later, the Army’s role in the Spanish-
American War proved critical to granting field credibility 
to the telephone.  In magazines dedicated to this new 
technology, telephone enthusiasts of the day bragged about 
a new service practice: 
[t]he often hinted at, frequently 
discussed, but never before realized 
field telephone in actual warfare has 
come and is come to say.  For the first 
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time in the history of the United 
States army, a long-distance telephone 
has been used for the purpose of 
handling troops in time of war.119 
 
In garrison, peacetime telephone usage helped transfer 
information among geographically separated staff offices.  
In one example at Camp Black in New York, adjutants, chiefs 
of staff, and field hospital commanders all had access to a 
newly-installed telephone system.  After testing its 
usefulness, the telephone proved extremely helpful in 
reporting operational and patient information, as well as 
providing “moral influence” over those not geographically 
stationed at the same location.  According to one source, 
in almost every branch of government, telephone service 
increased between 1898 and 1899.120  Even as telegraph usage 
continued to increase throughout the service, the telephone 
endured as an operational alternative throughout the era. 
     Finally, as the Aeronautical Division was coming into 
existence, another communications innovation became the 
talk of both the operational and administrative communities 
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in the Army – the radio.  Originally known as “wireless 
telegraphy,” it appeared to service leaders that radio 
communication provided the answer to the myriad wire 
constraint issues suffered in telegraph and telephone 
operations.  At least, that was the original leadership 
expectation.  Although it would take years for wireless 
telegraphy and spark-gap technology to play an integral 
part in Army operations, the potential of radio technology 
kept departmental leaders interested and engaged in 
wireless telegraphy projects.   With maritime communication 
and safety a major potential application for this 
technology, the Navy took the lead role in radio 
communication endeavors.  As it was, despite initial 
interest, the Army was still developing current 
communications applications via telegraphs and telephones.  
Realistically, how interested servicemen were in radio was 
a factor completely dependent on unit leadership.121  
     As it turned out, that leadership – predominately in 
the Army’s Signal Corps – remained engaged throughout the 
initial technology indoctrination process.  For instance, 
at the first international wireless telegraphy conference 
in Berlin in 1903, Chief Signal Officer Greely was part of 
                                                          




the select group that helped produce international 
protocols for future civilian and military applications.  
Three years later during a second conference in Berlin, 
Greely’s successor and air arm-founder Chief Signal Officer 
James Allen attended.  While new to the position, Allen 
impressively contributed to the conversation by helping 
create radio operations policy.  Even further, Allen helped 
define the radio’s military usefulness to the point that it 
found its way into Cuban operations in 1906 and Philippine 
operations in 1907.  Although clearly in its infancy, the 
Army did not squander its opportunity to begin integrating 
radio into the operational elements of the service.122  
     Over the half-century that separated the Civil War and 
World War I, the means by which the Army transmitted its 
information changed dramatically.  As the years passed, the 
ability to move data more rapidly grew at nearly the same 
speed as the requirements to do so.  In the beginning, the 
Civil War proved that visual signaling and telegraph 
requirements could be more effective information 
transmission methods (at times) than mail, messenger, or 
carrier pigeon.  By the end of the era, the Army possessed 
a wide variety of transmission methods that ran the 




spectrum of technological capability.  Operationally, as 
shown by its regulation in Army documents, the 
functionality and importance of each transmission method 
most often depended on the speed and cost of those methods 
that superseded them.  Still, two things appeared 
abundantly clear to military leaders at the beginning of 
World War I:   first, that technological advances in 
information transmission would continue into the future, 
and second, that they would be driven by the incessant 
desire to improve on the communications status quo.  
Conclusion 
     In 1864, Captain August Kautz of the Sixth U.S. 
Calvary wrote an official compendium detailing the proper 
methods for managing the books, records, and accounts 
required of an Army unit administrator.  Entitled The 
Company Clerk:  How and When To Make Out All The Returns, 
Reports, and Other Papers, and What To Do With Them, 
Kautz’s compendium stressed the importance of the 
administration business, noting that current regulations 
failed to properly guide clerks and other data keepers on 
the proper methods of recording and reporting the unit’s 
88 
 
vital information.123   What the Army needed, the captain 
wrote, was a handbook that explained not only what data – 
or as he termed, “administrative matters” – was required, 
but also how to process it.124   
     Army Colonel James Moss’ 1917 attempt at a similar 
compilation echoed several of the key themes Kautz had 
developed over a half-century earlier.  In Army Paperwork, 
A Practical Working Guide in Army Administration, Moss 
emphasized the indispensable nature of paperwork in Army 
operations, signifying that without ensuring its accuracy 
and completeness, the information dispensed across the 
service would be all but useless, wasting time, resources, 
and energy.  To the Colonel, the documentation, 
exploitation, and transfer of information was as essential 
to the military profession as any other function inside the 
Army.  Thus, “the man behind the desk” who was denied the 
glamor of battle or popular favor of the war hero could 
live with the solace of knowing that without the 
information he maintained and provided, the “man behind the 
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gun” would fail.125  As Moss concluded, Army paperwork and 
the information contained within it was “less spectacular 
though no less important” than any other detail in military 
operations.126   
     By themselves, these two documents illustrate a pair 
of important truths:  one, information requirements 
remained a consistent and often disjointed Army issue in 
the 53 years that separated them; and two, the absence of 
direction from the Army’s senior leadership that allowed 
two comparatively junior officers to act independently 
shows that information and administrative operations had 
not earned the former’s full attention.  Throughout this 
chapter, example after example of information environment 
modifications – from registers and typewriters to punched 
card tabulators and telegraphs – demonstrate how the Army’s 
most senior leadership neglected to proactively centralize 
or coordinate a data management strategy for the service.  
Instead, branch leaders like those from the Quartermaster, 
the Signal Corps, the Surgeon General and the Adjutant 
General culled together processes and procedures as best 
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they could, often clamoring for additional resources to 
accomplish their mission.  The Army during this period 
functioned, but certainly not cohesively.   
     These often independently driven changes and decisions 
at the branch- or unit-level became problematic for the 
service.  For example, haphazard unit typewriter purchases 
throughout the late 1800s meant a lack of unit 
standardization.  This difference in standards caused a 
number of concerns across the Army, most especially those 
resulting in administrative training issues where unit 
transfers potentially meant completely relearning 
information-related duties.  Another example occurred in 
1899, by which time telegraph usage standards varied by 
unit, branch, and staff.  Not only had the Adjutant General 
and Signal Corps published competing regulations, but also 
inside regulatory anthologies like Regulations of the Army 
of the United States were various directives that 
contradicted one another.127  In one final example, the 
Surgeon General’s relative failure to fully incorporate 
Hollerith’s card tabulating system into hospital 
information operations denoted a near failure of the data 
                                                          
127 As referenced in Regulations for the Operation and 
Maintenance of United States Military Telegraph Lines and 




mechanization concept itself.   This resulted in ill-will 
among the medical statistics community that permeated the 
mechanization discussion a quarter-century after this 
initial project.  The Army had issues that needed solving, 
but attempting to resolve them at lower unit- and branch-
levels only caused more challenges for the service later 
on.   
     Fortunately, however, some of the outcomes that 
derived from these uncoordinated and provincial activities 
still managed to benefit the service.  First, during the 
many conflicts and campaigns that arose between the 
Spanish-American War and World War I, wartime operations 
were significantly benefited by the compilation of Army 
regulations and the standardization of information 
processes.  Likewise, although the volume of data 
traversing the service was massive, especially given the 
reporting needs codified in the late 1800s, such 
information in the right hands allowed Army leaders to make 
more intelligent decisions than ever before…or at least, 
more informed ones.  This was especially true for the 
Quartermaster, who between 1865 and 1898 managed to develop 
a staggering array of supply and clerical forms that 
captured a tremendous amount of data for the Corps.  From 
that data, the operational, logistical, and administrative 
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decisions made both by Quartermaster and other branch 
leaders were based on facts as far as possible.  Last, such 
intensive data collection was helpful to officers and 
civilians who fought for resources and defended programs in 
front of an assortment of congressional committees.  As 
noted earlier in the chapter, the case of Major Arrighi and 
post-war typewriter purchases highlights that data 
collection and exploitation measures proved quite helpful.   
     Looking back, there clearly was no Army information 
strategy during this period, even though there were clear 
attempts to act as if one existed.  Army branch and staff 
organizations, each with its own purpose and directives, 
often followed their own path to gathering, exploiting, and 
transferring information within a set of relatively 
innocuous macro-level constraints.  This lack of strategic 
forethought or regulatory vetting process on the part of 
the Army senior leadership speaks to the general lack of 
cohesiveness in the service following the Civil War, much 
as General Sherman pointed out.  Given the amount of debate 
in Congress over what the Army did, its size, or its very 
existence, this disorganization is not surprising.  
Moreover, for those who have overgeneralized the Army’s 
lines of responsibility or misinterpreted the connections 
between organizations, this chapter challenges this false 
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sense of a singular, unified Army and replaces it with the 
notion that each unit – oftentimes by whatever means 
available – did what it could to improve its operational 
and administrative information status.  Using their data as 
a critical resource, these organizations overcame disorder, 
inadequate leadership, and inept guidance to eventually 
become a deciding military factor during the World War I.128 
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Information Standardization, Data Mechanization, 
and Statistical Control, 1907-1947 
 
    To properly understand the early history of the United 
States Air Force, it is important to explore the advances 
and decisions made using information management and 
technology as these were integral to the service’s 
development and operation.  In service narratives that tend 
to highlight successive aviation achievements, data 
management and mechanization often fail to emerge as 
significant themes.  However, these fields underpinned a 
great deal of the operational and organizational change 
that supported military aviation in its early decades.  
Examining the history of service data management and 
mechanization is therefore important to a comprehensive 
understanding of how the organization used its information 
for its operational and administrative needs and how in 
turn this affected the organization’s development as a 
service over these four critical decades. 
     The early U.S. military aviation component developed 
within a growing culture of information standardization 
that carried over from its Signal Corps origins.  Like 
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other Army components, the burgeoning air arm repeatedly 
sought to identify what information it required and then 
determined how best to generate it, albeit arguably not 
always in the most effective or efficient manner.  A large 
part of the resulting information generation involved the 
application of business machines and data management 
systems we construe today as information technology.  These 
advancements and improvements were pivotal factors in the 
development of new operational capabilities, organizations, 
and processes at both the unit and service level.   
     However, these were not the only factors affecting the 
air service’s growing information requirements.129  Although 
information technology did progress significantly during 
this period, some service processes remained married to 
manual systems and regulatory control in operational 
management.  Throughout this period, airmen relied upon the 
application of paper-based information forms and 
procedures, manual accountability systems, and hand-
calculated data/statistical analysis in order to meet their 
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information needs.  By the end of World War II, information 
management using both technological and manual systems was 
a fundamental component of Army aviation operations and 
administration. 
     This chapter demonstrates how, from 1907 to 1947, the 
management and application of information in the Army’s air 
arm played an essential role in the service’s development 
and operation. From aviation specific forms and procedures, 
to manual and punched-card inventory and reporting systems, 
to a service-wide statistical control and analysis system, 
the Army’s aviation service developed its information 
capabilities to help train, equip, and employ its forces 
both in-garrison and at war. As the air arm grew from a 
three-man office to more than a two-million-airmen 
organization, more timely and expansive information 
generation and processing for logistical, administrative 
and other purposes evolved.  Explaining how and suggesting 
possible reasons why this evolution occurred will 
demonstrate both the way information was pivotal the growth 
of the Air Force and the extent to which technological 
development in the arm was not simply a matter of 
progressively more powerful and complex aero engines and 




Information and Mechanization in the Air Service 
     World War I afforded the War Department a tremendous 
opportunity.  No longer manpower or fiscally constrained as 
in years past, the Army was able to use wartime authority 
to rebuild its organization, revamp its procedures and 
retool its operations and supporting equipment for the 
first time in decades.  Administratively, several branches 
used the opportunity to assign and improve information 
gathering, dissemination, and archival methods, given that 
pre-war requirements were but a fraction of wartime 
responsibilities.  As business machines and data 
mechanization became more prevalent in corporate and other 
circles, some branches already accustomed to organizing and 
manipulating large volumes of data did not hesitate in 
adopting these advancing technologies.  Although the 
military was certainly not keeping pace with its industrial 
and government counterparts, the parity achieved both 
during and after the war proved it was not blind to 
opportunity.130 
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     Between 1907 and 1918, the history of early military 
aviation information processing is quite similar to that of 
the United States Army as a whole during the same period.  
From its origins in August 1907 until it reorganized as the 
Aviation Section of the Signal Corps in July 1914, few 
information processes of the air arm differed from standard 
War Department procedures.131  This pattern changed only 
slightly in the years leading up to America’s entry into 
World War I despite explicit efforts to single out 
aviation-specific issues.132  At the time, there appeared 
little need to forsake most regular Army information 
procedures, especially given the seemingly ancillary nature 
of air applications in either a wartime or peacetime 
                                                          
Burroughs, and Remington Rand and the Industry They 
Created, 1865-1956 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1993), 11-14.   
 
131 Evidence in this paragraph is derived from conversations 
with members of the Adjutant General, Quartermaster and 
Signal Corps historians of the U.S. Army between November 
2012 and February 2013.  Specifically, until the Army 
Reorganization Act in 1912, few administrative processes 
like these were accomplished Army-wide. 
   
132 For example, in 1917 the Army published a completely 
separate equipment manual for the Aviation Section of the 
Signal Corps.  See Unit Equipment Manual for the Aviation 
Section, Signal Corps. (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1917), 17, and Annual Report of the Secretary of 





environment.  After all, as the country entered the First 
World War in 1917, the American military ranked fourteenth 
among nations with an aerial military component and could 
boast little more than few dozen airmen fully capable of 
flying.  Thus, improving information efficiency and data 
gathering was hardly a dominant goal in the air arm leading 
up to the war.  In some respects, early airmen considered 
themselves fortunate just to have the equipment and 
procedures they had.133  
     This is not to say there was no effort on the part of 
airmen to establish their own information environment.  All 
things considered, air officers appeared to understand from 
the start that there existed a need for certain levels of 
documentation and information control, mechanized office 
equipment, and effective administrative processes specific 
to military aviation.  Chief Signal Officer John Allen’s 
                                                          
133 There is no evidence to suggest the air arm dedicated 
any large-scale, extraneous effort trying to improve its 
data management procedures during this time, although steps 
were clearly taken to ensure aero-specific requirements 
were not neglected.  The primary focus on the unit, 
especially during such austere years as between 1908 and 
1913, was establishing the unit as a viable function of the 
Army.  See Martha Byrd, Chennault: Giving Wings to the 
Tiger (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1987), 18-
20; and Arthur Sweetser, The American Air Service; a Record 
of Its Problems, Its Difficulties, Its Failures, and Its 




first memorandum creating the Aeronautical Division 
suggested as much in ordering that all “data on hand will 
be carefully classified and plans perfected for future 
tests and experiments…and no information will be given out 
by any party except through the Chief Signal Officer of the 
Army or his authorized representative.”134  As the service 
developed over the next decade, its information needs 
swelled even as the organization’s future remained under 
consistent scrutiny from various War Department and 
Congressional committees.  Flight and accident reports, 
maintenance schedules, aircraft data, stock tables, and 
other administrative records all became essential 
information sources as the air arm defended itself, its 
requirements, and its expenditures time and again.  With so 
much at stake, the equipment, processes, and personnel 
responsible for recording and disseminating data tested the 
air arm’s information capabilities.135    
                                                          
134 This quote comes from the “Memorandum #6” in Hennessy’s 
book detailing the origins of an air arm in the Army.  
Juliette A. Hennessy, The United States Army Air Arm April 
1861 to April 1917 (Washington: Office of Air Force 
History, U.S. Air Force, 1985), Appendix 1. 
 
135 Specific information regarding flight records can be 
found in Hennessy, The United States Army Air Arm April 
1861 to April 1917, 28-89.  Although there is widespread 
discussion of these records throughout the manuscript, 
pages 28, 33, 34, 40, 54, 57-61, and 84 mention these 
records specifically.  Additionally, evidence regarding 
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     Beginning in 1912, Signal Corps reports and 
regulations contained sporadic hints of administrative 
measures adopted for aviation purposes specifically.  In 
that year’s General, Property, and Disbursing Regulations 
of the Signal Corps, mention of fixed-wing aeronautics and 
its materials is slight at best.  Compared to balloons and 
dirigibles, the regulation barely mentions heavier-than-air 
flying machines and associated equipment despite four years 
of military operation.  Nevertheless, the single reference 
to a new standard form – Army Form 277:  Record of 
Aeroplane Flights – speaks volumes, clearly denoting a 
conscious effort on the division’s part to create a unique 
data recording process codified by headquarters.136  
Meanwhile, aviation administration mirrored that of Signal 
Corps field companies with equipment allowances for such 
                                                          
typewritten documents as well as use of the telephone and 
telegraph in incident reporting and service documentation 
are also a part of this document.   
 
136 Balloons and dirigibles receive far more mention in this 
regulation than do the aeroplane, which as mentioned is 
known as "machine, heavier-than-air."  There is mention of 
handmade aeroplane tents, but otherwise little else is 
afforded the aircraft.  Page 161 contains the entire list 
of blank forms available for the Signal Corps specifically, 
of which Form 277 is listed under "Miscellaneous." Property 
and Disbursing Regulations, including Miscellaneous General 
Regulations, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 




items as typewriters, field books, letter boards, message 
envelopes, and pencils.  Meanwhile, for data processing and 
accountability, Corps ledgers and standard bookkeeping 
began giving way to a new method of data recording:  manual 
data card accountability systems.137   
     Intermittent use of card reporting and archiving was 
common across the Army before the war.  A manual derivation 
of the punched card tabulating system developed by 
Hollerith in the late nineteenth century, card records grew 
incredibly popular in many military fields, especially in 
the personnel, medical, and logistics branches.  The use of 
standard-sized cards with specific codes and recording 
standards allowed units to organize and manage their 
information, not to mention their associated resources, 
with considerably greater precision than the ledger-based 
accounting systems previously in operation.  For example, 
following the abandonment of Hollerith’s patient card 
                                                          
137 The equipment listing for Signal Corps field companies 
is standard, only deviating with organizations specifically 
assigned telegraph duty.  As for the manual data card 
accountability systems, a number of different uses are 
recorded in this document.  Specifically, the use of 
descriptive and assignment cards for personnel use, the 
civilian employee cable accountability record, and the 
daily report cards used in reporting issues and receipts of 
Signal Corps property.  See Property and Disbursing 
Regulations, including Miscellaneous General 
Regulations, 10, 30, 60-64, 76-82, 101-3, 31. 
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system in the 1890s, the Surgeon General of the Army began 
using manual 3½ x 8 inch “sick and wounded report cards” 
near the turn of the century to replace the decades-old 
Report of Sick and Wounded.  By 1904, the unit had nearly 
eliminated ledgers altogether and instead reported a 
soldier’s condition and treatment on cards maintained for 
hospital accounting.  Moreover, as patients transferred to 
other medical facilities, hospitals created “transfer” 
cards to ensure the data passed to the receiving facility 
without losing the information at origin. Finally, on a 
monthly basis, the Surgeon General’s office pulled the data 
from all hospital cards to report a complete picture of 
Army medical status and demographic information to its 
higher echelons.  While not an automated system like 
Hollerith’s, data systems like this set a benchmark for 
future information management processes throughout the War 
Department.138  
     For their part, between 1912 and 1914, the Signal 
Corps and its aviation units used card recording procedures 
                                                          
138 This report encompassed data ranging from illness and 
wounded figures to a census of the military population by 
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that generally revolved around either personnel data or the 
Quartermaster duties of supply requisition and inventory 
control.  At the time, these systems were often a function 
of Army General Order 92, a 1909 regulation requiring units 
to use a card record system to document all military 
correspondence.139  Although muster rolls and manpower 
registers remained personnel requirements at each post, 
this information still derived from descriptive and 
assignment cards originally maintained either on station or 
higher headquarters.140  At the same time, Quartermaster 
requirements for property accountability and responsibility 
dictated that Signal Corps Depots and Posts use a card 
record system to maintain order and discipline throughout 
their supply system.  By using daily report cards, depot 
stock cards, and storekeeper record cards, units maintained 
a record of all property available for issue.  
Additionally, by order of the Chief Signal Officer, depots 
used these cards to report the daily status of all property 
received and issued as well as the balance of items 
                                                          
139 James A. Moss, Army Paperwork, a Practical Working Guide 
in Army Administration... (Printed March, 1917). (Menasha, 
WI: George Banta Pub., 1917), 57. 
 
140 General, Property, and Disbursing Regulations, Signal 
Corps, United States Army. (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1912), 10; and Moss, Army Paperwork, a Practical 
Working Guide in Army Administration. 
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remaining on hand.  So enthused was the Army’s top 
signalman that he even bragged to the Secretary of War that 
the processes were “working with complete success and to 
the entire satisfaction of all concerned.”141  As a service 
to the units, this information additionally allowed the 
crosschecking of data between property records and daily 
reports while further ensuring stock accountability with 
detail as minute as the disbursing officer's order number 
and the item requisition number.142 
     With such stringent and task-intensive administrative 
requirements placed on Army units, the men of the 
Aeronautical Division and their Signal Corps superiors 
began to question the responsibilities of aviation officers 
and enlisted men.  In standard Army units, the 
responsibility for administrative duties such as personnel, 
finance, and Quartermaster often became either an officer’s 
additional duty or their full-time duty.  However, a long 
aviation training timeline and intensive operational 
duties, coupled with the harrowing possibility of death in 
both peacetime and war, made the administrative duty 
                                                          
141 Report of the Chief Signal Officer, United States Army, 
to the Secretary of War (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1914), 17. 
 
142 General, Property, and Disbursing Regulations, Signal 
Corps, United States Army, 10, 60-62, 76-83, 99, 168.   
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requirement for pilots seem unacceptably burdensome.  Army 
Chief Signal Officer Brigadier General George P. Scriven 
testified to this issue to the Secretary of War in 1913: 
In the assignment of officers to the companies it 
is assumed that [the aviators] are acting either 
as instructors or pupils, and it is highly 
desirable that they should not be included in any 
of the administrative or property work of the 
organization. In other words, the company should 
be regarded somewhat as a school organization. To 
each company, whether on a peace or war footing, 
it is most desirable to assign an officer as 
executive and property officer who will not be an 
aviator and not subjected to the unusual risk 
which such service involves.143  
 
Administrative duties were not necessarily seen as being 
beneath Signal Corps aviators, although over time some 
would draw such a conclusion.  Instead, to General Scriven 
and others in Army leadership positions, their job was far 
too intensive and perilous to burden further with unit 
clerical duties.  Instead, the General suggested one 
officer be assigned as an adjutant in each aero company or 
squadron in order to handle the unit’s requisite paperwork.  
Furthermore, a part-time clerk serving as a first sergeant, 
or perhaps even a supply or mess sergeant would also serve 
a similar purpose.144  Despite its growing importance in 
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Government Printing Office, 1914), 809. 
 
144 Annual Report of the Secretary of War 1913, 809. 
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aeronautical operations, information, data collection and 
the routine paperwork that accompanied it appeared to some 
as too bothersome to be handled by Corps aviators. 
     By 1914, the advance of military aeronautics had 
brought with it a corollary organizational milestone:  
Congress’ passing of Public Law 143.  The law, also known 
as the Act of July 18, 1914, effectively eliminated the 
Aeronautical Division in favor of an Aviation Section, a 
more discrete and autonomous organization complete with 
more manpower, resources, and its own special applications 
and necessities.  Over the next four years, Section leaders 
attempted to operate more independently even as 
congressional overseers showed little interest in funding 
their progress.  In fact, only months after PL-143’s 
passing, General Scriven’s request for an increased budget 
was met with so little interest that his original 
appropriation was instead reduced by more than fifteen 
percent.  Despite capturing the public’s interest and 
imagination, military aviation was stagnating.  The Army, 
having only purchased two dozen aircraft in the five years 
since the Wrights’ first delivery, operational aircraft 
were scarce as many became unserviceable due to accident 
and maintenance issues.  As Army aviation author Arthur 
Sweetser detailed shortly after the war, these issues were 
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the perfect indication of just “how purely experimental and 
negligible the service was considered at that time.”145  The 
challenge for aviation and Signal Corps officers was more 
than just survival; it was overcoming indifference in an 
effort to prove aviation’s capabilities and worth once and 
for all. 
     This indifference by Congress was neither based on 
ignorance nor factual misrepresentation; congressional 
leaders had more than enough information on the status of 
American aviation to comprehend what these budget decisions 
meant to the service.  Such facts were integral to the 
Army’s case and had been previously submitted to Congress 
in the Annual Book of Estimates published that same year.  
These volumes contained facts and figures from a host of 
services and programs on both the federal and state level 
and were indicative of the amount of data collection and 
exploitation achieved at the time.  The statistics were 
straightforward and abundantly clear:  the aviation 
expenditures of several other countries far exceeded those 
of the United States including five that equaled or 
surpassed the one million dollars Scriven had originally 
                                                          
145 Arthur Sweetser, The American Air Service; a Record of 
Its Problems, Its Difficulties, Its Failures, and Its Final 
Achievements, (New York: D. Appleton and, 1919), 17-19. 
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requested and three that exceeded his congressionally-
approved budget by more than a factor of twenty.  
Additionally, the information clearly showed that the Army 
also lagged behind in combined appropriations (a five-year 
total), numbers of aircraft and numbers of pilots.  
Overall, the Army clearly had done its job collecting and 
assembling the requisite information to make its case.  
Unfortunately, despite such evidence, Congress still chose 
to reduce the budget.  Although this effort did not deter 
the Army from compiling such data in the future, it was 
clear that even the best and seemingly most convincing 
information did not infallibly justify requirements in 
congressional eyes.146   
     Eighteen months after its creation, the Signal Corps 
took a major step in aiding its Aviation Section’s bid for 
organizational legitimacy.  This step involved the Chief 
Signal Officer’s approval of Equipment for Aero Units of 
the Aviation Section, a new service publication formally 
recognizing the unique equipment requirements of 
aeronautical units, including administrative items.  The 
notion was simple:  detail the requirements of forward 
                                                          
146 See Sweetser, The American Air Service, 15-18, and 
Congressional Serial Set, 64th Congress, 2d Session, 
December 4, 1916-March 4, 1917: House Documents, vol. 117 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917), 55-56. 
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deploying aviation units by identifying an approved, 
standardized set of equipment items.  What developed in 
this documentation, besides the obvious aero-centric 
necessities, were the distinct information needs of the 
unit.  As expected, many requisite items fell directly in 
line with the standard Army forms, folders, filing 
cabinets, and office utensils found across the service.  
What differed, however, provides evidence that unit leaders 
understood the organization’s advancing information needs 
and offers insight into the air arm’s attempts to manage 
its organization and document its progress.  These 
differences fall into two categories: equipment and 
processes. 
     Overall, the vast majority of information equipment 
required by the Aviation Section was hardly different from 
that of regular Army units and its parent Signal Corps.  
Through Equipment for Aero Units, the Chief Signal Officer 
set out to ensure the Aviation Section not only specified 
what different information equipment it needed, but also 
why.  The publication dictated that aviation units acquire 
special filing cabinets with hundreds of cards in order to 
file and preserve aircraft records.  Additionally, beyond a 
call for five miscellaneous-duty typewriters, it required 
$500 in blank forms, binders, and other assorted material 
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earmarked for keeping additional aeroplane documentation.  
The sophistication of maintenance administration grew to 
the point that even the Engineering branch required its own 
typewriter, presumably for both aircraft data recording and 
supply requisitioning.  While the aviation requirements as 
a whole did not massively differ from standard Army needs, 
the few equipment requirements that did diverge from the 
norm clearly established the exceptional nature of an 
organization determined to document essential data.147    
     The second area of difference came by way of 
information processes.  The service had increased the use 
and number of aviation-specific forms significantly since 
their first iteration in 1912.  Four years after the 
introduction of the Record of Aeroplane Flight form, the 
Army now had seven aeronautical-specific forms with four 
directly related to flight records and aircraft 
maintenance.  Meanwhile, it was the increase in aviation 
information recording that required specific attention in 
the publication.  Developed in aeronautical field units, 
these enhanced recording procedures ensured the Aviation 
Section documented the progress of flight at every turn.  
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Corps), Tentative, 1916. (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1916), 30-31, 49-51. 
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The procedures required every officer to keep an official 
diary to document each flight, designed to include 
comprehensive aeroplane and motor data for inclusion in 
section records.  Additionally, aircraft-responsible 
sections kept daily records of their own aeroplane and 
motor data, including descriptive lists for up-channeling 
squadron information.  Finally, unit expenditures and 
transportation vehicle data were also required, as were 
weekly and monthly reports that complemented those 
submitted on a daily basis.  In the end, each unit section 
kept a small record chest to hold the voluminous amount of 
spare forms and records required.  In this way, information 
recording became more than a necessity inside the Aviation 
Section; it was fast becoming a way of life.  In fact, few 
Army branches appeared as committed to such high levels of 
pre-war data documentation as did those in the aeronautics 
field.148   
     In 1917, the significance of articulating distinct 
aeronautical requirements went a step further.  This time, 
rather than directing a separate equipment publication from 
the Signal Corps, the Army’s Adjutant General published the 
document under the ultimate approval of the Secretary of 
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War – a sizeable leap forward in administrative oversight.  
While there are significant similarities between the two 
documents, the more recent publication abandoned building 
itemized allowances for organizational subsections.  
Instead, the Adjutant General centralized the Aviation 
Section’s administrative requirements under a special 
“Office Supplies” section, thus abating the need for 
individual units to account for their own exclusive 
requirements.  Like the previous Signal Corps version, the 
justification for an extensive card recording system (and 
requisite materials) remained firmly in place.  However, 
the Army tripled the requirement for mechanized writing 
instruments.  In this iteration, the service approved a 
complement of 17 typewriters as part of the standard 
aviation contingent, of which a dozen were portable 
machines built specifically by the Corona Typewriter 
Company.  This incremental improvement coupled with 
increased organizational oversight highlights the emerging 
importance of the organization inside the War Department 
and the persistent requirement to document its progress.149 
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     As indicated by an ever-increasing amount of 
regulatory guidance, Army leaders clearly spent a great 
deal of time before the war codifying the purpose, 
materials and procedures associated with War Department 
information processing.  As Army Colonel James A. Moss 
stresses in his administrative compendium Army Paperwork, A 
Practical Working Guide in Army Administration, paperwork 
was an essential albeit “irksome” requirement in the modern 
Army.  It was its primary means of recording, exploiting, 
transferring and archiving its information and now had 
become an indispensable characteristic of life in the 
military.150  Leaders understood that modern Army 
information processes were not only a factor in military 
and legislative requirements, but were also part of the 
“complexity of our present form of civilization.”151  As the 
ability to record data both increased and grew more 
efficient, so too did the requirement to exploit it.  For 
the Aviation Section and those seeking a more prominent 
role for military aeronautics, there existed an 
understanding that aero-specific documentation and 
reporting would remain vital to their struggle for greater 
                                                          






organizational legitimacy.  With the War Department leading 
all government agencies in adding new clerical positions in 
the intrawar period (over 5,000 new administrators in 
Washington alone), the institutional desire for information 
skyrocketed alongside increases in personnel and 
materiel.152  It became clear that the Army was becoming 
enamored with information and its corresponding technology 
and that information was becoming an integral part of its 
operations.        
     The scope and size of aviation’s information 
requirements remained reasonably small as before America 
entered the war.  As an organization insignificant in 
comparison to its great power counterparts, the Army’s air 
arm had little reason to invest copious amounts of 
resources toward improving or expanding its data processes.  
With few pilots and aircraft, there was little need to 
track pilot training or aircraft maintenance statistics, or 
separately improve aircraft materiel requisitioning or 
personnel employment records.  The meager budget 
allocations did not help matters either.  Overall, the 
Aviation Section was in a survival mode, just another 
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subordinate Army unit jockeying for scarce resources and 
operational respect.  Until the war, however, they received 
little of either.153       
     By the summer of 1917, however, that paradigm had 
changed completely.  America’s entry into the war afforded 
the Army and its air component the opportunity to pursue 
new technologies and methodologies without the intense 
fiscal pressure of peacetime.  In short order, the Aviation 
Section’s pre-war budget constraints began to vanish, 
usurped by the influence of wartime authority and public 
opinion.  Principal among these changes was President 
Wilson’s approval of the July 1917 Aviation Act.  Two 
months earlier, French Premier Alexandre-Félix-Joseph Ribot 
sent a cablegram to Washington briefly describing how 
aviation assistance from America “…would allow the Allies 
to win the supremacy of the air.”  To meet his challenge 
required unprecedented changes in both military and 
civilian aeronautics, with the Aviation Act providing the 
catalyst a mere fifteen weeks after America’s declaration 
of war.  For the first time since its inception, Army 
aviation leaders could finally begin building an air 
                                                          




service without the oppressive restrictions placed on them 
by an uncooperative Congress.154 
     The response to the Aviation Act’s was massive.  
Ribot’s 150-word cable requested aircraft and aviator 
acquisitions requiring over 640 million dollars in new 
funding, a seemingly absurd amount for an aviation program 
that had received less than a quarter of that sum over the 
past ten years combined.  With less than 300 planes in the 
government’s inventory at the time, the Act called for the 
production of more than 20,000 new aircraft, nearly half of 
types never before witnessed on American soil.  It required 
placing a thousand qualified men in training a month, 24 
new aviation training fields, as well as air parks, supply 
depots, and maintenance centers to keep the entire 
organization operational.  American aircraft manufacturers 
were tasked to produce two thousand planes a month in order 
to maintain the rigorous demand schedule, not to mention 
producing twice that many engines for aircraft and spares.  
Within the first six months alone, France specified that 
victory for the Allies required a flying corps of 
approximately 4,500 aircraft, complete with 5,000 new 
American aviators and nearly ten times that amount in 





maintenance technicians.  Ultimately, such sweeping changes 
challenged the organization and operation of the air arm in 
the war.  It also challenged how airmen handled their 
corresponding information requirements.155    
     Aviation leaders such as Generals George Squier and 
Benjamin Foulois were seasoned officers with experience in 
difficult situations.  However, the problem of handling the 
windfall of new aircraft, the selection and training of 
thousands of new aviators, and the operations of an 
organization ballooning to nearly ten times its former size 
was more than just a leadership issue.  This mammoth 
escalation in personnel and equipment created a host of new 
challenges for the air arm, not the least of which was an 
escalating amount of organizational information.  Until 
that point, the management of military aviation information 
was primarily an issue for higher Army echelon staff 
organizations.156  As the air service grew, however, its 
expansion necessitated the development of distinct 
administrative procedures ranging from aero-centric forms, 
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files and reporting procedures to a card-based personnel 
system that dovetailed into the larger Army system.  
Following the Aviation Act, Army leaders looked to new 
information and administrative procedures that were not 
based on a previous Army construction.157  For their part, 
air officers and their supporting cast began experimenting 
with data processes better suited to harness voluminous 
amounts of data, most often in the form of newer 
derivations of manual card-based data management systems.   
     Despite the continuing use of ledgers and registers, 
migrating to manual card systems became a universal 
tendency for major Army information processes during the 
war.  For aviation personnel specialists specifically, 
managing the growing horde of pilots and supporting airmen 
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Army. (Washington: National Publication-U.S. Army Adjutant-
General’s Office, 1919).   Throughout this document, the 
Army discusses how the onset of the war forced a number of 
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47, page 604 is entitled “Cooperation with the Aviation 
Section, Signal Corps and Department of Military 
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classification of air officers.  Also see Sweetser, The 
American Air Service…, 84-145.  
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was an alarming task.  In the first year of America’s war, 
the total air arm population grew from 65 officers and 
1,100 enlisted men to more than 12,000 officers and over 
130,000 enlisted men.  By mid-1918, the newly created Air 
Service had expanded to a size almost equal to that of the 
entire pre-war Army.158  With so many additional personnel, 
each with his own individual characteristics and background 
data, using a Hollerith tabulation system seemed a viable 
option for managing this information.  However, after 
nearly three decades of sporadic military use, some felt 
punched card systems were suited for little else other than 
figure calculations and were not a fundamental or necessary 
capability for large-scale data management.  Thus, instead 
of fielding its own data tabulation systems, the Aviation 
Section would instead borrow from the larger War Department 
effort of creating a single, manual personnel data system 
designed to handle the colossal amount of manpower pouring 
into the Army during the war.159 
     The rapid influx of troops put the Army and its 
aviation arm in a difficult position.  Recognizing the 
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issue early on, Secretary of War Newton Baker established a 
special committee to oversee the service’s growing 
matriculation and assignment concerns.  This group of 
highly-regarded civilians became known as the Committee on 
Classification of Personnel in the Army, responsible for 
tackling the Army’s manpower expansion challenges 
throughout the war.  Most notably, the committee 
recommended in September 1917 that the Army establish a 
manual card-based data management system built on 
identically-sized “Soldier Qualification Cards” to be 
universally applied across all branches. Replete with space 
for a soldier’s background information, education, 
occupational experience, assignment desires, and other 
pertinent data, the service strove to get all qualification 
cards completed within hours of a soldier’s arrival on 
station.  Moreover, cards were specially marked with 
orange-, black- or green-colored celluloid tabs to denote a 
soldier’s skill level in his given trade as well as his 
usefulness to the service. In June 1918, project managers 
refined the card system with simplicity and universality in 
mind.  Instead of an overbearing and complicated program, 
the committee members sought out a system that was easily 
cross-indexed, sortable between skill levels and trade 
sets, and would inevitably fit into a standard Army filing 
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cabinet.160  With qualification cards in use throughout all 
Army branches, air units specifically used them to 
integrate new personnel into the organization as a means of 
ensuring aviation procedures aligned with its higher 
echelon counterparts.   
     One area where the Aviation Section did require 
deviation, however, was in the selection of many of its 
enlisted airmen, especially ones designated for aircraft 
maintenance positions.  From its inception, members of the 
Classification Committee used their expertise to design 
tests for incoming soldiers that assessed mechanical 
capability and potential.  Nevertheless, air officials 
believed these examinations only validated general 
mechanical aptitude and did not discern between these 
individuals and those more qualified (or with the 
potential) for more challenging positions in aeronautical 
maintenance.  The Aviation Section convinced the committee 
in 1918 to design special tests to select soldiers for this 
specialized field.  The results were immediate, and the 
quantity and quality of airmen entering the air arm 
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profoundly improved.  Moreover, the mechanical capacity of 
incoming soldiers coupled with the diversification of the 
profession allowed enlisted aviation positions to 
proliferate into numerous subspecialties.  Whereas only the 
position of “Air Mechanician” existed before 1917, World 
War I saw aviation specializations develop in aircraft 
engines and wing fabric, in propeller making and testing, 
and in general aircraft maintenance.161  For those in the 
aviation organization not directly involved in flight 
operations, careers expanded in similar fashion to those in 
the Signal Corps itself, with positions in communications, 
engineering, photography, and weather.162  
     A similar evaluation and selection overhaul awaited 
the Aviation Section’s massively reinvigorated pilot 
selection program.  In general, the selection of new 
aviators both before and during World War I presented some 
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of the most significant data compilation challenges the air 
arm had ever seen.  Although exact figures vary, by the 
start of the war the total number of fully-qualified 
“flyers” in army aviation only amounted to approximately 50 
officers, although some estimates project that even a third 
of those were not considered completely competent in the 
air.163  From July 1914 to June 1918, the Army’s 
aeronautical unit processed 38,770 men seeking admission as 
Air Service pilots.  In some periods, as in December 1917, 
the application load grew incredibly intense with nearly 
3,000 candidates volunteering for examination in one month 
alone.  The administrative process became so selective that 
only 18,004 individuals made it past their initial 
screening, cutting the selection pool nearly in half.  By 
the time the Armistice was signed in November 1918, the 
U.S. Army Air Service had examined and trained upwards of 
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16,000 air cadets in their program.  No administrative task 
of this magnitude had ever been attempted.  Like the 
overall Army personnel system, the pilot selection process 
gave air leaders the opportunities to manage and exploit 
information in volumes the likes of which were foreign to 
the service’s short history.  And, once again, the method 
of data management became nearly as important a lesson as 
the information derived from the data.164         
     Although the air arm’s data recording methods were 
similar for enlisted and officer enrollment, the recruiting 
and subsequent information gathering processes for aviator 
selection were altogether different.  In the first place, 
the standards for aviation officers were incredibly high, 
calling for “men of the highest character” who were both 
“well-educated” and of “good physique.”165  Luckily, with 
aeronautical interest remaining strong throughout the 
country during the war, the number of applicants was 
staggering.  Thus, Signal Corps leaders understood they 
could afford to be particular when selecting pilots, even 
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in the face of the massive requirements levied by the 
Aviation Act.  Ensuring a thorough vetting process meant 
more than choosing those applicants who survived a 
stereotypical military training scenario.  Potential future 
aviators required a combination of qualification programs 
each designed to ensure only the most fit would eventually 
take to the air.  In fact, even the Adjutant General of the 
Army warned that neither schools nor competency boards 
should be the overall arbiter for pilot qualification as 
neither could perfectly determine who was truly airworthy.  
The final result was to be not only a test of the potential 
pilot’s aptitude and attitude, but also an extensive 
assessment of the service’s ability to manage the millions 
of corresponding data points that defined the process.  
Pilot selection was to be the largest information 
management program in aviation history until the Second 
World War.166    
     The amount of information collected on candidates 
journeying through the pilot selection process was 
staggering.  Each potential aviator provided substantial 
personal and professional information on his application 
forms in addition to the standardized data set required on 
                                                          




his Army qualification card.  This allowed examination 
boards to review an abundance of information determining 
everything from a candidate’s academic compatibility to his 
potential for courage and “zeal for risk.”167  The primary 
selection paperwork instrument during this process was 
known as a “Form 609,” a document that originated as a pre-
war medical evaluation form only to grow into a 
professional and mental examination document that included 
elements administered by Aviation Examining Boards.  
Through these forms, candidates provided answers to 
questions on family, education, business experience, 
athleticism, previous responsibility, and other forms of 
military or professional training.  Included in the Form 
609 package were no less than three letters of 
recommendation and the results of an oral examination 
conducted before yet another aviation board.  For each 
pilot candidate, the total amount of information required 
and compiled became a very daunting and invasive process 
that matured considerably throughout the war.168 
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     Aptitude data was continuously added and updated as 
prospective aviators navigated a gauntlet of intense 
educational and training experiences.  Beginning with a 
rigorous ground school, trainers tested and documented 
everything from aeronautical talent, to ceremonial drill, 
to wireless telegraphy knowledge.   By the time students 
made it through flying school, their cadet records 
reflected competency levels in flight theory, engine 
operation, aircraft rigging, navigational aids, 
reconnaissance and artillery theory, and a variety of other 
topics from bomb characteristics to general military 
paperwork.  Ultimately, despite being dispersed across 
forms, cards, and other assorted paperwork, enough diverse 
and detailed information existed on each cadet to determine 
his airworthiness.  Moreover, with so much concerted effort 
poured into each recruit’s evaluation, final graduation 
authority was not left to low-ranking officers but instead 
rested with the school’s commandant and the Chief Signal 
Officer himself.169 
     While air leaders designed the decision process to be 
both incredibly strenuous and selective, the task of 
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organizing, accounting and distributing all this 
information was still a chore in and of itself.  Therefore, 
to make this happen required managing this information 
throughout each process element.  For those military and 
civilian administrators who participated in this endeavor, 
pilot selection grew to become an exceptionally arduous 
procedure to adjudicate and was made worse by the vast 
amounts of paperwork required for process completion.  
Moreover, without any form of data mechanization or 
unlimited clerical assistance, the scale and scope of this 
effort was at times overwhelming.  After reviewing the 
pilot selection process in detail, one might question why 
the Aviation Section (and after 1918, the Army Air 
Service), the Signal Corps, or the Army did not introduce 
any form of data mechanization into this procedure to 
alleviate such a cumbersome administrative burden.  The 
fact is that punched card tabulators were, in fact, used in 
this process but not in the procedures previously 
discussed.  Instead, punched cards were used by another 
medical group in this process . . . one that was outside of 
the traditional military purview at the time.170   




     As mentioned in the first chapter, the Surgeon General 
of the Army used the rapid escalation in the number of 
recruits as an opportunity to exploit the personnel data of 
soldiers.  Encased in this effort was the Army’s 
psychological testing, of which aviation became an integral 
part given the newness and inherent danger of aircraft.  
The day after the United States declared war on Germany, a 
group of psychologists eager to contribute to the war 
effort formed a committee to address potential 
psychological problems in Army recruits.  At the request of 
the National Research Council, this “Psychology Committee” 
aligned with the Council of the American Psychological 
Association and examined ways to best utilize the expertise 
of the nation’s top psychologists.  Under the original 
direction of Dr. (and later, U.S. Army Major) R. M. Yerkes 
of Harvard, the group established a subcommittee 
specifically to examine the unique military problems 
related to aeronautical personnel.  Formally designated 
“the Committee on Psychological Problems of Aviation,” 
Yerkes selected this panel of experts as one of the twelve 
breakout groups to assist the war effort.  Shortly 
thereafter, they began work on selecting specific testing 
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methods and certifying the mental and psychological 
information captured on the Form 609.171 
     A year later, shortly after the Air Service came into 
existence, the aviation psychological committee continued 
to make substantial progress in its aero-centered 
investigations.  By closely studying the examining board 
and intelligence test data, committee members were able to 
discern valuable information on progressing aviation cadets 
as well as devise additional assessments to further hone 
their findings.  After a study of over two thousand 
records, committee chairman Dr. Edward L. Thorndike 
determined critical relationships existed between pilot 
success and a candidate’s age, social status, intellect, 
professional achievement, and athleticism.  From that data, 
the committee designed a testing and ratings plan for the 
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Air Service’s Personnel Procurement Branch to adopt in 
order to meet the Aviation Act’s goal of one thousand 
aviation cadets per month.  Still, even with such an 
advanced level of analysis, the processing methods remained 
a manual endeavor.  Although numerous accounts of the 
Psychology Committee recall the use of Hollerith tabulators 
during the war period.  Hundreds of clerks worked for days 
on end to compile, sort, and distribute the committee’s 
data throughout the remainder of the war.  It was not the 
finest hour for air arm information processing.  
Eventually, however, the toil spent during this period 
would become an exemplar for future systems generated 
during the next World War. 
     In the meantime, the larger Psychology Committee did 
manage to capitalize on its opportunity.  After culling 
approximately 200,000 records from a pool of over 1.5 
million, Major Yerkes and his committee of experts applied 
a Hollerith punched card system to statistically examine 
the progress of this subsection of Army troops.   The board 
compiled as much data into one card as they could feasibly 
imagine:  camp assignment, state drafted from, age, rank, 
military specialty, nativity, time in country (for foreign 
born soldiers), schooling, test scores, and most important 
of all – race, specifically White or Negro.  While 
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interesting and informative, the end result was a series of 
statistical studies that were not as groundbreaking or as 
helpful to the war effort as perhaps some committee members 
initially expected.  While the compiled material certainly 
provided a host of surveys and reports useful to higher 
echelons, the data remained predominately useful for 
selection and training procedures.172 
     Thus, by war’s end, data mechanization clearly existed 
as part of the Army’s information processing programs, but 
only on a limited basis.  Meanwhile, for the newly-minted 
Army Air Service, tabulation systems for inventory and 
personnel control were of even less importance in its 
overall information processes.  The qualification card, the 
Form 609, and the abundant amount of aero-specific tests 
and evaluations performed on recruits (especially pilots) 
remained the most enduring information control lessons 
learned from the First World War.  It would take several 
more decades, as well as a continuing fascination with 
statistics and data analysis, to entrench the use of 
punched card tabulators in the military’s air organization 
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as well as produce the need for information technologies 
more powerful than Hollerith ever imagined.    
Supply, Statistics, and Data Tabulation 
    The newly christened Air Service came out of World War 
I with renewed focus.  No longer driven by the operations, 
logistics, and support missions of the war, the service 
could now concentrate on standardizing and improving its 
processes and procedures in order to sustain itself as an 
independent Army branch.  Part of this improvement process 
meant taking a close look at how the organization managed 
and exploited its information.  In the post-war Air 
Service, few endeavors exemplified this effort as much as 
those undertaken by the service’s Supply Division. 
     In the winter connecting 1919 and 1920, Supply 
Division Lieutenant Edwin R. Page engaged in what one 
historian described as “undoubtedly one of the most 
important steps taken by the Air Service after World War 
I.”173  His junior rank notwithstanding, Page developed a 
new property classification information system that would 
become the backbone for aviation logistics processing for 
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the next thirty years.  By dividing all equipment and 
supplies into 29 different classes, this new program 
allowed logisticians to navigate a manual supply system 
that identified, stored, and issued supply items with 
relative ease.  Given the intricacies and disconnectedness 
of the existing system developed both before and during the 
war, Page’s methods were welcomed in the Air Service.  
Moreover, the fateful presence of then-Major Augustine 
Warner Robins in the same office truly brought the program 
to light.  Robins, now known as the father of Air Force 
Logistics and the namesake of one of today’s largest 
logistical bases in the world, helped take the system 
public, believing in it so strongly that some writers 
mistakenly give him credit for developing the program 
himself.   Interestingly, when Robins transferred to take 
command of a transitional air depot in the plains of Ohio, 
Page went with him.  It was there that the importance of 
information control was tested in the post-war Air Service 
through the service’s first true operational applications 
of data tabulators.174 
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    In 1919, small airfields, depots, and other service-
related installations peppered the countryside of many 
American states, and western Ohio was no exception.  Just 
outside of Dayton in Fairborn, Fairfield Air Depot served 
as the service’s supply clearinghouse, especially for the 
trainloads of excess airplanes, engines, and various 
unsorted aeronautical equipment shipped there after the 
war.  Only miles away, McCook Field was an up and coming 
experimental laboratory that housed, among a number of 
other organizations, the Airplane Engineering Division 
tasked with designing and redesigning aeronautical 
components ranging from engines to armament.  In the two 
locations, the Air Service developed some of the basic 
logistical functions required of an air arm, specifically 
the acquisition, supply, and experimental research systems 
of the organization.  To do so required the establishment 
and formalization of key information processes designed to 
ensure the most effective operation possible, especially 
given the financial constraints of the post-war Army.  What 
information the organization tracked, and how, became a 
principle factor in the behavior of the post-war 
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organization . . . a fact not lost on other service 
officers besides Robins and Page.175 
     In line with its wartime procedures, the Air Service 
put aside thoughts of mechanizing their data processes in 
favor of the tried-and-true manual card-based systems 
applied over the past decade.  At McCook Field, known 
throughout the service as an “information clearinghouse” 
for producing aviation-specific reports and bulletins, this 
meant that the statistical analysis and information 
processing required for these publications would remain a 
manually-processed endeavor.  For its airmen, this amounted 
to using tens of thousands of cards each month to 
operationally control information.  In July 1919 alone, the 
Engineering Branch at McCook used over 33,000 three-by-five 
inch cards just to monitor the phases of aircraft 
development programs.  Steeped in information 
documentation, a number of functional units under the much 
larger Engineering Division used this card system in 
coordination with other data “machines” and methods.  Using 
recording processes that involved blueprints, blank forms, 
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stationary stock, mimeographs, multigraphs, photographs, 
and a plethora of other documentation and also office 
machines, McCook airmen were able to publish the reports, 
bulletins and special orders required by the unit’s 
experimentation and engineering work.176   
     A few years later, Fairfield Air Depot contained more 
than 250 million dollars’ worth of government property 
registered on 120,000 stock record cards, each requiring 
continuous updating to ensure accuracy.  With Robins in 
command and Page on staff, the Fairfield depot became a 
supply repository for post-war aeronautical surplus, not 
only from inactivated airfields throughout the states, but 
also from the host of overseas depots established during 
the war.  Because so many war surplus items (both 
serviceable and obsolete) made their way to the depot, the 
amount of excess supplies requiring sorting, 
classification, and storage created “serious record-keeping 
problems.”177  In fact, it took well over two years for the 
operation to become fully functional.  The painstaking 
accountability process involved identifying, designating, 
cataloging, and indexing entries for hundreds of thousands 
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of technical supplies.  In all, it took a team of 350 
civilian employees nearly four years to annotate the entire 
system.  If reviewing the programs at McCook and Fairfield 
reveals anything about the Air Service during this period, 
it is that these installations relied heavily on manual 
card information processes.  Even more so, it highlights 
the importance of the information they generated and the 
service’s persistence in obtaining it regardless of cost.178   
     The effective maintenance of supply information after 
World War I shows just how important accurate and timely 
information was to the air arm.  However, methods employed 
also demonstrate a reluctance to make massive, wholesale 
changes to information systems.  As time went on, the 
reliance on manual card-based systems stood in even greater 
contrast to the mechanized data machines in use across 
similar logistical and administrative networks outside the 
military.  War Department personnel understood that 
eventually programs would include an either partial or 
completely mechanized information system.  The only 
question was when.  With companies adapting to modern 
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administrative technologies at a faster pace, the gap 
between the military and industry grew more noticeable with 
each passing year.179   
     In the decade following World War I, the commercial 
market for data tabulators and business machines in general 
grew even larger as new and improved variants enticed a 
growing pool of potential users.  Additionally, new market 
competitors pushed the prevailing technological boundaries 
as each sought their own niche in the fast growing office 
machine industry.  The American public was swept up in the 
phenomenon, with more school aged children signing up for 
typewriting classes each year and an increase in office 
machine and furniture sales for industry and in the home.  
In these early business machine years, companies such as 
Remington Typewriter, Dalton Adding Machine, and Powers 
Accounting Machine all competed for market share against 
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original standouts like Herman Hollerith’s Tabulating 
Machine Company.  Even the Census Bureau, which only years 
earlier had relied on Hollerith’s innovation for their all-
important decennial event, turned inward and created its 
own machine shop to build the equipment for its data 
collection and statistical needs.  In short, there were 
enough machines, with enough capability, with enough proven 
performance to satisfy many of the statistical and 
informational requirements of the military in the mid-
1920s.  The question of when the air arm would abandon 
manual systems and begin employing modern business machines 
was anyone’s guess.180  
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     Accounts vary as to the time and place of the first 
significant, aviation-specific data mechanization program 
in the air service.  There are some writings that place 
mechanical business equipment at McCook Field as early as 
1919; others suggest an operational application at Ohio’s 
Wright Field in 1926.  However, with documentation as the 
best arbiter of fact, perhaps the two earliest and most 
developed data mechanization accounts occurred even later 
in the post-war decade – in the Inspection Division’s 
Development Section in 1927 and in the Materiel Division in 
1929.181   
     Service historians note that beginning in April 1927, 
the Inspection Division’s Development Section tracked 
aviation trends, especially those pertaining to improving 
pilot and aircraft performance, by performing statistical 
analyses using the latest mechanized data equipment.  As 
aircraft enhancement programs progressed in the post-war 
military, the Development Section remained focused on 
studying aircraft accidents and forced landings by way of 
statistical investigation.  Moreover, the unit used these 
investigations to pioneer new standards for recording 
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aircraft flying hours, individual flying hours, and 
aircraft engine time.  The section took on the additional 
task of life insurance management, a task stemming from the 
unit’s original accident documentation mission.  Using data 
tabulation and calculations, these airmen were able to 
examine data quicker and with greater proficiency than ever 
before.  The significance of these analyses clearly 
revolved around the quality and efficiency of its 
information.  At the unit level, these data-focused units 
grew evermore significant as this information became 
essential to daily operations.  At the higher headquarters 
echelons, the importance was magnified as this same 
information helped determine the major organizational 
decisions being made throughout the service.182 
    It was at these higher echelons that the Inspection 
Division’s Development Section sought an even greater 
impact with its information.  Given its access to mission-
critical statistical and operational data, the Section 
aimed to serve as a research and planning agency for the 
Office of the Chief of the Air Corps (OCAC) in hopes its 
statistical methodologies and mechanized processes could 
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formulate management control methods for Air Corps 
leadership.  Even more, the unit looked at developing 
special statistical studies for OCAC offices to aid with 
pending Congressional legislation affecting the air 
service.  Unfortunately, despite contributing numerous 
reports to headquarters organizations, the unit operated 
for over a decade without being credited with any major 
impact on either service decision making or management.  In 
fact, with the exception of providing both personnel and 
products to support headquarters’ statistical support, the 
Development Section’s impact up to 1939 is regarded as 
nominal at best.  As fate would have it, nearly a dozen 
years and countless mechanized data analyses failed to make 
a significant contribution to Air Corps decision making in 
the interwar years.  Just as they had prior to World War I, 
senior leaders focused so heavily on service relevancy in a 
fiscally-constrained military that the importance of 
promoting data mechanization paled by comparison.  The 
drive for statistical data did not cease in the interwar 
military, but its importance remained questionable until 
another world war was imminent.183   
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     At the same time the Development Section was advancing 
data mechanization processes, a key statistical 
organization inside the Air Corps’ Materiel Division began 
a three-year process of installing punched card tabulators.  
Beginning in 1929, the Materiel Division – the service’s 
largest branch responsible for all aircraft and equipment 
research, development, procurement and maintenance – 
ordered the Statistics Unit of its Field Services Section 
to record and preserve the consolidated records of 
aviation’s critical flight development programs.  These 
programs maintained an abundant amount of vital information 
on all airplanes, airships, balloons, and engines in the 
Division’s arsenal, including inventory totals, location, 
condition, status, and flying time of each part or 
aircraft.  To effectively utilize this information, the 
Field Service Section installed “business machine 
equipment” at Wright Field to perform analyses on aircraft 
and equipment.184  In fact, without tabulating equipment, 
reporting comprehensive airframe and engine statistical 
data was deemed too arduous to attempt.  Although leaders 
originally purchased these machines for cost accounting 
purposes, their reports became a quintessential part of the 
                                                          




Section’s operational effectiveness, not to mention a 
useful tool in the Air Corps operations and logistics 
management.185   
     By 1936, the Materiel Division’s statistical mission 
officially migrated to the Air Corps Budget Office due in 
large part to a continued headquarters requirement for such 
reporting.  To those at the OCAC-level, it was clear these 
reports and analyses represented only a fraction of the 
unit’s potential, especially given its steadily increasing 
use of modern business equipment.  Of course, as these 
statistical programs were visible to the rest of the War 
Department, the benefits of data mechanization extended 
beyond the offices of the Air Service.  For example, in 
1938, General George Marshall took inspiration from other 
service mechanization efforts and ordered the creation of 
Army electronic accounting units to handle administrative 
tasks ranging from manpower to finance to logistics.  A 
year later, the War Department began hiring administrative 
                                                          
185 Acomb, Statistical Control in the Army Air Forces, 2-4; 
Review of Statistical Services, January 1950 - July 1954, 
1; Arthur Tatnall, History of Computing: Learning from the 
Past : IFIP WG 9.7 International Conference, HC 2010, Held 
as Part of WCC 2010, Brisbane, Australia, September 20-23, 
2010 : Proceedings (New York: Springer, 2010), 89-90; and 
"Air Force Materiel Command Fact Sheet," Air Force Materiel 




specialists to coordinate with industrial experts to 
establish a new service-wide accountability program, known 
later as the U.S. Army Personnel Accounting System.  This 
system used punched card tabulators capable of tracking 
every soldier with impressive accuracy, proving even more 
effective than the World War I mechanized card systems in 
the Surgeon General’s office.  Installing these tabulating 
units later became an integral part of the Army’s broader 
plan to create mobile, truck-mounted “Machine Record 
Units,” or MRUs, capable of handling the personnel 
management and record keeping for deployed units and 
designed with statistical control in mind.  Near the end of 
the decade, it was clear that mechanization programs 
symbolized the coming of a new era in information 
management and control in the Army.  Soon it became 
incumbent upon its Air Corps to follow suit.186 
     Between January 1939 and December 1941, the number of 
machine tabulators and calculating machines grew 
progressively throughout the Air Corps.  After nearly two 
decades of meandering data mechanization programs that 
received little fanfare in the service as a whole, efforts 
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flourished as major organizations continued marrying their 
information processes to both the manual and machine-
assisted statistical compilation programs of the day.  In 
fact, elements of Air Corps data automation began 
permeating the highest levels inside the War Department.  
For example, after relocating a number of times, the 
Materiel Division’s once meager Statistical Unit expanded 
to become the Air Staff-Statistics Office, responsible for 
liaising with the statistical sections of the Assistant 
Secretary of War, War Department General Staff, and the 
Office of Production Management.  In another example, after 
several organizational moves of its own, the Development 
Section’s statistical mission reappeared in early 1941 in 
the Inspection Division’s newly organized Safety Section.  
This new element became responsible for all flight records, 
medical examination records, and emergency tabulations for 
the numerous divisions inside OCAC, taking on an entire 
Army machine tabulating unit assigned to assist with the 
additional workload.  After years of changing priorities 
and requirements, the organization finally processed all 
Air Corps military personnel data and eventually, civilian 
personnel records as well.  In the months before World War 
II, there was little doubt that the service’s statistical 
control was a rapidly advancing capability.  Its 
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advancement was matched only by the organization’s growing 
reliance on the data machines themselves.187 
     In June 1941, the combination of a dependence on 
statistical data and the various decentralized methods of 
obtaining it was too much for Air Corps leaders to ignore.  
At the time, the War Department was rewriting Army 
Regulation 95-5, a critical document that gave the aviation 
service the opportunity to reorganize.  This allowed Corps 
leaders, anxious to make pivotal changes in departmental 
operations, to take advantage of the chance to rectify data 
process issues.  At the time, thirteen distinct statistical 
activities operated independently throughout each major 
aviation organization of the service.  A noticeable lack of 
control and information integration sometimes caused more 
problems than it solved.  In fact, leading up to the 
reorganization, statistical reporting clearly suffered from 
an operational and organizational duplication of effort 
that rendered these endeavors ineffective to those who 
relied on them.188  Using both data mechanization and manual 
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reporting methods placed an undue paperwork and reporting 
burden on field units while failing to provide the 
necessary information to higher echelons who needed to 
“control the increasingly complex plans and operations of a 
defense organization.”189  What the Air Corps needed were 
organizational structures and processes that created a 
functioning relationship between these statistical units, 
not to mention one that removed the data errors or 
omissions caused by a lack of functional control.  
Regulation 95-5 provided a catalyst for change.190 
     Under the authority of this War Department regulation, 
the Army Air Corps reorganized as the Army Air Forces (AAF) 
on 20 June 1941.  The event created an “overall 
administrative command” for Army aviation that finally 
oversaw all the organization’s air-centric aspects.191  At 
long last, this centralization of authority allowed AAF 
leaders to create headquarters-level information 
organizations to be the preeminent aviation statistical 
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control units, the most prominent of which became the Air 
Staff-Statistics organization.  This entity initially 
focused its energy on generating studies focused on AAF 
personnel and materiel.  However, within its first few 
months, requests from service leaders augmented its 
responsibilities considerably.  The unit began producing 
analyses ranging from aircraft allocation and production 
reports to pilot and technician training rate studies.  
What occupied a good deal of time was the creation of 
tables, charts, plans, maps and general officer-purposed 
statistical handbooks for the AAF Commander’s “War Room.”192  
As service historians note, this was the first major step 
in creating an air service statistical control entity that 
not only centralized statistical reporting but also planned 
and directed “a strategic program upon the basis of 
statistical knowledge.”193  Overall, the leadership’s 
information requirements were driving changes in service 
processes as well as creating new organizations and new 
strategic planning programs with data fidelity never before 
encountered in the department.   
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     Over the next several months, the importance of 
statistical information and the Air Staff-Statistics 
organization grew throughout the service.  Another major 
information organization, the Research and Statistics 
Section, gave up its flight record machine tabulation 
program in August in order to concentrate its resources on 
developing and maintaining statistical, budgetary and other 
data analysis required for aviation programs and 
activities.194  Soon key officers from across the Air Staff 
began studying the question of statistical controls and 
associated projects throughout the headquarters.  Data 
collection and exploitation duties were split up between 
the statistical organizations with one organization solely 
responsible for the collection and compilation of primary 
and special operational data while another was responsible 
for regular and special studies based on such data.  In a 
memorandum signed just five days before the Japanese attack 
on Pearl Harbor, future Air Force Chief of Staff and 
current Air Staff officer Brigadier General Carl A. Spaatz 
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confirmed this relationship by formally codifying that, 
“[t]he Statistics Section of the Air Staff will furnish 
consultation service to all Divisions of the Air Staff and 
will conduct such specialized projects related to this 
study as may be required, with the assistance of the 
Statistics Sections, OCAC.”195  Spaatz’s involvement proved 
that nearly a decade-and-a-half after the service founded 
its first true statistical units, headquarters echelons 
were finally solidifying the service’s information and data 
mechanization processes.  The AAF was now far better 
postured information-wise for war.  
     The three months that followed the bombing of Pearl 
Harbor saw two additional headquarters reorganizations in 
the air arm of the U.S. Army.  As the War Department 
mobilized for this next global war, those responsible for 
the framework of statistical control in Army aviation 
sought to establish a more structured and standardized 
state for their mission.  The crucible of war quickly 
proved to a rapidly expanding air service how it was 
suffering from an information management problem, one that 
posed a significant threat to pursuing any form of data 
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automation and statistical control in wartime.  The issue 
was not a shortage of data or the lack of report 
generation.  Rather, the air arm was generating too much 
information.  In all, the newly designated Army Air Forces’ 
produced over 2500 recurring official reports and 
statistical publications, making it nearly impossible for 
units to operate without them.  Moreover, despite the 
preset responsibilities assigned by Spaatz and others at 
the headquarters level, the AAF had done little to control 
the statistical units and their data equipment in the 
field.  Overall, it was clear to those at headquarters and 
throughout the air arm’s reporting agencies that while 
tabulating equipment was indeed essential to the service’s 
statistical activities, it required centralized control to 
operate effectively.196 
     In March 1942, the air service prepared for yet 
another reorganization.  This wartime organizational 
change, combined with the growing data requirements across 
the major operational and support branches, led some AAF 
leaders to yet again jockey for control over the nature and 
missions for future statistical control organizations.  
Some envisioned statistical units producing enough reports 
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to cover all aspects and activities of the service.  Others 
focused on creating a new officer position – the 
statistical officer – who would be so important to AAF 
operations that they were to be handpicked by the service, 
educated at a newly established and specialized school at 
Harvard University, trained by headquarters, and assigned 
to nearly every squadron and headquarters unit in the 
organization.  With the Army focusing its efforts on 
Machine Record Units and the pre-war automated personnel 
accountability system, the air forces concentrated on 
creating an accountability system all their own.  They 
sought more than the administrative data, personnel roster 
and troop strength reports, and casualty records that made 
up the mission of the MRUs.  AAF leaders wanted a system 
that provided “continuous studies” of AAF requirements and 
maintained a reporting system that could keep headquarters 
echelons consistently updated on the status of all aviation 
and supporting units.  On March 9, 1942, the War Department 
performed a major reorganization creating three autonomous 
Army Commands (Army Ground Forces, Services of Supply, and 
Army Air Forces), a result of which was the conglomeration 
of all headquarters’ statistical functions.  That outcome 
created a single unit responsible for controlling the 
preponderance of mission-essential information traffic 
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across the AAF worldwide.  This organization became simply 
known as the Directorate of Statistical Control.197 
     The mission of this new directorate spoke directly to 
the growing requirement for data automation in the service.  
The AAF Statement of Functions specifically detailed the 
organization to “provide machine tabulation and other 
statistical services for all subdivisions of the AAF 
located at Headquarters, and to coordinate the activities 
of all machine-tabulation installations in the AAF.”198  In 
charge of the directorate was Charles Bates “Tex” Thornton, 
a civilian at the time but a Colonel by war’s end.  With a 
mission statement rooted in machine tabulation and a 
growing stable of highly-educated and extremely competent 
statistical officers, Thornton’s Directorate of Statistical 
Control set out to create an information environment 
predicated on detailed machine-based data reporting from 
field units, mechanized statistical analysis at the 
headquarters level, and decision-making based on a 
conglomeration of the two.  Without question, after years 
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of delays and setbacks, data mechanization was now an 
integral function of the Army’s aviation organization. 
     Over the next three years of the war, statistical 
control and mechanized data processing permeated nearly 
every aspect of major information transfer inside the air 
service.  In the field, to allow for the Army’s machine 
record unit’s oversight of War Department-specific 
personnel information, the AAF established “Statistical 
Control Units (SCU)” throughout the American theaters of 
operation and placed them in proximity to the MRUs for both 
control and equipment purposes.  In many cases, the MRU 
functioned as an adjunct of the SCU when attached to the 
same headquarters, especially under the auspices of 
equipment sharing.  Following the reorganization at 
headquarters in 1942, the AAF set out immediately to 
resource each statistical unit with IBM machinery.  
Although this effort took time, a standard control unit 
prior to D-Day in 1944 contained the following equipment: 
 IBM 405 Alphabetic Accounting Machine 
 IBM 513 Summary Punching Reproducer 
 IBM 522 Alphabetic Interpreter 
 IBM 080 Horizontal Sorter 
 IBM 077 Collator 
 IBM 031 Alphabetic Key Punches 
 IBM 054 Alphabetic Verifier 199 
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Moreover, each unit was staffed with at least one officer 
experienced in statistical control work and machine 
operations, ten enlisted men with specific machine 
processing and form processing experience, and another five 
to ten enlisted men with key punching or typing/clerical 
experience.  Overall, the establishment of a SCU at a 
designated location signified the Army Air Forces’ 
requirement to establish a controlling authority over that 
location as well as an information hub responsible for 
reporting its personnel, equipment, and readiness status on 
a consistent basis.  To the headquarters, this effort was 
clearly a matter of centralized control.  To the field 
units, however, it sometimes seemed to be little more than 
headquarters-generated paperwork.200   
     One of the earliest issues confronting the field 
placement of SCUs was gaining the permission of the field 
commanders themselves.  On one level, the control units 
represented a watchdog organization for headquarters and 
added little to the unit’s mission as a whole.  However, as 
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they also represented the potential to reduce the unit’s 
administrative burden, most units were willing to yield.  
Furthermore, because the SCUs were designed to alleviate 
field unit paperwork, operational units could nearly rid 
themselves of the administration deemed as a “great plague” 
in combat arms.201  The military had made little progress 
reducing the administrative burden on commanders, unit 
leaders, and clerical personnel since the previous World 
War.  Throughout this new conflict, the Army and its 
subordinate air forces spent a great deal of effort 
delineating what information they wanted from field units, 
and how often, in hopes of rectifying the problem.  In one 
particular example, the machine units concentrated on the 
Army’s focus on personnel information by centering their 
energies on “mechanizing” the Officers and Soldiers 
Qualification cards (AGO Form 66-1 and AGO Form 20), as 
well as the standard “Morning Report,” unit strength 
report, and a change report providing supplementary 
personnel information when required.  The machine record 
units, oftentimes operating out of one or more heavy 
vehicles, took this burden from field organizations and 
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transmitted the data to upper echelons via either teletype 
or telephone.  With successes such as this, the AAF 
statistical unit responsibilities grew even larger, 
expanding in depth and breadth beyond anything imagined 
before the war.202 
     There were many data requirements for statistical 
control units in the field, most presented as official 
forms to be mechanically compiled and transmitted by each 
unit on a regular basis.  These documents ranged from the 
standard AAF Form 120, which calculated the unit’s daily 
aircraft inventory, to the more complex air mission AAF 
Form 34 containing individual sortie data that included 
aircraft totals, flight time, bomb tonnage, ammunition and 
fuel consumption, and even approximated losses on both 
sides of the equation.  However, of all the information 
forms generated by the service, perhaps none were more 
important than the two primary, mechanically-prepared forms 
known universally as the Form 127 and the Form 110.  In 
response to the data presented by the MRUs, the air arm 
developed the AAF Form 127, also identified as the Weekly 
Report of Personnel Status and the primary report for 
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statistical manpower information.  The Form 127 reported 
all aviation personnel by unit and military specialty, 
helping to ensure headquarters leaders and unit commanders 
fully understood their established personnel requirements, 
unit condition and pending disposition.  The data also 
ensured that decision-makers across the service received 
the same information simultaneously, and that leaders based 
higher echelon decisions on the same data.203 
     Meanwhile, the AAF Form 110 dealt with the other 
critical resource for the air arm:  service equipment.  For 
aircraft, the Form 110 provided a daily inventory report 
that reported the type, model, and series by serial number 
for every aircraft on hand at each location.  Additionally, 
the form recorded the aircraft’s current status and its 
total number of flying hours, a vital statistical that also 
doubled as an accident and battle loss reporting mechanism 
for the service’s high command.  Overall, between these two 
primary forms and the additional data collected at each 
location, the volume of information traversing the SCUs on 
a recurring basis was staggering, not to mention complex.  
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However, the large volumes of data crossing each unit gave 
field commanders an entirely new perspective on information 
operations, not to mention their impact on mission 
success.204 
     Commanders with assigned statistical control units 
quickly recognized that despite the volume of information 
required by each unit, the hard work and dedication of the 
men in statistical operations made their job easier.  
Despite the initial culture shock of seemingly endless 
amounts of required information, commanders recognized that 
SCUs could actually contribute to the unit’s mission by 
shouldering the administrative reporting burden and freeing 
up valuable combat personnel resources.  Requests for SCU 
assistance began to rise considerably throughout the war 
theaters as commanders credited SCUs with simplifying 
reporting procedures and handling their statistical 
reporting tasks.  In addition, field leaders recognized 
that the benefits of large volume data reporting were not 
limited to headquarters elements.  Knowledge of personnel 
and equipment shortages on a regular basis often translated 
into quicker replacement times from manpower and supply 
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chains, sometimes even without requiring formal 
requisitioning forms on the part of the unit.  In fact, the 
system appeared so beneficial that the commanding general 
of Tenth Air Force went so far as to formally report that 
“[t]his statistical reporting system has worked wonders for 
the Army Air Forces.”205   With thousands of pieces of IBM 
equipment manned by highly-trained field personnel, the 
investment made in SCUs appeared to be paying off.  These 
statistical units foreshadowed the ever-growing requirement 
for improved information capabilities in the service.206 
     During the war, data mechanization permeated a number 
of AAF organizations beyond the standard information 
reporting chain and the purview of its statistical 
organizations and data mechanization experts.  For example, 
the Army Air Force climatology program used punch card 
tabulators to record more than 26,000 station-months’ worth 
of records during the war, utilizing nearly 20 million 
cards in the process.  Additionally, after German weather 
punched cards were captured, allied meteorologists 
deciphered two large card decks full of climatological data 
on the European and Asian theater, providing previously 
                                                          






inaccessible weather information to Western forces.207  In 
another instance, this time in direct support of the flying 
mission, the IBM 405 accounting machine was essential to 
producing Air Almanacs that delivered essential 
aeronautical data used for all American flying forces 
during the war, each more than 700 pages long and 
containing approximately 3,000 machine-verified figures.208  
In these cases and many others, it became clear that by 
war’s end statistical units were not the only data 
automation organizations in existence in the Army Air 
Forces.  These units nonetheless provided the legitimacy 
needed for other aviation organizations to procure their 
own data mechanization systems that produced results 
similar to those that preceded them.  As requirements for 
faster calculations of larger data sets began to prevail 
across the service, scientists and researchers looked for 
ways to accommodate these service needs.  From these 
operational requirements and efforts, the first computers 
were born. 
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     Between 1907 and 1947, the management and application 
of information played an essential role in the United 
States Army’s evolving air service.  Using information to 
help train, equip, and employ these growing forces 
supported the air arm’s emergence from a single 
administrative office to a war-changing, million-plus 
airmen organization in a relatively short span of time.  In 
highlighting this evolution, this chapter disproves the 
assumption that air service data processes and technologies 
mirrored those of its parent Army organization.  Instead, 
the air arm’s information services developed at the speed 
of its user requirements, which frequently outpaced 
advances in aeronautical technology as well as the 
organizational growth of the air service itself.   
     These user requirements developed early.  Although the 
aviation organization did not set out to create an 
independent information system before World War I, the 
needs of its developing air operations necessitated unique 
applications and alterations of its current data 
methodologies.  Deviations from standard Army procedures 
were small at first:  the addition of the Record of 
Aeroplane Flights form, the reference to aeronautical 
equipment in higher-order regulations, and the requirement 
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to keep records on flight data, engine motor statistics, 
transportation expenditures, and many data points in-
between.  Soon the information requirement grew large 
enough that airmen implemented special concessions to feed 
the growing aviation-centered data processes.  From 
publishing aviation guidance such as 1916’s Equipment for 
Aero Units of the Aviation Section to requiring an air arm-
specific data card recording system, the information 
processes of this flying organization diverged from 
standard Army procedures a little more each day. 
     World War I sped up this divergence considerably.  
President Wilson’s approval of the July 1917 Aviation Act 
rapidly increased the Army’s requirements for both pilots, 
support crews and aircraft with the organization ill-
equipped at meeting their overall needs.  The Aviation 
Section attempted to mitigate these shortfalls by creating 
their own manual data systems to handle the influx of 
recruits and equipment.  They developed information 
procedures using Hollerith systems and comprehensive data 
forms (i.e. Form 609) to alleviate information shortfalls 
and corral the vast amounts of data pouring into the air 
organization on a daily basis.  These improvements and 
others were critical to aviation’s pursuit of greater 
organizational legitimacy, especially as the service 
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struggled for a more prominent War Department role by using 
statistical documentation and data reports to make their 
case.  This pursuit pushed the air service’s data 
requirements further than ever and helped bolster future 
data requirements. 
     The organization’s interwar years were met with 
massive budget cuts and drastically reduced mission 
requirements.  Some air service units, however, took these 
circumstances as an opportunity to utilize information 
technology and procedural applications as a means of 
increasing operational efficiency.  For example, aviation 
units used data mechanization to produce statistical 
analyses for improving pilot and aircraft performance.   
They pioneered new standards for recording aircraft and 
individual flying hours, aircraft engine time, and post-
event analysis for aircraft accidents and forced landings.  
Aviation units also used business machines to record and 
preserve the service’s flight development programs and kept 
a voluminous amount of information on all its airframes.  
In the months before World War II, the statistical 
requirements internal to the air service had increased to 
the point that centralization and consolidation of 
information activities began to take shape.  Soon the 
budgetary, personnel, and other supporting data analysis 
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took a back seat to the operational information processes 
that ran in tandem with the mechanization processes of the 
Army. 
     World War II spawned two significant information 
entities in the air arm:  the Statistical Control Units in 
the field and the Directorate of Statistical Control in 
Washington.   The SCUs changed the way units conveyed their 
information by utilizing data mechanization gear to collect 
and report critical information while simultaneously 
reducing the administrative burden of its collocated, 
battle ridden field units.  Meanwhile, Statistical Services 
at AAF headquarters created a new and widespread mechanized 
information environment that took SCU data and developed 
statistical analysis and decision-making data sets that 
permeated nearly every aspect of major information 
transfers inside the air service.  Decisions on bombing 
targets, personnel relocations, and armament procurement 
were all made thanks to the information sent by field units 
and exploited by its higher headquarters.  By war’s end, 
the Army Air Forces were no longer an organization 
operating with information . . . they were an organization 
run on information. 
     By 1947, the air service hardly resembled the 
organization commanded by General Scriven in 1913, and was 
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certainly nothing like what General Allen signed into 
existence with “Office Memorandum No. 6” in 1907.  After 
two world wars, unprecedented technological advancement, 
and a mission progression few saw coming at its inception, 
the aviation mission had grown so autonomous of the Army’s 
role on land that creating an entirely independent service 
seemed almost anticlimactic.  While there was certainly 
cause for celebration on September 18, 1947, the reality 
was that the United States Air Force had earned its 
independence gradually through decades of functional and 
organizational change and not with the stroke of President 
Truman’s pen.  The Air Force developed into a separate 
service as it adapted to its operational and organizational 
environment and adjusted the way it functioned.  Part of 
that journey involved the way the service regulated itself, 
kept track of its operations, maintained personnel data, 
and sought a growing level of speed and accuracy through 
task professionalization and office mechanization.  As 
explained throughout this chapter, inside the history of 
the air arm from 1907 to 1947 is a complex story of Air 
Force evolution partially driven by the management and 









Early Air Force Computing and Mechanized Data 
Management Programs, 1947-1955 
 
     The formative years of Air Force computing and data 
automation were defined by those individuals who pursued 
the development of relevant technology before the service 
was organized or overly interested in doing so.  Between 
1947 and 1955, these advocates – civilians, military, and 
contractors alike – challenged existing technological and 
operational paradigms and put the service at the leading 
edge of computer technology.  This period was characterized 
by a lack of oversight and direction from higher echelons.  
Innovations were introduced by futurists who evaluated and 
anticipated service requirements even when unit leadership 
was otherwise preoccupied.  While there were some official 
service programs designed to harness this technology, in 
reality efforts were guided by one or more key individuals, 
some of whom were guided by personal aims in addition to 
those of the service.  Computing and data automation arose 
following the ENIAC’s (Eckert and Mauchley’s Electronic 
Numerical Integrator and Computer) initial development in 
the mid-1940s and evoked enthusiasm from those with the 
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expertise and foresight to understand their importance to 
the service’s future.209  In 1955, the Air Force assigned 
computing oversight to a single office at the Pentagon – 
the Directorate of Statistical Services – in an effort to 
centralize responsibility inside the organization.  
However, given the myriad unique computing systems cropping 
up throughout the service, such consolidated oversight was 
to prove virtually impossible. 
     In this chapter I focus on the origins of Air Force 
computing and mechanized data management, not only from a 
technological standpoint but also from a leadership and 
organizational perspective in order to demonstrate how 
important individual initiative in this sphere was to the 
service’s success.  I will detail how the dedication and 
tenacity of a number of key military, civilian, and 
contracted individuals produced change during this period.  
I will highlight how in these early years of the Air Force 
key contributions and advances helped shape the operational 
and organizational landscape of a service void of an 
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identity beyond that of manned flight.  Additionally, this 
chapter explains how and why the service chose to organize 
and operate itself in the wake of these new processes, new 
systems, and new possibilities.  
Following an Information-fueled War 
     By the end of World War II, the U.S. Army Air Forces 
was an organization run on information.  The service’s 
statistical control operations, known in the field as the 
“Stat System,” permeated nearly all organizational units 
from its headquarters to its squadrons.  For over three 
years, military leaders had used the information gathered 
and disseminated by control units to strategically plan and 
execute their war orders.  The service used the data 
traversing these statistical control units to do more than 
inform; it used it to influence operations affecting 
millions of lives and billions of dollars.  Information was 
no longer important . . . it was mission critical.210   
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     As the world’s “largest centrally controlled 
installation of mechanical accounting equipment and 
private-wire teletype” during the war, this information 
monolith continued to produce new data requirements and 
forced massive resource investments throughout the AAF.211  
Upholding a high level of information efficiency required a 
cadre of three thousand officers, fifteen thousand enlisted 
personnel, and enough data machinery, support equipment, 
and operating facilities to support sixty-six major SCU 
locations worldwide.  After the war, budget cuts forced the 
service to drastically reduce the size of the statistical 
control entity, especially as it could no longer afford 
such a large personnel reserve.  The requirement for 
statistical information, however, did not dimish.  The 
success of World War II information operations confirmed 
the necessity for a centralized data control system as well 
as the leadership’s desire to access large volumes of 
information.  Statistical control remained an integral part 
of air operations through its integration into the Office 
of the Comptroller in 1947 and the service’s independence 
soon thereafter.212   
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     Three years earlier in 1944, Statistical Control’s 
Combat Analysis Branch was the exemplar for wartime 
information processing in the Army Air Forces.  Operating 
from a single office on the fourth floor of the still-
under-construction Pentagon building, the branch’s nine 
staff members (seven of them AAF officers) spent their days 
and nights translating field data into meaningful 
statistical information bound for leaders across the 
military.  Their director was George Dantzig, a 
mathematician and statistician by trade and education, and 
an expert in statistical analysis who had served in the 
branch since the war began.  Over the next several years, 
it was his experience in statistics and logistical planning 
that placed him at the helm of Air Force information 
control as well as at the forefront of its newest 
information devices.213 
                                                          
213 The “Roster of Key Personnel for the Statistical Control 
Division, 1944” listed 9 members of the Combat Analysis 
Branch, with Dantzig as its head and 8 additional members – 
1 Major, 2 Captains, 3 First Lieutenants and one Second 
Lieutenant.  The final individual’s status is unknown.  All 
were listed under room 4C1037 at the Pentagon (4th Floor, C 
Ring, 10th Corridor, Room 37).  Communication outside the 
office was apparently not a major priority as there were 
only two telephone numbers assigned to the branch (as 
opposed to others who had 6-10 numbers).  Dantzig was the 
only individual in the branch to have access to both 
numbers.  See Roster of Key Personnel, Headquarters Army 
Air Forces Statistical Control Division, 1944, USAF 
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     Dantzig’s experience after nearly four years of AAF 
statistical analysis proved few knew more about the power 
and benefits of aggregated information.  Combat Analysis 
collected the predictable air combat information – sorties 
flown, bomb tonnage expended, attrition rates, etc. – but 
they also prepared detailed Air Staff plans covering the 
gamut of service requirements ranging from the 
accountability of hundreds of thousands of various material 
goods to validating more than fifty thousand personnel 
specialties.  Dantzig’s efforts as director proved he 
clearly understood the statistical analysis capabilities of 
punched card tabulators and arithmetic calculators but was 
also equally aware of their limitations.  The director’s 
vision of implementing supplementary and more complex 
calculations was originally shelved due to the technical 
constraints of existing machinery.  Fortunately, his 
familiarity with parallel projects underway throughout the 
Pentagon gave him both unique insight into and optimism 
about new calculation possibilities for the directorate.  
These projects produced machines that became known as 
                                                          




computers and played a significant role in Dantzig’s own 
logistics planning mathematical efforts.214 
     Before 1947, the term “computer” was multifaceted.  
Its simplest definition, “something that computes,” fully 
entered the AAF lexicon during the Second World War 
although its use varied widely.  In 1943, General E. L. 
Eubank recommended the AAF purchase a dozen Model AAF10-B 
bombing error computers for its bombardment headquarters 
and training units.  While the device helped analyze 
bombing errors and bombsight problems caused by ground 
speed, drift, and altitude, it more closely resembled a 
complex calculating instrument.  Meanwhile, nearly two 
hundred female workers who performed ballistic computations 
for the war effort were ironically called computers 
themselves.  Only in January 1946 did analysts from the 
National Defense Research Committee use a more current 
interpretation of the term as they foresaw a War Department 
“Tactical-Strategic Computer” complete with dials and 
controls capable of forecasting the outcomes of battles and 
wars.  In all, the first “computers” took many forms:  
electronic calculators, machine programmers, tabulating 
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machines, and so on.  Shortly thereafter, the term finally 
arrived at its current definition – that of an electronic 
device capable of receiving information, performing a 
sequence of operations, and producing a result – in both 
the Air Force and among the general public.215   
     The Army’s most prominent computational project during 
the war was the ENIAC – the electronic calculating machine 
designed to solve artillery algorithms and not the combat 
statistics or logistics planning Dantzig was familiar with.  
However, scientists and military leaders alike understood 
this device and others that followed could become the 
beasts of burden for the seemingly endless, mind-numbing 
calculations required by U.S. military missions.  Boasting 
computing speeds almost one thousand times faster than the 
electromechanical devices in use at that time, ENIAC put to 
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Department’s “research and development of computer 
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rest any John Henry-type allusions that a person could out-
calculate a machine of this caliber.  In fact, no 
innovation in computing since has witnessed a leap so 
statistically significant.  In Dantzig’s world of seemingly 
endless amounts of data and calculable statistics, such a 
device might be invaluable to future operations.  Although 
early computing histories do not connect the ENIAC to 
Dantzig, the Office of the Comptroller, or the Combat 
Analysis Division, its very presence affected them 
considerably.  If there is a bridge that connects the 
worlds of Air Force statistical control and its computing 
programs, it is George Dantzig.216  
    Over time, Air Force leaders sought to utilize the 
computer not just to assist airmen in their day-to-day 
jobs, but in many cases to replace them altogether.  As 
computers grew ever more powerful, computer applications 
capable of exceeding the realm of human capability became 
even more prevalent in project consideration.  The 
replacement of human beings by machines had been long the 
subject of speculation by cybernetics and automation 
theorists such as John von Neumann, Norbert Weiner and John 
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Diebold who all predicted (in their own way) how computers 
would one day perform many of the same tasks as humans of 
the previous era.  To some, this was simply futuristic 
fantasy. However, over the decade following the appearance 
of ENIAC, the operational and administrative requirements 
of modern industry and the federal government helped create 
a growing role for such computers in society.217 
The Origins of Air Force Computing 
     In 1949, the United States Navy began publishing the 
Digital Computer Newsletter, a semi-annual publication 
designed to provide a “medium for the interchange, among 
interested persons, of information concerning recent 
developments in various computer projects.”218  The Office 
of Naval Research’s Mathematical Sciences Division 
published the first volume that April and included as much 
recent information on current military systems as members 
                                                          
217 See Ray Kurzweil, The Age of Spiritual Machines: When 
Computers Exceed Human Intelligence (New York: Penguin 
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218 United States Navy Office of Naval Research Mathematical 
Sciences Division, Digital Computer Newsletter 1, no. 1 
(April 1949), 1-6.  
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could locate.  At the forefront of the newsletter were 
those projects under the direction of the United States 
Army’s Ordnance Department, which included the ENIAC, 
EDVAC, ORDVAC and the Institute for Advanced Study 
Computer.219  The same edition credited the newly-formed 
United States Air Force with two of its own computing 
projects after little more than a year-and-a-half as a 
separate service – the National Bureau of Standards Interim 
Computer and the Institute for Numerical Analysis Computer.  
However, absent from the newsletter was the full story of 
the Air Force’s computing journey that had begun years 
prior to the Newsletter and exhibited a far broader scope 
than the numerical analysis requirements offered in the 
Navy’s publication.  That journey centered on Project 
SCOOP.220   
                                                          
219 The ENIAC and EDVAC (Electronic Discrete Variable 
Automatic Computer) were successive products of Eckert and 
Mauchley.  The ORDVAC (Ordnance Discrete Variable Automatic 
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Computing, from ENIAC to MSRC: A Record of a Symposium and 
Celebration, November 13 and 14, 1996, Aberdeen Proving 
Ground (Aberdeen, MD: U.S. Army Research Laboratory, 2000). 
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     Without question, Project SCOOP (Scientific 
Computation of Optimum Programs) became the most 
significant venture in early air service computing efforts 
and evolved as a result of staffing efforts directed at 
improving the service’s program planning process.  Program 
planning during World War II meant fundamentally 
understanding and planning for all the resource 
requirements of a specified program or project, including 
all associated costs.  The planning process then translated 
that data into an expected financial figure representing 
the program’s impact on both the military establishment as 
well as the civilian economy.  In early 1942, the Office of 
Statistical Control first attempted to mechanize this 
process but met with poor results due to insufficient data 
(caused by system reporting deficiencies) and inadequate 
mechanical calculating equipment.  Two years passed before 
service leaders devised a viable alternative to existing 
planning processes.221 
                                                          
of Standards' SEAC," in A History of Computing in the 
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221 Direct reference is made by Lieutenant General E. W. 
Rawlings and Mr. Marshall Wood in United States Air Force, 
"Scientific Planning Techniques." (Special Air Staff 
Briefing: 5 August 1948, Pentagon, Washington), 4-8; Edward 
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     By 1944, data reliability and consistency allowed 
Pentagon planners in the Office of Program Control to 
develop a more systematic program scheduling procedure, due 
in large part to the success of the centralized statistical 
reporting system.  The procedure was led by service 
programming leaders Dr. Edward Learned and Marshall Wood 
and involved coordination between a great many staff and 
command agencies across the service.  Both Learned and Wood 
believed that if they could time when each agency entered 
its statistically-generated data, and then plot out when 
each agency required such data for their own inputs, they 
could schedule the inputs in order to optimize the process 
without bottlenecks.  The entire system became a well-
orchestrated symphony of data reporting, analysis, and 
computation synchronized for maximum efficiency over the 
course of many months of trial and error.  In effect, what 
they developed was a “program for programming.”222   
     Unfortunately, it simply was not good enough . . . not 
for Learned and Wood, and certainly not for service leaders 
both during and after the war.  The crux of the issue was 
speed:  the entire process still took a grueling seven 
                                                          
Dunaway, "U.S. Air Force Oral History Interview: Interview 





months to complete per program.  Command decisions, 
planning factors, and on-the-ground situations changed so 
quickly that any major fluctuations within such a long time 
span could throw off the entire process and make the 
programming result worthless.   Additionally, time-
sensitive reliability in such a slow program made it nearly 
impossible to have alternative solutions by the end of the 
process.  Program scheduling became incredibly difficult in 
peacetime as more limitations, especially on funding, were 
placed on the military establishment.  Air Force 
Comptroller Lieutenant General E. W. Rawlings pointed out 
years later that perhaps the greatest limiting factor to 
the entire problem “was a matter of simple arithmetic,” 
noting that the Air Staff probably had more people working 
on arithmetic than any other single work item in the 
Pentagon.223  The viability of programming was in question 
throughout the Pentagon and the service required a new 
methodology if the Air Staff process were to continue.  The 
onset of the military’s first computers in the mid-1940s 
made that new methodology possible.224  






     In 1946, the Comptroller’s Office began building a 
“mathematical model” of the entire planning process.  The 
diligent workers of Statistical Services using Air Staff-
provided data calculated how to generate enough information 
over the next year to analyze the incredibly difficult 
mathematical functions and the dependent variable data from 
other agencies.  To make this work, to actually generate 
the information, required finding a vendor who could 
produce a large-scale digital electronic computational 
device that could not only make the necessary calculations 
but also systematically classify and store all the 
requisite data.  At the time, the United States Bureau of 
the Census was under contract with ENIAC’s J. Presper 
Eckert and John Mauchly in their attempt to create a 
computer capable of storing a program internally while 
running at “electronic speeds.”  Air Force programmers 
understood that if something akin to the ENIAC could assist 
their situation, the Census contract was the most viable 
option available to them.225 
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     The air service needed a bureaucratic go-between in 
order to quickly latch on to the Eckert and Mauchly 
contract.  In cooperation with the Departments of the Army 
and Air Force, the National Bureau of Standards acted as 
the contract’s technical monitor in light of its 
established expertise with electronic component design.  
The Air Force Comptroller initiated this process by 
transferring to the Bureau $400,000 in June 1947 so that 
Eckert and Mauchly could produce an electronic computer 
built to military specifications.  This first commercial 
computer would be known throughout the industry as Univac 
and was to be the result of a three-machine order that 
would send one unit to the Census Bureau and the other two 
to the military departments (the second going to the Air 
Force).  The air service needed a mathematical expert to be 
a part of this monumental and groundbreaking effort.  That 
expert turned out to be the former director of the Combat 
Analysis Branch, George Dantzig.226   
     Dantzig did not stay with the service long after World 
War II.  After his term in Statistical Control, the 
mathematician departed Washington to complete his doctoral 
program at the University of California-Berkeley, which he 
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did in a single semester.  The newly-appointed Dr. Dantzig 
turned down the opportunity to stay on as a professor and 
returned to the Pentagon as the Office of the Comptroller’s 
Mathematical Advisor, which included Project SCOOP.  By 
1948, this effort had progressed from a project 
investigating theoretical mathematical and electronic 
computer applications to a full-fledged acquisition program 
with a number of project publications already underway.  
SCOOP personnel ensured the purposes of the Air Force’s 
first computer project were abundantly clear: 
 Most importantly, develop an advanced design for an 
integrated and comprehensive system for the planning 
and control of all Air Force activities. 
 
 Prepare the Air Force to take maximum advantage of the 
recent developments in high speed digital electronic 
computers, especially as extensions of 
mathematical/quantitative management problems. 
 
 Simulate Air Force operations using large sets of 
equations, effectively designated as mathematical 
models of operations. 
 
 Free up personnel and resources, especially those 
bogged down in day-to-day arithmetic and clerical 
calculation duties.227 
 
On 13 October 1948, Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt S. 
Vandenberg codified these elements in Air Force Letter 170-
3, an official document formally identifying the Air 
                                                          
227 Vandenberg’s Air Force Letter 170-3 is found in 
"Scientific Planning Techniques," 4-12. 
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Force’s entrance into this new era of computing by 
demanding “all echelons…support Scoop to the fullest 
possible extent.”228  The letter modified the earlier 
statements of Chief Comptroller General Rawlings who 
stated, “…if we can work this out…it will be possible for 
the Staff to spend more of its time in developing proper 
factors, in doing some real planning.”229  All Dantzig and 
the Project SCOOP team had to do was make it work.  
     1948 was not a good year for the development-stage 
Univac system.  After a series of technical difficulties 
and subordinate projects delayed its completion, the 
absence of a Univac delivery forced the Air Force to seek 
an immediate, near-term solution.  The problem was that 
Dantzig was not happy with his current choices.  He was 
familiar with the systems either already in industry or 
under contract and determined Project SCOOP required a 
computer solution as fast as possible.  The mathematical 
advisor told a panel of Air Staff leaders in August that of 
the fourteen large scale “digital computer” projects in the 
United States at the time, the ENIAC at Aberdeen was the 
only system built that he actually considered an electronic 
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computer.  The other “computers” in operation (e.g. the 
Mark I, the Mark II, and the IBM Selective Sequence 
Electronic Calculator) were in his opinion little more than 
electromechanical relay machines.  Calculation-processing 
speed was a major factor in Dantzig’s assertion as earlier 
relay-based computers were not comparable to the systems 
currently under construction by Eckert and Mauchly.    
Dantzig and the other team members were confident that the 
right machine could do in a few hours what it would take a 
large staff several months or years to accomplish, but it 
was clear that the Univac was not going to be that machine 
any time soon.230 
     In an effort to obtain a temporary machine, or what 
Marshall Wood called “a pilot model,” Dantzig advised the 
Air Force to contract with the National Bureau of Standards 
(NBS) to develop a machine that in the interim could 
fulfill a number of their growing computing requirements.  
The Standards Bureau was already hard at work developing 
its own computer for both scientific research and the 
upcoming American census.   By 1950, years of computer 
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development at the Washington Laboratory produced a machine 
that could service NBS organizational needs plus meet Army, 
Air Force, and Census Bureau requirements equally.  Such a 
computer would allow the Air Force to perform a number of 
important mathematical- and programming-based functions, 
serve as an investigative tool for certain specialized 
problems, solve general mathematical problems, and conduct 
performance tests on various types of supplementary 
equipment.  For project leaders like Dantzig and Wood, this 
machine’s best attribute was that the Air Force would 
possess it more than a year before the delivery of the 
first Univac.  Early publications called this machine the 
National Bureau of Standards Interim Computer or the 
Interim SCOOP Computer until it was formally renamed the 
Standard Eastern Automatic Computer (SEAC) after its 
operational debut.  To most of those involved in the 
process, it remained known as Interim as those who 
understood its purpose thought the name a better and 
historically-accurate fit.231   
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    SEAC was the first operational internally-programmed 
digital computer in the United States with capabilities so 
newsworthy it joined the ENIAC in sparking the imagination 
of the public.232  The New York Times published a piece 
entitled “Air Force Unveils Fastest Computer” the day after 
its unveiling in June 1950, praising the system: 
“Bewildering in its scope, speed and accuracy, it 
multiplies or divides eleven-digit numbers in 250 one-
millionths of a second” and for being the “first 
automatically-sequenced super-speed computer to be put into 
useful operation.”233   While NBS Director Edward Condon 
received high billing for this accomplishment, it was 
General Rawlings as Air Force Comptroller who sang its 
praises in the Times.  Referencing its four main sections – 
input/output, memory, control and arithmetic units – 
Rawlings discussed its service-wide importance through 
Project SCOOP and the “mathematical model” of programming 
equations pivotal to Air Staff budgetary and planning 
elements.   For Danztig and others who had programs that 
had been awaiting the arrival of a computer, SEAC – the 
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Computer," New York Times, June 21, 1950, 5. 
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“Mechanical Brain” – was a colossal success from its first 
day forward.  Even after the Univac’s arrival, this “pilot” 
computer remained operationally relevant for well over a 
decade.234 
     The Univac computer’s eventual entry into Air Force 
operation in 1952 was met with far less fanfare thanks to 
the success of SEAC.  Given the long delay in the Univac’s 
delivery, the development and acquisition of the 
Interim/SEAC computer appeared as a stroke of genius on the 
Air Force’s part, especially George Dantzig.235  SEAC 
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designers ensured success by utilizing corollary successes 
from a number of contemporary projects in the automatic 
computer field.  The machine employed the acoustic memory 
achievements of the EDVAC project, the effective germanium 
diode uses from the BINAC system, and pulse transformer 
applications from an ongoing MIT Servomechanisms Laboratory 
project for the Navy (Project Whirlwind). Its use 
eventually stretched well beyond the Office of the 
Comptroller by performing computations as operationally 
relevant as the first Hydrogen bomb’s production in 1952.  
Although SEAC was clearly a monumental step in industry 
computing, its impact on the air service was even bigger.  
What the Navy’s first Digital Computer Newsletter edition 
left out in 1949 was how the individual initiative of one 
man – George Dantzig – helped galvanize top-level service 
support, push the organization’s computing success forward 
by two years, and automate programs and processes in time 
to assist with the war in Korea.  The SEAC Interim Computer 
changed the scale and scope of Air Force operations through 
its very use and thus became a monumental factor in the 
evolution of computing in the Air Force.236 
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Early Computer Development in the Air Force 
     The SEAC computer drew a great deal of attention in 
both the Pentagon and the media but was not the only air 
service computing program under development at the time.  
The early success of ENIAC spurred the development of a 
number of Federal Government computer programs with many 
assisted or guided by the National Bureau of Standards.  
The developmental momentum from Project SCOOP and the 
Interim/SEAC Computer aided the creation of a second major 
calculation computer known as the Institute for Numerical 
Analysis Computer.  In October 1948, the National Bureau of 
Standards’ Applied Mathematics Executive Council sought to 
develop its own electronic digital calculator.  The project 
was sponsored by the Air Force’s Office of Air Research to 
provide high-speed electronic computational ability and an 
electrostatic memory capacity to the National Bureau of 
Standards’ Institute for Numerical Analysis – a field 
station at the University of California at Los Angeles.  
Leaders in this effort, which included George Dantzig, 
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intended that the machine should engage in long-range 
mathematical research as well as calculations for present-
day problems originating with the Air Force, its 
contractors, and other governmental agencies.  The service 
deemed the computer system so important to the development 
process that it diverted nearly $200,000 in funding away 
from other projects.237  Like its SEAC predecessor, this 
highly-anticipated computer carried many primary 
requirements and was to be built “as quickly as 
possible.”238  
     Work on the Institute for Numerical Analysis Computer 
began in earnest in January 1949 under the direction of the 
National Bureau of Standards’ Dr. Harry Huskey.  This 
computer veteran was another member of the University of 
Pennsylvania’s former faculty who worked on the ENIAC 
project in the mid-1940s.  Huskey was fond of a strong 
technical ensemble and built his high-speed electronic 
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digital computer construction team complete with nearly a 
dozen senior and junior engineers, technicians, and 
mathematicians.239  Plans for the computer that April 
included an electrostatic memory of approximately 1000 
words and cutting-edge storage capabilities developed under 
the direction of renowned data storage pioneer (and Chair 
of Electrotechnics at England’s Manchester University) Dr. 
Frederic Calland Williams.  Huskey attempted to speed up 
the development process by allowing his team to let 
industrial contracts for a number of items, including 80 
chassis support units for the arithmetic unit and 45 units 
for the cathode ray tube memory systems.240  Despite an 
attempt to complete the project by year’s end, the December 
progress report regrettably conveyed the fact that only 
eighty percent of the project was complete.  It was obvious 
to Huskey that the new machine would have to be scaled back 
in computational power.241    
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     The development team began January 1950 by looking for 
ways to complete the project within requirements but even 
more expeditiously than before.  For example, Huskey and 
his team reduced the once lofty goal of a 1024-word memory 
to 512 words as memory capacity became one of the principle 
bargaining points among system developers.  The engineers 
then agreed the computer would begin operations with only 
256 words of electrostatic memory instead of their most 
recent 512-word goal.  This allowed the team to expedite 
completion under the provision that memory would at least 
double as soon as practicable following initial operation.  
Other early expectations soon followed suit and were 
downgraded in an effort to meet development timelines.  
Originally espoused expectations that included an 
electromatic typewriter, a standard teletype-tape unit, and 
magnetic-tape storage units were sadly reduced in 1950 to 
only typewriter and teletype-tape unit input/output 
mechanisms.242  What could be attained in the short term 
                                                          
241 See Harry D. Huskey, Harry D. Huskey: His 
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Digital Computer Newsletter Vol. 1. no. 1, 1-6.  
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prevailed over what might be attained in the longer term 
during this critical construction phase.243 
     On August 17, 1950, Huskey and his team officially 
completed their project just two months after the SEAC 
dedication.  Rather than retain its original name, the 
Institute for Numerical Analysis Computer’s designation 
formally changed to the National Bureau of Standards 
Western Automatic Computer (SWAC) in an effort to align it 
with its SEAC cousin on the East coast.  The Bureau 
followed the formal dedication ceremony by holding a one-
day symposium on digital computing machine applications 
(specifically focusing on scientific problem solving) and 
honed in on methods studied by West Coast laboratories and 
universities at the time.  Huskey’s team maintained big 
plans for SWAC which, despite a shoestring budget of 
$170,000 still included upgrading its auxiliary memory, 
upgrading the input-output unit, and an improved chassis 
for integrating new hardware systems.  Meanwhile, the Air 
Force’s plans for SWAC did not change over time – service 
                                                          
242 Huskey’s expectations of attaching one or more magnetic-
tape units were put on hold until the computer reached 
initial operational capability, and even then further 
conciliations were made.   
 
243 Specific information in this paragraph sourced from 
Computer Branch, A Survey of Large-Scale Digital Computers 
and Computer Projects, 1-26.   
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experts remained vigilant in wanting a computer system that 
could help solve mathematical and statistical problems.  
SWAC’s ability to solve pressing service calculation 
problems – aeronautical engineering issues, biological and 
radiological experimentation calculations, and differential 
equations based on von Neumann’s “Monte Carlo” method – 
proved its usefulness to Air Force leaders.244   
     While the SEAC and SWAC computers represent the first 
direct computing efforts of the Air Force, the air service 
itself was involved in a number of programs predating those 
mentioned in the Navy computer publication.  While not 
necessarily specific to flight operations they provided 
greater capabilities to the Air Force mission at the unit 
level.  These systems did not show up in the pages of the 
Digital Computer Newsletter until years later, and even 
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then the Navy did not necessarily attribute their use to 
the Air Force.  These operational systems, clearly vital to 
the service’s efforts in the modern computer era, are an 
integral part of the Air Force’s computer history. 
     The first such computer system took form in 1946 when 
the Northrop Aircraft Corporation earned a government 
missile system contract for a “unique, automatic, extremely 
accurate guidance system for long-range missions.”245  This 
system was named Project MX-775 by Northrop but eventually 
known throughout the service as the “Snark” missile 
project.  The endeavor was based on a contract so specific 
that it demanded all the innovative and engineering talents 
the company could muster.  The contract required a delivery 
range greater than 5,000 miles, a flight path at altitudes 
between 30,000 and 50,000 feet, and a delivery accuracy of 
one-tenth of a nautical mile (a tremendous feat undoubtedly 
requiring some form of an electronic navigational 
computation system).  Already immersed in early computer-
                                                          
245 See D.E. Eckdahl, I.S. Reed, and H.H. Sarkissian, "West 
Coast Contributions to the Development of the General-
purpose Computer. Building Maddida and the Founding of 
Computer Research Corporation," IEEE Annals of the History 
of Computing 25, no. 1 (2003), 4-33.  Additionally, see 
"The Dawn of the Computer Age," Engineering & Science, 
2006, 7-12; and "G. Floyd Steele: Computer Oral History 
Collection, 1969-1973," interview by Robina Mapstone, 
January 16, 1973, 1977. 
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related technology, Northrop engineers assumed their most 
recent innovation could fill the Service’s requirement:  a 
newly-developed digital differential analyzer, nicknamed 
DiDA, capable of evaluating and solving ordinary 
differential equations.  Workers in the company’s “computer 
group” assumed this system could solve MX-775’s 
navigational issues.  However, Northrop’s Assistant Project 
Engineer for Guidance Robert Rawlins decided to outsource 
the Snark’s computational issue instead of using the DiDA 
system, a wholly unpopular internal decision but one that 
inevitably had a major impact on early Air Force and 
industry computing.246 
     Rawlins’ decision to contract the navigational 
computer system shocked those inside Northrop but was a 
nearly impossible option for company leaders to overlook.  
The airborne digital computer contract Rawlins let went 
once again to industry experts and ENIAC producers Eckert 
and Mauchly who were in the process of developing the 
Univac.  Few doubted their Philadelphia-based computer 
corporation possessed the capability to deliver a workable 
system both on time and within specifications.  To Rawlins’ 
benefit, rumors surrounding the computer corporation pegged 




the duo as being in dire need of cash, presumably to help 
fund Univac’s development.  This was all but confirmed when 
Eckert and Mauchly’s submission of a ridiculously low 
$100,000 contract bid gave Northrop little option but to 
accept on the basis of low cost and proven expertise.  For 
nearly a year-and-a-half, the Philadelphia team made 
extraordinary efforts designing and building a pair of 
systems capable of fulfilling the range, altitude, and 
accuracy specifications for the system.  The only contract 
specification they could not meet was the original 
intention have it airborne as well, but systems development 
problems made this requirement ancillary in comparison to 
overall project completion.  After tens of thousands of 
dollars in cost overruns, Eckert and Mauchly convinced 
project managers to drop the airborne condition in an 
effort to meet or exceed the remainder of the 
requirements.247 
     Eighteen months after Rawlins let the contract, the 
result was a computer system the corporation officially 
named BINAC, an obvious derivation of the machine’s binary 
number system operation and a similar-sounding moniker to 
its ENIAC predecessor.  BINAC was a sophisticated, high-





speed calculation device that could produce up to 3500 
additions or subtractions, or 1000 multiplications or 
divisions, per second.  Moreover, it was a bit-serial 
binary computer that hosted two independent processing 
units, each with its own 512-word acoustic mercury delay 
line memory.  BINAC was not groundbreaking but was rather 
an evolutionary step in the creation of the faster, more 
powerful computer systems that developed later.  Perhaps 
its greatest achievement was that both contractor and 
customer achieved a satisfactory end-state by the time the 
contract ended.  Eckert and Mauchly’s computer corporation 
received enough funding and experience from BINAC to 
utilize the computer as a partial prototype for the longer-
awaited Univac venture.  As for the Northrop Corporation – 
and by default, the U.S. Air Force – immediate possession 
of one of the smallest and most powerful computational 
systems available further solidified their contributions to 
the rapidly developing computer industry.248 
     The second computer deriving from Rawlins’ decision 
came directly from within Northrop itself – the 
aforementioned DiDA.  Northrop engineers worked tirelessly 
to modify the system in order to make it compatible with 
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the Snark’s navigational requirements until such time as 
the project went to contract.   That contractual change 
became the catalyst for Northrop executives to realign the 
computer group and reevaluate new uses for both the project 
and its previous personnel.  One of the most significant 
changes was the addition of magnetic drum memory as DiDA’s 
primary storage device, allowing Northrop’s computer 
experts to repackage the machine and allow the company to 
seek to market the product in new and different ways.  The 
end-result was called Maddida, short for Magnetic Drum 
Digital Differential Analyzer, and was significant enough 
to attract the attention of other military and industrial 
organizations.249 
     Northrop may have performed the work for this project 
but the system truly belonged to the Air Force given its 
development under the pre-existing Snark contract.  
Regardless of ownership, the company still had to prove the 
computer’s worth to the air arm as an improved differential 
analyzer.  Maddida was an impressive machine to those who 
studied these machines, employing sixty-eight vacuum tubes, 
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came from the numerous editions of the Navy’s Digital 
Computer Newsletter – specifically, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Aug 




one magnetic drum, and the integrating capacity of twenty-
two differential analyzers.  Reports in the mid-1950 
editions of the Digital Computer Newsletter portray Maddida 
as a developing system built to solve differential 
equations and thus making it a viable system for both the 
military’s scientific and its operational communities.  
Northrop believed in the product to such an extent that 
they sent Maddida prototypes to educational and military 
institutions across the country to prove its capabilities.  
By July 1951, Maddida was in use in several Air Force 
locations while new and improved versions remained 
throughout the service until the middle of the decade.  
What was once thought to be a casualty of corporate 
competition turned out to be a viable machine in the 
military’s growing computer arsenal.250 
     Scientists and developers throughout this period built 
on one another’s successes as the interest and funding for 
computer programs continued to escalate.  Air Force 
officers and senior civilians who engaged in these projects 
soon realized that program funding was often easier for 
systems that directly supported the service’s primary 
                                                          
250 Ibid.   Also see United States Navy Office of Naval 
Research, A Survey of Large Digital Computers and Computer 
Projects, report (Department of the Navy, 1950), 17. 
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operational mission of manned flight.  While there were a 
number of systems in significant competition for funding 
and resources midway through the decade, few if any fit the 
mold of an Air Force operational system quite as well as 
did the illustrious Whirlwind Computer.    
     During World War II, the U.S. Navy contracted with the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) to develop a 
“computer-aided” system to support its pilot training 
program.  The project began in 1944 through the Office of 
Naval Research at MIT’s Servomechanisms Laboratory and was 
specifically developed as a crude computer-aided flight 
simulator (simulated aircraft telemetry connected to a 
cockpit mock-up) for the U.S. Navy.  The post-war 
environment and changing military priorities completely 
changed the course of the program by 1949 and was 
transformed into Project Whirlwind, a high-speed electronic 
digital computer system capable of solving complex problems 
through the repeated use of fundamental arithmetic and 
logical operations.  Its first demonstration on 20 April 
1951 quickly earmarked this electronic high-speed digital 
computer as a landmark machine as it was not only a pioneer 
effort in real-time information processing but also the 
first digital computer capable of displaying real time text 
and graphics on a video terminal (at the time, a large 
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oscilloscope screen).  The possibilities for Whirlwind 
continued to grow following this demonstration, but so too 
did the requirement costs.  With their stake in the program 
waning and expenditures more than twenty-five percent over 
budget, the Navy soon lost interest.  By 1953, the Navy had 
abandoned Whirlwind and left the Air Force as the project’s 
sole military user.251   
     The Whirlwind’s impact on computing over the next 
decade extended well beyond the innovations displayed in 
1951.  One significant development involving Whirlwind was 
the Lincoln Laboratory, a joint venture between the 
military and MIT that bonded the educational institution 
with the research and development programs of the air 
service’s Scientific Advisory Board.  This innovative 
combination of organizations became the forerunner for 
other similar research and development agencies such as 
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MITRE and the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA).  A 
second effort connected with Whirlwind was the invention of 
magnetic-core memory, which altered the course of computer 
storage technology that had seemed stuck utilizing less-
reliable storage-tube memory systems.  Companies such as 
IBM and RCA soon applied this core memory in their 
commercial computer projects and it became a fundamental 
stepping stone in their success.  However, of all the 
groundbreaking aspects arising from the Air Force’s Project 
Whirlwind, few compare to the computer’s use in the AN/FSQ-
7 combat direction computer and its connection to the 
service’s other critical operational effort:  Project SAGE. 
     SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Equipment) was a ground-
based air defense system initially designed to help protect 
the United States against long-range bombing attacks.  
Historians credit the project as the first major real-time, 
computer-based command and control system, of which the 
AN/FSQ-7 was a central unit.  SAGE weighed 250 tons and 
contained more than 60,000 vacuum tubes, making it the 
biggest and heaviest computer system ever built.  At a cost 
of more than $8 Billion, it was also the most expensive 
computer system in history.  The program also consumed some 
of the greatest computer experts and technical resources of 
the age, including over 800 programmers from the military, 
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a number of the country’s leading computer corporations, 
and field “pioneers” Jay Forrester, George Valley, and 
J.C.R. Licklider.  The integration of Whirlwind technology 
and the constant innovations pushed by Lincoln Labs and 
SAGE vendors advanced the Air Force’s computer technology 
baseline beyond comparison with standard industry 
systems.252   
     The Whirlwind/SAGE computer efforts in the early 1950s 
dramatically changed the Air Force’s computer research and 
development efforts, even though SAGE did not achieve its 
initial operational capability until 1958.  This was 
because beyond the advances in air defense and telemetry 
calculations, SAGE was first and foremost a calculation 
machine that was built on the algorithmic programming 
required of an air defense system.  As Thomas Hughes 
clarifies in his book Rescuing Prometheus, “[t]hough SAGE 
is conventionally portrayed as an air defense system, it 
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can also be described as an information-processing and 
real-time control system.”253  SAGE may have been a 
programmatic disappointment by the late 1950s, but its 
involvement with Whirlwind throughout the early part of the 
decade ensured it became an essential part of some notably 
groundbreaking events.254 
     By the time SEAC, BINAC, Whirlwind, and many of the 
other aforementioned projects reached completion, the scope 
of the computing environment was still expanding.  By the 
end of 1955, the list of distinct, major computer models in 
use throughout government, industry, and academia had grown 
to several dozen.  The decisions made in response to 
potential evolutionary changes and innovative improvements 
produced calls for systems upgrades or component 
conversions with the United States Air Force at the 
forefront of expansion.  The air service had clearly 
established itself as a leader in the fields of scientific 
and mathematical computing by the middle of the decade, 
most especially in the research and development segments of 
the organization.  Programs like SAGE and the ATLAS missile 
project continued to push the envelope of Air Force 
                                                          





scientific development for the next several years, and 
computers played a major role in such programs.  Were it 
not for the proactive nature of Air Force scientists, 
systems developers, and leaders, the history of specific 
computer mission systems might look considerably different 
today. 
Part III - Early Air Force Data Management and 
Mechanization 
 
     Statistical control and data mechanization pervaded 
most Army Air Force operations and administration during 
World War II.  The AAF’s Statistical Control Units in the 
field delivered essential information to upper echelons on 
a regular basis as part of the most comprehensive data 
collection and exploitation mechanism ever used in the 
United States military.  This management of data and 
statistics was integral to the tactical and strategic 
decisions of AAF generals such as Hap Arnold, Carl Spaatz, 
and Curtis Lemay, and became a natural function of daily 
operations throughout the service.    
     These data processes endured long after World War II 
was over.  The Army expended a great deal of post-war 
effort eliminating extraneous organizations and personnel, 
but the offices and operations of statistical services were 
not among them.  Instead, branch requirements for 
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comprehensive data and statistical information remained an 
important feature in military operations and planning, and 
enabled the service’s use of punched card machines and data 
tabulators until the days of Project SCOOP and Univac.  It 
became incumbent upon the division chiefs and project 
leaders in Statistical Services to find new ways to harness 
this information in forms that benefited all levels of the 
service.  The AAF decision maker’s growing reliance on 
information mechanization was no longer a wartime 
phenomenon; it was now an embedded reality in the very 
culture of the air arm.   
     Statistical Service’s first comprehensive, mechanized 
data management effort began in the waning years of World 
War II.  Departmental leaders sought to compile the vast 
amount of statistical information acquired annually through 
the punched card to teletype delivery system.  So much 
information traversed air service units that the immediate 
solution seemed almost elementary – compile an annual, all-
inclusive compendium, using the latest in data exploitation 
techniques, which could be distributed across service 
organizations and would promote the impressive statistical 
processing capabilities of the statistical services unit.  
In 1945, the Army published its first major data collection 
volume:  the Army Air Forces Statistical Digest (World War 
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II).255  The AAF’s intention was to prove to service leaders 
the value of widespread statistical mechanization and 
display the breadth and depth of the information such 
automation could attain.  Along with a large supplemental 
addendum, the digest contained a voluminous amount of 
mission and support information covering everything from 
combat and operational data to training and recruiting 
statistics.  Even as the air arm transitioned out of the 
Army organization in 1947, the service’s year-end 
statistical data requirement remained unchanged and 
continued to provide data and statistical continuity 
throughout its transition.256 
     By 1950, the officially renamed United States Air 
Force Statistical Digest was christened as “the official 
Air Force statistical yearbook for the presentation of 
summary statistics on all phases of Air Force activity, 
strength, and operations.”257  The fifth annual compilation 
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256 Operations Statistics Division of the Directorate of 
Statistical Services, Deputy Chief of 
Staff/Comptroller, United States Air Force Statistical 
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Defense Technical Information Center, 1950). 
 
257 Operations Statistics Division, United States Air Force 
Statistical Digest, Jan 1949-Jun 1950. 
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was more than just a large accumulation of data:  it had 
grown into an enormous, multi-disciplinary anthology.  This 
installment was a mammoth undertaking containing over four 
hundred pages of numerical tables and figures of a quantity 
rarely consolidated in one volume.  Its sixteen major 
sections comprehensively represented each phase of Air 
Force activities and represented months of data collection 
and exploitation even with the assistance of card machines 
and tabulators.  This inclusive and wide-ranging compendium 
was so vital to service reporting and statistical 
evaluation that Air Force officials refused to cut back on 
it despite pending budget reductions.  The United States 
Air Force Statistical Digest in 1950 was not just an 
important document in the service’s administrative arsenal; 
it had become common, essential, and expected regardless of 
cost.258 
     The digest was indicative of an information landscape 
where such publications – along with the daily, weekly, and 
monthly reports due to headquarters – were regarded as 
invaluable to service decision makers and the 
organization’s operational tempo.  These reports were part 
of a much larger service reporting system known as Reports 




Control and were a carry-over from Army information 
administration.  Each report (noted by its Reports Control 
Symbol, or RCS) consisted of official data compilations 
that were each formally approved by the Comptroller’s 
office and sanctioned by higher headquarters.259  
Facilitating these transactions were each base’s own 
statistical personnel made up of primarily keypunch 
operators and machine accountants who spent their workdays 
gathering, consolidating, and processing data for virtually 
all major Air Force activities.260  As the central 
controlling authority for this data, Statistical Services 
became the critical link for information management across 
the Air Force.261 
                                                          
259 Each RCS report carried a specific alphanumeric 
designation distinguishing it from the myriad of other 
documents passing through the headquarters at that time.  
RCS reports included daily maintenance activities, 
personnel status reports, supply levels and budgetary 
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260 “Processing” included encoding data on cardboard punched 
cards and then electronically transmitting it to higher 
headquarters for utilization.   
 
261 Service histories of this period are replete with 
information on RCS reports and PCAM usage as these were a 
primary function of the operation.  See United States Air 
Force, Historical Summary: Directorate of Statistical 
Services, DCS/Comptroller for the Periods of 1 January – 30 
June 1950 (Washington: United States Air Force, 1950) and 
United States Air Force, Historical Summary: Directorate of 
Statistical Services, DCS/Comptroller for the Periods of 1 
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    In the early 1950s, the importance of these daily 
information activities were matched in significance by the 
strategic statistical information compiled and utilized by 
department planners and tacticians.  At the hub of this 
activity was Marshall Wood, the civilian scientist who in 
1947 became the division chief of Planning Research and the 
Assistant Director of Management Analysis.  More 
importantly, Wood was at the forefront of the Univac 
acquisition and Project SCOOP along with George Dantzig and 
the Air Force’s top military leaders.  While the Air Force 
awaited computerized solutions to its pending problems and 
studies, Marshall Wood and his staff developed key manuals 
and data management directives that gave utility to the 
information analysis and exploitation already underway at 
the Pentagon.  Of these publications, one of the most 
important was simply known as WPF-50.262  
     The Wartime Planning Factors Manual, or WPF-50, 
provided contemporary and realistic planning information to 
the Air Staff and became an essential data set for 
                                                          
July – 31 December 1950 (Washington: United States Air 
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262 For more information on Marshall Wood, see "Pioneer in 
Government Computer Planning," Washington Post, February 





commanding air generals during the Korean War.  Wood’s 
statisticians built the manual from World War II 
statistical records and applied the data to current war 
planning factors to illicit statistical data comparisons 
between like air-centric operations.  Such analysis was the 
result of years of statistical compilations and reporting, 
and provided valuable information that allowed air leaders 
and planners to update and modernize their tactics, 
aircraft and equipment data.  In one particular case, 
Wood’s division used a statistical data set built in 1945 
to compare the relationship between operational aircraft 
damage and loss rates (fighters and bombers) in World War 
II to help the Air Force’s acquisition planners consider 
the newest suite of aircraft to come off the line for 
Korea.  In turn, the Korean War provided a tremendous 
opportunity to review previous war planning calculations 
and data sets and improve upon them by giving statisticians 
the opportunity to hone operational reporting skills not 
utilized since the previous war.263 
                                                          
263 Information covering the application of WPF-50 manual in 
the Korean War is located in United States Air 
Force, Historical Summary: Directorate of Statistical 
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June 1950 (Washington: United States Air Force, 1950), 15-
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     The end of the Korean War did not diminish the demand 
for statistical data across the service.  The Air Force 
instead demanded statistical services keep  “tight 
administrative control and disciplined planning” over the 
service’s data, especially when examining logistics 
resources, detailing materiel resources and equipment, and 
accounting for air service readiness in any of its primary 
missions.264  Moreover, in light of the computing progress 
made during the war, the Air Force could now employ its new 
calculation technology to enhance its information 
reporting.  Data management leaders like Dantzig and Wood 
were instrumental in helping Air Force developers compile 
special programs for the Project SCOOP (SEAC) and Univac 
computers and thereby integrate the two worlds of data 
processing and computing. In fact, the Air Staff created an 
entire subsection of operations entitled “Special Program 
Computations” to handle the headquarters’ requests 
requiring unique computational or methodological assistance 
that fell into this category.  This integration between 
systems – between the Pentagon’s data processing and 
reporting processes and its newest computing projects – 
helped formalize the field of Air Force data automation, to 




include developing statistical services into its own 
automation organization.265 
    The post-war propagation of RCS reports and other data 
compilations contributed to the service’s growing need for 
electric accounting machines and punched-card accounting 
machine (PCAM) equipment.  By the end of 1953, Headquarters 
Air Force’s requirement for field reports topped more than 
450 individual compilations by year’s end, which was in 
addition to nearly 300 additional reports for the Secretary 
of Defense and another 308 for internal use.  Senior 
leaders relied so heavily on this information that they 
began including data reporting and mechanization objectives 
in their strategic guidance to their staff and field units.  
This tone was first set by Air Force Assistant Vice Chief 
of Staff Major General William F. McKee in 1952 when he 
informed the Directorates of Installations and Statistical 
Services that base-level reporting mechanization was now 
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one of his top objectives.  Air logistics leaders echoed 
this sentiment by publishing (under the Deputy Chief of 
Staff of Materiel) their own strategic guidance promoting 
the use of advanced electronic information-handling devices 
in order to increase materiel logistics efficiency.266  
Experienced logisticians understood how automation could 
replace time-consuming paperwork and increase the 
effectiveness of the service-wide system as a whole.  
General McKee’s edict in 1952 only solidified their desire 
for data processing expansion and kept their interest in 
data mechanization high.267   
     Yet another example of this senior level guidance 
derived from the Air Force’s Office of the Comptroller 
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Force, Historical Summary: Directorate of Statistical 
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itself.   Air leaders gathered from across the department 
at the service’s annual Worldwide Comptroller’s Conference 
to speculate on the practicality of mechanizing the Air 
Force’s budget system.  The conference aimed to accomplish 
this by appointing the task to a joint committee made up of 
directorate representatives from Budget, Accounting, and 
Statistical Services.  The committee took only a few months 
before they first submitted plans to use data mechanization 
equipment to improve the Directorate of Budget’s processes 
. . . a plan that was immediately approved.  With the 
program underway so quickly, the Comptroller wasted little 
time in seeking opportunities to “mechanize” or “automate” 
existing paperwork systems using the Univac and other 
proposed computers planned for acquisition.  The 
Comptroller and other senior Pentagon offices looked to 
data mechanization as part of their directorate’s future.  
Air Force leaders began publically praising the benefits of 
information automation in their correspondence.268  
     The primary focus of the statistical services at the 
end of 1953 remained data production and transfer.  Air 
Force data integration efforts only confirmed the division 
between what the air service expected electric/punched card 
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accounting machines to accomplish and what the Univac 
computer could calculate and produce just a few floors down 
in the Pentagon’s basement.  The Univac’s use for 
Programming and Budgeting projects highlighted the 
connection between the two processes, especially since the 
Univac’s data most often derived directly from Statistical 
Services’ PCAM-generated data and reports in the first 
place.  Throughout the year, indeed, and at the Worldwide 
Comptroller’s Conference, the idea that the Univac computer 
should take Statistical Services punched card output to 
perform further “immensely complicated calculations” 
involving personnel, training, and requirements issues was 
considered.269  Statistics leaders even pondered the 
possibility of a new device that collected data like 
accounting machines, processed information like the Univac, 
but included more memory to store the entire inventory of 
Air Force items.  Such a machine was to be known as a 
“data-processing” machine and was thought to have great 
strategic value for the organization and became a model for 
what mechanization might look like in the future.270     
                                                          
269 Ibid. 
 
270 United States Air Force, Historical Summary: Directorate 
of Statistical Services, DCS/Comptroller for the Period of 
1 January - 30 June 1954; United States Air Force. 
Historical Summary: Directorate of Statistical Services, 
222 
 
     As 1954 began, the Air Force’s data management 
successes remained a direct reflection of its lead 
statistical office and the hard work of many personnel.  It 
was additionally a direct reflection of the efforts of the 
organization’s experienced leader, Director of Statistical 
Services Major General Charles Raeburne “C. R.” Landon.  
Landon had led the data management unit since 1950 and was 
one of a select group of commanders who possessed a 
background in operations, supply, and personnel 
administration.  One of his most significant contributions 
came early in his tenure when he established the unit’s 
four primary mission areas:  directive and report 
verification; data consolidation and recording; statistical 
and mathematical data application; and data interpretation 
and presentation.  As a former enlisted Marine and longtime 
veteran of the Army’s Adjutant General Corps, Landon was no 
stranger to administrative paperwork and fully understood 
the possibilities for data automation across the 
information-heavy directorates.  His guidance and 
leadership during the migration of PCAM and computing 
equipment into statistical operations placed him on the 
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leading edge of Air Force data automation.  Moreover, his 
leadership through both the Air Force’s early strategic 
changes as well as the tactical challenges of the Korean 
War became a testament to his information management vision 
for the service.271 
     1954 marked General Landon’s fourth and final year as 
director.  When he took over in February 1950 his 
responsibilities predominately surrounded the rapidly 
increasing use of electrical accounting techniques.  Over 
the next four years, however, Landon served out his third 
“war” overcoming two well-engrained paradigms in Air Force 
field units:  first, that base mechanization was primarily 
a unit accounting function; and second, that such 
activities were mostly confined to the Pentagon or Air 
Materiel Command.  These patterns made sense at the time as 
pre-1950 unit involvement included only localized base-
level processing that fed a headquarters-derived 
requirement.  In order to ensure the entire air arm 
understood his current automation methodology, the general 
authored the Directorate’s strategic “Planning for Calendar 
Year 1954” report, stating that “[t]he contributions of 
Statistical Services to Air Force management may be 




measured in terms of the continuing improvements in the 
accuracy and timeliness of basic data, and the continuing 
progress in the extension of sound, modern mechanized 
business techniques to Air Staff Operations.”272  His goals 
to “explore and develop further mechanization of new 
reporting systems in major management areas” and to 
“continue expansion of base mechanization as a means of 
increasing the efficiency of administrative or support 
activities” set the tone for the future of the statistical 
services.273     
     Landon retired in July 1954 after more than four years 
in Statistical Services.  Brigadier General Llewellyn O. 
Ryan took over the unit whose rise in importance was 
reflected by its increases in personnel and machinery.   
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With a worldwide statistical organization of 11,000 
military and civilian personnel structured in a network 
across all Air Force bases, Ryan’s new unit used 
approximately one hundred million dollars’ worth of 
electronic and electric accounting machines and amounted to 
the “largest application of modern business equipment ever 
developed in industry or government.”274  The general began 
his tenure by charging the directorate to seek new ways to 
manage the volume of statistical data requirements.  One 
solution involved centralizing information responsibility 
into one headquarters unit, which Ryan accomplished by 
appointing the Materiel Statistics Division as the primary 
manager of all data reporting on Air Force installations.  
Another was assigning responsibility for technology 
integration across the service by delegating it to the 
Machine Accounting Division.  This division became 
responsible for merging the air service’s electronic data 
processing equipment with existing punched-card systems.  
Finally, the directorate spent a considerable amount of 
effort modifying and refining existing reporting systems to 
ensure its baseline programs remained reliable and 
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effective.  The efforts of General Ryan and his staff 
prepared the organization for an unknown operational and 
administrative future in the wake of two wars and periods 
of great organizational and technological growth.275   
     The increasing quantity of service statistical 
requirements sent Air Force researchers looking for systems 
with greater capacity and speed than those currently in 
inventory.  Program managers began looking to their sister 
services and industry to survey the latest data processing 
equipment the market had to offer.  Experts directed 
project managers to companies such as Remington Rand, RCA, 
and IBM.  Headquarters programmers tested the IBM 650 drum 
calculator as a solution for several existing data 
processing projects, culminating in an air service purchase 
of a dozen machines by year’s end.  Air Materiel Command 
already employed eight of its own IBM 650 units plus a 
newly acquired Remington Rand Univac.  While the number of 
Statistical Services computers was significantly on the 
rise, these were still heavily outnumbered by the existing 
data processing machines remaining in the field.  By 
comparison, the Air Force still had 4,946 electric 
                                                          
275 United States Air Force, Historical Summary: Directorate 
of Statistical Services, DCS/Comptroller for the Period of 
1 June - 31 December 1954, 4-35. 
227 
 
accounting machines in use at 170 installations across the 
Service by the end of 1954, up from 4,417 machines and 122 
installations the previous year.  The service was therefore 
clearly approaching a data machinery decision point and its 
leaders had little choice but to begin deciding which 
equipment to pursue for its future.276     
     In 1955, the United States Air Force formally decided 
to pursue a data processing environment beyond its 
traditional World War II-era reporting system.  To do so 
necessitated extending the scope of mechanized reporting 
and creating an integrated reporting system that 
encompassed the entire service.  Moreover, it required 
improving the quality and speed of its current systems, 
installing newer high-speed computing equipment at both the 
headquarters and in the field, and ensuring base 
mechanization became the organization’s principle 
management tool.   To manage and lead the post-war Air 
Force meant abandoning older information management 
techniques and embracing a single, integrated program that 
could handle the service’s mounting information 
requirements.  1955 was an important year in the branch’s 




data processing history and heralded the beginning of a new 
Air Force data automation era.277     
     On January 20, 1955, the Air Force officially 
recognized data automation as a legitimate departmental 
mission by establishing the first centralized office 
assigned to integrate it into service operations.  This 
Office of the Special Assistant to the Directorate for Base 
Mechanization commandeered the data processing function out 
of its home in the Plans and Liaison (P&L) Group and 
created a separate office within the headquarters where it 
no longer shared the data mission responsibility.  The 
decision to create such an office was not an easy one for 
Air Staff leaders.  However, the growth of data processing 
throughout the air service – generation, transmission, 
exploitation, and distribution – simply grew too large and 
too important to leave in either a bifurcated or 
subordinate position.  The Air Force charged former World 
                                                          
277 The service history of this period covers all the 
individual branches and divisions of the larger Statistical 
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details of a new era of base mechanization with an 
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War II B-24 Liberator pilot Colonel Thomas E. Peddy and a 
senior staff consisting of a pair of former P&L majors, 
Wesley Saville and Seymour Colman, to run the unit.  All 
three understood this was not a permanent assignment, but 
each also understood the importance of making this new 
mission work.278   
     The base mechanization environment Peddy and his staff 
faced in 1955 was incredibly convoluted, especially after 
years without central direction.  The majority of service 
equipment originated from the IBM inventory but its 
acquisition and distribution had been haphazard across the 
major commands.  Leaders outside the Statistical Services 
were not surprised by the lack of service-wide 
standardization, but they certainly were alarmed.  The 
staff of the Special Assistant’s office attempted to 
rectify the situation by taking a number of immediate 
actions.  First, they developed an Air Force policy 
directive that covered the application of data machine 
                                                          
278 Specific data on Colonel Peddy found in several 
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procedures, including base-level operations, record keeping 
and reporting.  Second, the staff built an implementation 
schedule for the entire service base mechanization effort.  
With 144 bases contemplating mechanizing, as well as 74 of 
them already mechanized in one or more subject matter 
areas, such a schedule provided a baseline for 
implementation that had been non-existent in years past.  
Third, a Base Mechanization manual was developed to ensure 
the existence of standardized automation implementation 
procedures.  Finally, the office sponsored and formed a 
Base Mechanization Coordinating Committee to assist and 
advise the Air Staff on all relevant automation matters.  
These initial actions played a significant part in 
providing the much needed structure absent in previous 
program management activities.  Unfortunately, it was not 
enough to counteract them all.279   
     One of the biggest issues facing a service-wide base 
mechanization effort was enlisted training.  At the end of 
1954, an Air Proving Ground Command evaluation of the 
Machine Accountant training course highlighted the same 
issues many Major Command leaders found in previous program 
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Directorate of Statistical Services, DCS/Comptroller for 
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efforts.  The training course was located at Sheppard Air 
Force Base in Texas and trained all new career field 
entrants in preparation for any Air Force statistical 
machine operator position.   Commanders concerned about the 
lack of continuity between base mechanization programs 
found the training courses ineffective at preparing 
trainees for their positions in the field.  The issue 
became so pronounced that the de facto trainee solution was 
for them to learn what they could at Sheppard but be 
prepared to receive their meaningful, full-qualification 
training “on-the-job” at their duty location. The Command’s 
own evaluation not only highlighted the problems inherent 
in service training, but also illuminated the 
standardization problems across the service itself.  Its 
findings were but one of the challenges Colonel Peddy and 
his office would face all year.280 
     The training course staff had several objectives in 
mind for each trainee.  First, course instructors educated 
                                                          
280 Information on the Machine Accountants Course is found 
in United States Air Force Air Proving Ground 
Command, Final Report on Evaluation of Graduates of Machine 
Accountants Course, Project Number APG/CSC/388-A (Dayton, 
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new Machine Accountants in the wiring and operation of the 
IBM 402 Accounting Machine, along with its corresponding 
sorter, interpreter, and collator.  Additionally, they 
familiarized the students with the IBM 407 Accounting 
Machine, a successor to the 402, and its associated sorter 
and collator.  Both of these accounting machines (and their 
peripherals) were late 1940s-era machines and were in 
widespread use across the service.  However, instructors 
understood these two systems only covered a portion of the 
machines that future machine accountants would face on 
active duty.  For example, those students returning to a 
base with an IBM 063 Card Controlled Tape Punch Machine had 
no training opportunities at Sheppard, and those who 
learned to operate the IBM 514 Automatic Reproducing Punch 
Control Machine could only do so on the older models as the 
newer models were not covered at all.  Moreover, evaluators 
at Air Proving Command noted that trainers spent an entire 
week familiarizing students with the IBM 101 Electronic 
Statistical Machine, which leaders deemed wasteful due to 
the 101’s limited service use across the Air Force.  Coping 
with this cornucopia of accounting machines, along with the 
discontinuity issues, was naturally relegated to Colonel 
Peddy’s organization.  With more than fifty new pieces of 
electronic accounting equipment entering the air service 
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each month, equipment standardization remained an issue for 
Peddy for the remainder of his tenure.281   
     The remainder of the year witnessed the continued 
progress of programs established in January, including the 
consolidation of the Air Force’s integrated RCS reporting 
system.  Progress also involved the continued increase in 
the number of Air Force bases with punched card equipment, 
a corresponding increase in the utilization of each machine 
(indicated by the number of reports processed each period), 
a sustained emphasis on machine processing procedure 
standardization (to counteract the formal and OJT training 
issues), and the modification and refinement of existing 
reports.  Additionally, Peddy’s office made a concerted 
effort to recruit more military and civilian personnel into 
the career field to deal with a shortage of trained machine 
operators caused by widening the program.  Finally, 
headquarters began preparations for a service-wide project 
that included installing high-speed electronic computing 
equipment at each base location, presumably to take over 
the data management task of personnel report processing.282  
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Colonel Peddy and his staff decided in September that the 
program was finally stable enough to update commanders on 
the office’s progress, which they did the Air Force’s 
first-ever Base Mechanization Conference.283    
     On December 31, 1955, after a full year dedicated to 
little but base mechanization, the Air Force formally 
disbanded Colonel Peddy’s Office of the Special Assistant 
to the Directorate for Base Mechanization.  Managing all 
punched card tabulating machines and electronic data 
processing equipment over the previous year amounted to 
successfully attaining a statistical reporting process at 
nearly all Air Force base-level organizations.  This 
milestone meant a special program office was no longer 
needed.  A more formal and long-lasting office to oversee 
the program’s future was now required.  The Air Force 
seemed pleased with the role of the Special Assistant’s 
office, but especially with the work of Major Saville who 
earned an Air Force Commendation Medal for his work during 
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283 Air Training Command played host to the first official 
Base Mechanization Coordinating Committee Conference held 
at Scott Air Force Base.  See United States Air Force, 
Historical Summary: Directorate of Statistical Services, 




the program’s test period.  Peddy left the Special Program 
Office in phenomenal shape, having truly become a catalyst 
for service-wide data automation in the Air Force.284   
     To replace the Special Assistant’s office, the Air 
Force formally appointed the Comptroller’s Directorate of 
Statistical Services as the program manager for all punched 
card and electronic data processing equipment in the air 
arm at the end of 1955.  This meant that any piece of 
electronic equipment designed to record, communicate, and 
process data now came under the purview of the directorate.  
Operational and scientific computers like those in the SAGE 
and ATLAS programs maintained their own separate program 
management.  For those focusing on data management and 
exploitation elsewhere, however, responsibility fell to the 
directorate.  The service was on track to implement base 
mechanization systems for 158 programs across the Air Force 
by year’s end, including the maintenance, personnel, and 
supply programs that made up the bulk of the air service’s 
data reporting.  With so many base mechanization programs 
in place, it finally appeared as if the Department of the 
                                                          




Air Force – all of it – had officially embraced the 
computer as the newest phase of its information journey.285    
Conclusion 
     Unlike other programs and procedures that ended with 
World War II, August 1945 did not mark the termination of 
air service data and statistical control.  Quite the 
contrary: such procedures became more entrenched and 
organized, with the greatest surge coming after 
independence a few years later.   The statistical services 
worked through the war using the information technology 
available, primarily punched card tabulators and 
electromechanical calculators.  AAF leaders meanwhile 
received their information through this “stat system” with 
little need for major process improvements during the war.  
With the development of the ENIAC and its posited 
capabilities, however, the Army computer’s reputation 
opened the aperture to a future that immediately included 
high-speed data proliferation.  It still took someone, 
however, not just something, to make such a capability 
available to the air arm in the late 1940s.  
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     The Air Force computing programs that succeeded the 
ENIAC were not isolated efforts but rather part of a 
growing crescendo of interest originally billed as Project 
SCOOP.   Although SCOOP had the support of the Air Force 
Chief of Staff and the Comptroller General, it was civilian 
mathematician George Dantzig’s insistence and perseverance 
that made the venture such a meaningful endeavor.   The 
documents surrounding the project’s early implementation do 
not read as a downward-directed edict but rather as the 
musings of leaders impressed by capabilities they hardly 
understood.  In essence, while the enthusiasm for new 
technology belonged to these Air Force general officers, 
the actual understanding of the potential Air Force 
applications of computers belonged to Dantzig, Harry 
Huskey, and others.  Without Project SCOOP, Air Force 
efforts like the SEAC/Interim Computer, the Numerical 
Analysis/SWAC Computer, and the UNIVAC computer might not 
have come to pass in the manner that they did.   
     The operational computer systems under development 
were likewise influenced by their project managers rather 
than just the expectations of those at the top.  The 
development of BINAC for Northrop’s Snark missile project, 
the spin-off development of the Maddida differential 
analyzer, and the rescue and reapplication of the Whirlwind 
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computer were all the product of service advocates who 
challenged traditional practices and risked their careers 
to advance computer applications.  Additionally, 
information projects such as SAGE and ATLAS continued 
testing computer potential driven by the scientists, 
systems developers, and leaders who supported them.  In the 
years between its independence and the centralization of 
computer applications in Statistical Control, the number 
and capabilities of service computers grew exponentially 
through these often bottom-up efforts.  By 1955, the 
service was firmly established as a leader in the fields of 
scientific and mathematical computing.   
     Intertwined with all this computer system development 
was the issue of data management.  Although it was 
important to determine what computer system would 
manipulate the service’s data, and how, it became even more 
important to determine what data would be exploited, and 
from where.  Data compendiums like United States Air Force 
Statistical Digest and the Wartime Planning Factors Manual 
(WPF-50) were as well-known and influential as the 
computers (i.e. SEAC, Univac, Maddida) that manipulated 
data.   While many of the statistical processes were born 
in World War II, it was the Korean War that solidified the 
prominence of the statistical services and led to it 
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becoming the service’s computer focal point.  Through all 
the top-down authorized changes, however, it was always the 
individuals in the fray who made data automation a service 
reality.  Civilians like Dantzig and Wood were institutions 
in service computing and remained dominant voices behind 
the data mechanization projects of the 1950s.  The public 
face, meanwhile, belonged to military officers such as 
Landon, Ryan, Peddy and Saville, whose diligence and 
tenacity helped data automation become the success it was 
by mid-decade.  
     The period September 1947 to December 1955 witnessed 
the bulk of the service’s transition into the era of 
computing, both in computer application and data 
automation.  However, I argue this was a part of, but 
should not be confused with, its longer and more 
established “information age” that began almost a century 
earlier.  Data mechanization and the service’s information 
applications began long before 1955, but the centralization 
of these activities and the application of computing mark 
this as a new stage of the Air Force’s evolving information 
environment.  Whether this period is lumped in with other 
historical periodizations such as a “computer age,” an 
“electronic age,” or a “digital age” is a matter of 
conjecture and preference.  The fact is that these new 
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innovations saw information continuing to grow as a 
valuable Air Force commodity, with the principle difference 
being how it could be harnessed and exploited.  By 
officially creating a Special Assistant for Base 
Mechanization in 1955, as well as formally assigning the 
Directorate as the central authority for data processing 
equipment, the Air Force was preparing itself to enter this 
new era without abandoning older premises.  The need to 
collect, manage, and exploit the service’s large data 
resources remained a vital part of the organization’s 
methodology.  The difference after 1955 would be how such 
method’s would be achieved.286        
     In the early days of computing, the Air Force had the 
benefit of being a new and extraordinarily technical 
military department, thus granting it the latitude to 
explore and contribute to the greater technological efforts 
underway in industry and academia.  Early data 
mechanization had everyone from the most senior Air Force 
leaders to the lowest airmen looking to advances in 
electronic tabulators and accounting machines to connect 
geographically separated units with information and 
alleviate the growing stacks of paperwork in a massive 
                                                          




bureaucracy.  Luckily, by the end of this period, these two 
endeavors began to unite.  By 1955, the same companies that 
were bidding on computer contracts for aviation projects 
were often the same ones that sought to create the next, 
better data processing machine.  As the lines between an 
electronic data processor and a general purpose computer 
began to blur, these devices became more and more 
commonplace in the military and in general.  For the Air 
Force, the impact on the Department was clearly 
substantial.  While the mission of the Air Force may have 
been to fly and fight, no one was doing much of either 
without the assistance of either a computer or data 
processor, or both.  In time, the two machines would become 
one and the same. 
     This chapter focuses on the origins of Air Force 
computing and mechanized data management through a 
leadership as well as a technological lens.  By 
highlighting some of the service’s overarching 
organizational and operational issues, as well as the 
computer and data processing solutions designed to solve 
them, this chapter hones in on not just how they were 
solved, but also by whom.  Computer and data automation 
history is often a narrative tightly focused on the 
technology that purportedly “enabled” relevant changes in 
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the industry.  However, it becomes apparent that it was the 
individual leaders rather than the technology itself that 









The Origins of a Data Automation System, 1953-1968 
     In 1962, the United States Air Force officially 
embarked on the largest and most expensive computer project 
in its fifteen-year history.  Years of smaller, base- and 
command-independent ventures with electronic tabulators, 
punched card machines and even early computers prepared the 
Air Force for a service-wide, cutting-edge upgrade that 
promised to eliminate hundreds of manpower positions, save 
tens of thousands of hours of work, and change the 
organization’s operations by the next decade.  This system 
featured the new UNIVAC 1050-II computer and was the first 
data automation project in the Department of Defense to 
provide “direct and immediate customer access to the 
computer by remote input/output devices.”287   The Air Force 
called this program the Standard Base Supply System, or 
SBSS, and approved a development plan charging supply 
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logisticians with taking the lead role in air service data 
automation.  
     The history of the Air Force’s first data automation 
system is not a common narrative in service history.  
Moreover, that such a massive investment began first in a 
support operation is almost counterintuitive to those 
familiar with the major investments and expenditures of the 
military during this period.   It is more logical to assume 
that a service devoted to aviation and aeronautical support 
would aim its first major computer system directly towards 
manned flight.  Such experimental and costly technological 
advances are most bureaucratically palatable when falling 
within the bounds of an organization’s key mission – in 
this case to fly and fight.  Rather than forging their 
future with flight management automation systems or 
electronic air traffic control data systems, the Air Force 
chose a very different route.  Service leaders instead 
looked to one of the most administratively-intensive 
organizations within its ranks to find the most useful and 
wide-reaching applications of data automation available:  
Base Supply.         
     In Logistics of War, a quintessential service history 
published by the Air Force Logistics Management Agency in 
2000, authors Scott, Rainey and Hunt give their brief 
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assessment for the rationale behind the SBSS’ design and 
fielding.   They suggest that with the initial elements of 
the Vietnam War underway, “an enormous inflow of supplies 
and equipment” going into theater was a primary requirement 
for a new, Air Force computer-based supply system.  
Additionally, the authors refer to a number of preexisting 
and compounding problems in the service’s previous supply 
system, including multiple and incongruent computer and 
manual systems that often ignored the standardized supply 
procedures set forth in Air Force Regulation 67-1, the USAF 
Supply Manual.  Using both rationales, Logistics of War 
helps detail how Air Force leaders developed the SBSS as a 
reaction to both the demands of war and existing service 
constraints.   
     Up to a point, the authors of Logistics of War are 
correct; the Air Force did use the system during the 
Vietnam War and did suffer from a tremendous service-wide 
supply system incompatibility issue.  For example, in the 
latter case specifically, Air Force Director of Supply and 
Service’s Brigadier General A. A. Riemondy stated in his 
Air University Review article, “Supply and Service—The 
Nucleus of Logistics:” 
In 1962 most Air Force base supply 
accounts were managed by a mix of 
manual, punch-card, or computerized 
246 
 
inventory control systems. Eleven 
different systems were in use, each 
designed autonomously by the major 
commands to fit the peculiarities of 
their accounting equipment. 
Proliferation of nonstandard base 
supply systems, designed with minimal 
Hq USAF control, restricted the Air 
Staff in establishing meaningful supply 
policy.288 
 
However, Scott, Rainey and Hunt’s argument that these two 
period-specific issues were somehow the genesis for this 
program grossly underplays the history of the Supply Corps 
and most especially its pioneering legacy.  Discussions 
about such a system predate the program’s actual 
establishment by almost a decade and a tradition of 
integrating new logistical procedures and technologies was 
part of a long heritage of organizational and operational 
improvement that preceded both the first service-purchased 
punched card systems of 1926 and even the card- and form-
based inventory systems of World War I.  In fact, the 
legacy of American supply data improvement dates as far 
back to the first true form- and regulatory-based supply 
methods established a full generation before the Civil War.  
The airmen of Supply and the legions of Army quartermasters 
that preceded them offer a long history of proactivity and 
innovation.  To claim that the SBSS was an isolated and 
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reactive measure to the events of the early 1960s is a 
misrepresentation of the facts. 
     The purpose of this chapter is to place the Standard 
Base Supply System in its proper historical context – as a 
groundbreaking Air Force program built on years of 
discussion and debate and the result of a long legacy of 
logistics innovation.  To do this, I briefly explore 
several key areas in the service’s long history of supply 
accountability and inventory control.  Next, I review the 
debates and events that led to the SBSS as the Air Force’s 
singular and groundbreaking supply system.  Finally, I 
review the evolution of the SBSS program itself, as well as 
illuminate the critical programs that resulted both during 
and after the system’s development.   
 
Humble Beginnings 
     Service logisticians in the early 1950s were 
accustomed to the manual, data-intensive supply inventory 
system that had been initiated long before the Air Force’s 
founding.  Through a series of stock card and supply form 
procedures, airmen accounted for each item in meticulous 
detail and produced composite tallies accordingly.  This 
data was forwarded to senior echelons for reporting and 
evaluation purposes, placed alongside other unit data, and 
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managed with painstaking effort.  However, on the heels of 
Project SCOOP and the UNIVAC’s acceptance, Air Force 
members could finally visualize a “mechanized” or 
“computerized” logistics future that included data 
processing and information data control across the entire 
service.  The fact that the technology did not exist did 
not stop service leaders from developing a requirement for 
such a system, which became more and more elaborate as 
technological capabilities progressed.  Years of technical 
theorizing, the continued operational process, and 
information improvement helped the Standard Base Supply 
System come into existence. 
      Until the 1950’s, the origins of supply 
accountability and control in the air corps could be traced 
back to two founding fathers.  The first was quartermaster 
pioneer Brigadier General Thomas Sydney Jesup who served as 
the Army Quartermaster for an unprecedented 42 years from 
1818 to 1860.  Jesup built the foundation of modern Army 
supply accountability after significantly revising the War 
Department’s preexisting supply methods and techniques.  By 
installing a series of regulations and procedures in the 
years leading up to the Civil War, the general literally 
rewrote the book covering stock item purchases and supply 
requisitioning.  Regarded as the “Father of the 
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[Quartermaster] Corps,” the general set out to improve the 
supply accountability process by creating a form-based 
information process designed to facilitate supply purchases 
through a voucher and receipt system, thus accounting for 
all activity published in the Army’s monthly summary 
reports.  The longtime Army Quartermaster was convinced 
that for a large military, a supply accountability system 
could be effective and efficient so long as individuals 
held themselves accountable and played by the rules.  These 
“rules” remained an effective model not only for the Army 
Quartermaster, but soon also for its Signal Corps whose own 
supply requisitions were a vital operational element.  As 
the air arm began its evolution in 1907, it was these 
supply regulations, forms, and procedures that guided its 
processes through World War I.289 
     While General Jesup built the foundation for supply 
processes and accountability, Colonel (eventually, 
Brigadier General) Augustine Warner Robins led the Army Air 
Corps through its interwar logistics transitions between 
1919 and 1937 by establishing the procedural baseline for 
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the SBSS program.  Airmen at McCook Field (and ultimately 
at Fairfield Air Depot) initially utilized the manual, 
card-based accountability systems operated by the air 
service before and during the war.  With tens of thousands 
of stock cards in cycle each month, the job of inventory 
management was both tedious and time-consuming.  After 
Supply Division Lieutenant Edwin Page engineered a new 
organizational scheme for the manual system, it was Robins 
who advocated the design and set about revamping the 
inventory system altogether.  As Air Force historians 
readily point out, it was Robins who used Page’s 
organizational system in tandem with the preexisting card-
based accountability system in use across the Ohio 
airfields to create a supply accountability system that 
remained in effect until the advent of computers thirty 
years later.290 
     Through these early developments, the importance of 
supply accountability and the necessity for an effective 
base supply system was established in the air arm.  The 
Standard Base Supply System was the service’s first 
departmental automated data system.  The program was a 
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mammoth and costly project that diverted precious manpower, 
equipment and fiscal resources away from other service 
projects and was built on foresight, sacrifice, and the 
inherent notion that data management of a military’s 
materiel stockpile was essential to effective service 
operations.  The SBSS’ success was based on the idea of 
information management as a force multiplier capable of 
increasing operational efficiency while saving resources.  
Thus, this pioneering system, which some logistics airmen 
affectionately nicknamed “the grand-daddy of them all,” 
opened the door to possibilities of data automation and 
consequently became the linchpin to a series of data 
projects in the 1960s, 70s and 80s that completely 
transformed Air Force operations and information 
management.291    
The Inventory Data Processing Discussion 
     Data reporting and exploitation during and after World 
War II, along with the computer advances of the early 
1950s, contributed to an organizational environment 
receptive to the service-wide application of computing.  
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This reception was further aided by government agencies’ 
excitement over receiving their first UNIVAC at the same 
time these Remington Rand systems were correctly predicting 
the 1952 election.292  Contracts for UNIVACs increased 
shortly thereafter, including deliveries for such 
prestigious companies as General Electric, Metropolitan 
Life, U.S. Steel, DuPont, and Westinghouse.  Meanwhile, 
industrial competitor International Business Machines (IBM) 
simultaneously ventured out from its staple product line of 
typewriters and calculating devices to start contributing 
to this new age of computing.  The IBM 701 “electronic data 
processing machine” was UNIVAC’s primary competitor in the 
early 1950s and boasted its own major contracts with Boeing 
Aircraft, General Motors, the University of California and 
the Atomic Energy Commission.  The popularity of computers 
and their applications continued to grow through the early 
part of the decade, and the military remained a pioneering 
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organization.  It was, after all, become a growing part of 
its operational culture.293      
    By 1953, computing and data mechanization had become 
popular themes for discussion in numerous service 
communities of the United States Air Force, but perhaps 
none more so than the community of logisticians.  These 
early years saw both technology experts and service leaders 
alike waxing philosophic over the future of service 
computing and the possibility of harnessing these machines 
to control and process the immense information resources of 
Base Supply.  Over the next several years, ideas and 
proposals for new inventory control systems or new supply 
procedures dominated logistical conferences and 
publications.  A number of RAND Corporation research 
memoranda were dedicated solely to such topics.  The 
question for service members was no longer if Air Force 
materiel information would be mechanized, but when. 
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     The conversation began in earnest in 1953, just a few 
years after the service received its first computer system.  
At Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio, officers of the 
Wright Development Center were hard at work postulating the 
future of a logistics function that would utilize some form 
of computer automation.  Charged with evaluating the 
strategies in the service’s forward-thinking “Logistics in 
1956” planning document, these officers recognized they 
required assistance evaluating one specific task in the 
plan:  the flow of information between the materiel user 
and Base Supply at a future prototypical Air Force 
location.  To accomplish this, the Development Center 
contracted Ohio-based Battelle Memorial Institute – known 
primarily in industry for its work with fuels, metallurgy, 
and dry photographic reproduction – to help the Air Force 
solve its pending technical challenges.  The first 
paragraph of Battelle’s report echoed the thoughts of many 
computer proponents at the time:  
A keystone of this plan is the application, where 
feasible, of advanced electronic information-handling 
devices as substitutes for time-consuming paper work. 
Within their proper fields of application, such 
electronic devices may replace manual handling of 
data, and might (1) eliminate paper work on certain 
functions, (2) cut information flow time, (3) remove 
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human inaccuracies from present records [and] (4) make 
data readily accessible.294 
          
Since Air Force logisticians were no strangers to mountains 
of paperwork, the prospect of the automation of their 
information processes was welcomed.  Within the scope of 
all logistics functions in the Air Force, no task seemed 
more appropriate for data automation than the paperwork of 
Base Supply.295 
     Across all American military departments, “supply” 
organizations in the 1950s were the embodiment of 
administratively inundated organizations.  Following World 
War II and the Korean War, little if any equipment, 
materials, or goods arrived at a military installation 
without first going through these extraordinarily busy 
units.  Base Supply was a service-wide function in the Air 
Force, which meant airmen managed inventory control of 
everything from aircraft parts to desk staplers not only at 
the base-level, but also at headquarters.  The purpose of 
the supply pipeline was to ensure a steady flow of parts 
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for immediate availability when required.  A shortage of 
equipment or parts in the pipeline system meant the 
potential failure of operational missions.  Of course, 
managing supply levels of thousands of tons of parts, 
equipment, and supplies required outstanding clerical 
bookkeeping to ensure adequate stocks were always 
available.  The officers at the Wright Development Center 
and their contracted experts at Battelle already realized 
there were fewer functions better suited for electronic 
data assistance than those of Supply, and soon the 
conversation extended well past these Ohio-based 
organizations.296   
     Over the next several years, the conversation about 
supply applications for computers began permeating 
strategic discussions across the military and industry.  
Between 1954 and 1956, reports by the National Bureau of 
Standards, the University of California, RAND, and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology theorized on the 
future of electronic data processing equipment and its 
application in inventory and production control.  
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Encapsulating a number of these discussions was a student 
paper published at Washington D.C.’s Industrial College of 
the Armed Forces (ICAF) in May 1956.  Entitled “the 
Application of Electronic Data Processing Machines to 
Military Supply Systems,” this paper written by United 
States Navy Commander Frank J. Roberts demonstrated how 
electronic data processing machines already performed 
numerous clerical-type functions with impressive speed and 
accuracy.  He surmised that since military supply systems 
leaned heavily on clerical work, the use of computerized 
data processing would prove incredibly useful.  Roberts 
concluded that although local supply offices had displayed 
impressive individual initiative in starting the automation 
of data, the major logistics line commands had not fully 
investigated the benefits of electronic data processing 
(EDP) in comparison to their minions at the station level.  
In fact, he believed those minions actually were proving 
the adaptability of military supply data processing through 
their daily experiences.  In his summation, Commander 
Roberts recommended senior level officials of all military 
branches review the mass of data involved in logistics 
planning, both in peacetime and war, and recognize the 
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“significant” potential of electronic data processing in 
the world of military supply.297   
     Commander Roberts’ study, however, was not the first 
to discuss the automation of logistics.  Three years prior, 
and just months after cybernetics pioneer Norbert Wiener 
lectured at the college on “Automatic Control Techniques in 
Industry,” a committee of senior-ranking military students 
had developed their own study on the service-wide 
applications of cyber-oriented control.  The committee 
documented how a “future in the centralized handling of 
military inventory control...seem[ed] almost limitless,” 
adding that supply calculations necessary for efficient 
operations “create a genuine demand for the utilization of 
electronic computers.”298  By the mid-1950s there were in 
fact several studies of potential computer applications 
being conducted.  
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     The U.S. Army’s automation conference in 1956 promoted 
the “adoption of an integrated Automatic Data Processing 
System” of which “logistical inventory control” and 
automated supply stockpiles would be key components.299  In 
1957, a Department of Defense logistics system study 
identified the need “to attain a maximum of automation in 
the processing of routine supply actions and attendant 
record-keeping at accountable or subordinate levels.”300  
Even in industry, the call for EDP in logistics was growing 
too loud to ignore.  In a 1957 “Automation in the Office” 
survey of nearly 4000 U.S. and Canadian companies, 
researchers showed inventory control systems were either 
present or planned in 98 percent of the companies staking 
their future in computers.  Although scientific and 
engineering computing had existed for over a decade, the 
field of data automation was only now beginning to take 
hold – not least in relation to the supply functions of the 
U.S. military.301 
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     Supply was the first major Air Force organization to 
attempt full-scale data automation due, in part, to its 
previous automation efforts at base- and major command-
level undertaken years earlier.  Bases during the 1950s 
often operated using disparate computerized, manual and 
punched-card procedures that often varied between major 
commands, even stations.  Such diverse electronic data 
processing efforts resulted in a disjointed Air Force 
supply environment – one that contained eleven different 
systems independently designed to meet the needs of their 
specific commands.  Included in these distinct and 
disjointed environments were the training regimens of each 
major organization.  With so many different systems in 
existence, supply airmen transferring to a new base often 
found their automation knowledge and skills virtually 
useless at their next assignment.  Moreover, the 
proliferation of such nonstandard base supply systems, 
constructed with little or no oversight from the Pentagon, 
restricted higher headquarters’ ability to establish any 
meaningful supply policy.  It became obvious to Air Force 
leaders by the end of the decade that they had outgrown 
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this system of outdated equipment and training 
incompatibility and that it required an immediate 
upgrade.302   
     The Air Force was not the only organization in need of 
systems enhancements by the early 1960s.  Since both 
hardware and software capabilities had rapidly improved 
during the previous decade, the demand to upgrade entire 
systems had increased as well.  In hardware, two major 
improvements marked the differences in systems design by 
the end of the 1950s:  the transformation in circuit 
technology as transistors replaced vacuum tubes as the 
preferred computer processor; and the revolution in storage 
capabilities as memory progressed from large (and sometimes 
volatile) tube, mercury delay line, or rotating drum 
storage to a much smaller and expandable core memory 
system.  In software, improvements in assemblers and 
compilers, data sorting algorithms, and programming 
languages such as FORTRAN and COBOL turned these boxes of 
circuits, tubes and wires into powerful data manipulation 
and storage devices.  By 1961, researchers for the U.S. 
Army had documented these design system upgrades by 
categorizing over 220 unique systems at work throughout 
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industry, academia and the military/government complex.   
From major insurance and banking firms, to car and aircraft 
manufacturers, to science and technology laboratories 
across private and public institutions, leaders began 
integrating computer systems and their data automation 
capabilities into their operational landscape.303      
    Through the mid- to late-1950s, the size of the data 
processing industry continued to escalate.  Companies that 
had made their fortunes earlier in the century producing 
cash registers, tabulating machines, and other electronic 
equipment invested in this latest trend with great 
enthusiasm.  A review of the vendor list supporting Air 
Force systems is a glimpse of the industry’s American 
computer leaders of the time.  Corporations such as 
International Business Machines (IBM), Burroughs, UNIVAC-
Remington Rand, National Cash Register (NCR), Radio 
Corporation of America (RCA), Elecom, and Bendix all 
supported more than one system in operation in the service.  
Much like those in industry and academia, a number of Air 
Force systems in the early 1960s required either 
retirement, replacement, or upgrade as older variants gave 
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way to newer “second generation” technology.  Service 
leaders understood this oversized legion of vendors and 
their myriad disparate and aging data processing systems 
posed a threat to a coordinated and integrated Air Force 
data processing future.  Additionally, the methods the Air 
Force used to contact, review, and contract these vendors 
were themselves problematic as few commands possessed the 
same contracting standards and implementation guidelines.  
Controlling these problems quickly became a chief concern 
of senior service officers.304 
      The lack of computer system standardization and a 
systematic acquisition policy in the early 1960s became an 
Air Force-wide problem extending far beyond the sterile 
computing environments of the base data processing rooms.  
Operating independently of higher headquarters guidance, 
many of the unique major command and unit systems 
disregarded standardized Air Force operational procedures 
and policies.  This caused significant conflicts in 
training, compatibility, and policy implementation issues 
at all levels across the service.  The Air Force clearly 
required a much larger effort to rectify these issues 
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across its organizations worldwide and understood that 
solving service-level automatic data processing (ADP) 
standardization and obsolescence issues required a 
significantly expensive and manpower intensive approach.  
Leaders in the Pentagon’s Directorate of Data Automation 
and the Logistics Directorate began simultaneously 
advocating for an identical solution – a new era of 
service-wide automation and a large organizational user to 
lead the way.  Both directorates looked to Base Supply to 
handle this task.305   
The Birth of SBSS 
     The Air Force was similar to other services in that it 
did not launch headlong into a service-wide logistics 
automation program.  In the years prior to this effort, the 
organization maintained a more ad-hoc version, the 
Electronic Inventory Control System, in order to increase 
responsiveness and inventory accuracy in the supply systems 
throughout the Commands.  The air arm intended this 
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program, under the authorization of Air Force Manual 67-1, 
to utilize EDP equipment systems for base inventory 
control, especially where they could accelerate 
responsiveness and improve the accuracy and timeliness of 
supply data.  Such a system aimed to take data entries from 
base supply functions and transmit them to local management 
and to command/support channels.  Program managers across 
the Air Force in turn maintained data link compatibility 
between other electronic base supply systems and 
transmission systems throughout the organization.  The Air 
Force designed this initial inventory system to deliver 
important data such as consumption rates, supply 
requirements, transaction analysis, item location and 
expense distribution.  The designers were also careful to 
ensure it tied in with other systems, such as the 
Comptroller’s Financial Inventory Accounting System, in an 
attempt to integrate technological gains wherever possible.  
While not a final solution, the Electronic Inventory 
Control System provided a valuable springboard from which 
the Logistics community could broaden their data processing 
horizons.306 
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     Between 1962 and 1963, after years of studying, 
discussing, and prototyping supply control systems, the Air 
Force took a series of steps to establishing an official 
service-wide, stand-alone logistics automation program.  
The process began in 1962 when the yet unnamed program 
earned its official authorization from the Air Force Chief 
of Staff, General Curtis E. LeMay.  It was October when the 
General, better known for his role in building Strategic 
Air Command (SAC), approved the concept of a standard 
supply system and authorized the base-level execution of 
automatic data processing management.  LeMay was familiar 
with the benefits of data management having worked closely 
with future “Whiz Kid” and Secretary of Defense Robert S. 
McNamara during World War II, and appeared eager to 
incorporate its efficiencies in his organization.  The data 
automation decision profoundly affected the service’s 
organizational and operational future and eventually 
outlived even the once-mighty SAC.   
     Eight months after disseminating the General’s 
decision, the Air Force published Special Order G-58 
approving the formation of the Supply Systems Design 
Office, or SSDO, at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, 




D.C.  This new organization was comprised of personnel 
hailing from both headquarters and command units, and was 
formally charged to "develop and control a standard USAF 
base supply electronic data processing system."307  The 
Directorate of Data Automation published their 
comprehensive Plan for Installation of EDPE in Selected Air 
Force Base Supply Activities in August that called for the 
installation of electronic data processing systems at 
selected Air Force Base Supply activities.  These and other 
measures built enough momentum across the headquarters that 
the air arm created an official program to harness all the 
supply-oriented, data mechanization endeavors.  This 
program was originally designated as the Standard Base 
Level Automated Inventory Control System, but as the 
systems’ mission grew, the Air Force renamed it to better 
represent its larger purpose:  the Standard Base Supply 
System.308   
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     The Standard Base Supply System was a formal extension 
and standardization of various command systems falling 
within Supply’s Electronic Inventory Control System with 
the eventual intention being to replace the latter 
entirely.  The program’s success relied on the purported 
“many proven benefits of automated inventory control” and 
the second- and third-order effects such automated 
inventory control created.309  To homogenize the entire 
service supply system, program managers prepared to replace 
all individual Command computers, programs and external 
procedures with standardized versions to enforce a first-
ever automated system at every Air Force location.  To 
accomplish this required computers with a multitude of 
complex new capabilities:  inputs receivable either at the 
computer or remotely; inputs processed through detailed 
edits and decisions for file/output determination; files 
maintained in storage for immediate access; and outputs 
that were distributed by on-line card punch or printers and 
generated for a wide variety of management products.  
Moreover, the task required the installation and operation 
of this complex system at more than 140 bases worldwide 
over the next three years.  By May 1963, the deliberation 
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as to what this new system was supposed to do was over.  It 
was time for the Air Force to find a vendor who could 
support these new SBSS ideals.310   
     The task of finding a vendor to handle such a program 
proved monumental for the Directorate of Data Automation.  
The Data Systems Coordination Division only finalized the 
method for evaluating such competitive computer proposals a 
few months prior in January 1963.  Led by Colonel Kent 
Prim, the division published “Analytical Technique for 
Automatic Data Processing Equipment Acquisition” in order 
to facilitate competitive selection of EDPE regardless of 
the equipment’s purpose.  Following Colonel Prim’s 
guidance, the division reported that twenty-three 
interested equipment vendors had received detailed systems 
specifications on the Air Force’s future supply system in 
April 1963.  Shortly thereafter, in mid-May, Air Force 
Systems Command’s Electronic Systems Division hosted a 
vendors conference allowing interested contractors the 
opportunity for an in-depth review of SBSS specifications 
prior to the service’s 19 July 1963 submission deadline.  
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The Directorate held the conference at Hanscom Field in 
Massachusetts and ensured vendors understood the magnitude 
of the system’s set-up and operational requirements.  
Specifically, planners took care to ensure they paid 
special attention to the requirement for worldwide 
installation of approximately 152 computers at the rate of 
ten per month.  Between July and September, the Air Force’s 
System Source Selection Board arduously evaluated the 
submissions from a number of potential vendors.  When 
Secretary of the Air Force Eugene M. Zuckert approved the 
Selection Board’s recommendation on 4 November 1963, the 
announcement signified the organization’s automation system 
choice to take Supply, and its hundreds of thousands of 
customers, into the next technological era.  Zuckert, 
perhaps best known in military history as the initiator of 
the Air Force-wide “Project Forecast” future technology 
study series, appeared to be the perfect person to announce 
which system would lead the department into an automation 
future.  That system was the Sperry Rand UNIVAC 1050-II.311 
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     The Air Force’s order for the UNIVAC 1050 Model II was 
unprecedented in Defense Department computer system 
acquisition.  According to a 1964 New York Times article on 
Sperry Rand, the Supply System’s Design Office’s order of 
more than 150 complete computer systems represented “the 
largest military order ever signed.”312  The Model II was an 
Air Force-specific, augmented version of the standard 
UNIVAC 1050 sent into industry.  This UNIVAC was a second-
generation computer system containing extra peripherals and 
real-time memory storage/access units in an effort to 
provide Air Force bases and their smaller supply satellite 
installations with the latest in data processing 
capability.  The computer provided “real-time processing” 
according to the Times, meaning instant system updating 
with each stored supply transaction to ensure information 
stayed current.  Its modular, or “building-block,” design 
allowed capacity expansion or reduction dependent on the 
required workload and was the first in the Department of 
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Defense to offer “direct and immediate customer access to 
the computer” by way of remote input/output devices.313  To 
those involved, the 1050-II appeared as a true 
revolutionary device in the burgeoning automation age. 
     However, a glaring programmatic issue with the UNIVAC 
was its labor requirements.  Sperry Rand estimated the 
system required a crew of 27 individuals to operate the 
computer around-the-clock in jobs ranging from supervisor 
to librarian.  Therefore, while the Air Force looked to 
SBSS as a means of saving money through technology, the 
service faced the reality of adding and justifying nearly 
4000 more computer personnel to its roster.  The original 
plans called for reutilizing many personnel from previous 
EDP-related positions but it still remained the SSDO’s 
responsibility to prove that the benefits of higher-level 
automation far outweighed any additional personnel costs.  
These were not unusual for computer transitions during this 
period but such Air Force costs were growing given the size 
of the program and its personnel load.314 




314 See  "Univac 1050," Computer History Archives Project, 
accessed March 3, 2012, 
http://sites.google.com/site/computerhistoryarchivesproject
/1/univac-1050;  Quotes and statistics from The quote 
regarding “direct and immediate customer access to the 
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     Like nearly all Air Force acquisition projects, 
funding such an epic venture was possible only if the 
return on investment appeared both reasonable and tangible.  
Making a case for such a massive allocation of resources 
required a considerable return on the government’s 
investment, especially one renowned for its size and scope.  
To emphasize the system’s benefits, the program management 
office established project goals that were straightforward 
and covered everything from fiscal, operational, and 
training objectives: 
 Reduce overall costs, including manpower 
requirements, and eliminate duplicate programming 
efforts in the various commands. 
 
 Decrease response time and increase asset control in 
base level supply operations. 
 
 Facilitate implementation of Air Force base level 
supply policies. 
 
 Eliminate the need for each command to design, 
justify, select, program, implement and control its 
own base level supply EDPS. 
 
 Permit Air Training Command to train supply 
personnel, thus establishing a uniform training 
program allowing inter-command transfers without 
retraining (ensuring personnel were immediately 
useful at any base). 
                                                          
computer” comes directly from Riemondy, Supply and Service—
The Nucleus of Logistics.  For additional information on 
Univac 1050-II progress, see Martin H. Weik, A Fourth 
Survey of Domestic Electronic Digital Computing 
Systems (Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: Ballistic Research 




 Permit the compilation of standard management data 
regarding base level supply operations.315 
 
Additionally, the Air Force also believed the system could 
promote better interaction among Air Force Logistics 
Command depots and the Major Commands, which was a much-
needed improvement over the individualistic operations of 
the past.  By eliminating duplicate operational and 
programming efforts across various commands and units, the 
service planned to use Supply as a test bed for a number of 
other mission activities.  If the Air Force could save the 
Defense Department time, money, and effort using service-
wide EDP equipment, the Standard Base Supply System 
developers had to prove it.316      
     That job fell primarily to Brigadier General Louis 
Grossmith.  Grossmith was the Director of the Data 
Automation Directorate and oversaw both vendor selection 
and base installation preparation.  The general was neither 
a supply guru nor a computer expert.  He was instead a 
pilot-turned-comptroller who had earned his first star only 
                                                          
315 See United States of America, United States Air Force, 
Directorate of Data Automation, United States Air Force 
Data Systems Automation Program, Sections I and 
II (Washington: United States Air Force, 1963).  
 
316 United States of America, United States Air Force Data 
Systems Automation Program, Sections I and II.    
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months prior to entering his position in 1962.  He was, 
however, the Directorate’s inaugural leader and spearheaded 
the organization’s transition after the Air Force moved 
data automation responsibilities into the unit.  An 
experienced pilot and staff officer, he was ultimately 
responsible for translating the benefits of the SBSS to 
those in the service – especially aviators – who knew or 
understood little about the benefits of data automation.  
Producing guidance for his fellow commanders on upcoming 
computer-project implementation and training schedules was 
not the glamorous role many senior pilots saw themselves in 
late in their careers, but such was the life of a senior 
staff officer in the Pentagon.317   
     General Grossmith’s guidance, including the unit’s 
“Plan for Installation of EDPE in Selected Air Force Base 
Supply Activities,” reached far beyond the Washington 
beltway and was distributed to all participating service 
Commands.   The general and his staff acted quickly after 
Zuckert’s system selection, especially as the contract 
programmed computer system installations to begin as early 
as September 1964.  Headquarters personnel quickly warned 
                                                          
317 United States Air Force, Historical Summary, Directorate 
of Data Automation, 1 Jan - 30 June 1963 (Washington: 
United States Air Force, 1963), 1-32.  
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units of the preparation time and parameter requirements as 
they simultaneously took major steps to ensure the Pentagon 
met all of its own responsibilities.  For example, in 
addition to the SSDO, the Air Force formed a “Central 
Development Group” at Bolling AFB responsible for the 
systems design, programming, testing and debugging of the 
new supply system in the latter months of 1963.  Moreover, 
to ensure the test base was close to the Directorate’s 
Pentagon location, the Air Force chose Maryland’s Andrews 
AFB as its initial site for the first operational SBSS 
computer.  Finally, just days before Christmas of 1963, the 
Directorate completed all initial training of programmers 
and systems personnel.  By year’s end and after a 
tremendous amount of program actions on the part of 
Grossmith and his staff, the Air Force was officially ready 
to embark on its first service-wide, base-level EDPE 
system.318   
The Implementation of the SBSS 
     As the Air Force ushered in the New Year, it 
subsequently kicked off its newest era of data automation – 
that of a standardized, service-wide system built on new 
                                                          




technology and the backing of service leadership.  In 
February 1964, the Air Force and Sperry Rand installed the 
first 1050-II computers at two locations, Bolling AFB in 
Washington, D.C. for program testing and at Sheppard AFB in 
Texas for a training center.  By May, they had installed 
two additional systems, the first at Texas’ Amarillo AFB in 
its own training center and at Maryland’s Andrews AFB as an 
operational test location.  Early on, leadership remained 
positive about the aggressive implementation schedule 
following “no significant problems” during installations at 
Bolling and Amarillo.319  However, by the time Major General 
Elbert Helton took over as the Director of Data Automation 
in July 1964, a more guarded attitude prevailed across the 
program.  Managers began cautiously holding in abeyance all 
additional base installations remaining for that year 
pending the completion of program development and 
operational evaluations at the Andrews site.  Adding to the 
caution were configuration changes, such as the addition of 
magnetic tape recovery units, which forced planners to 
alter pre-established system structures and personnel 
training as test sites simultaneously underwent their 
                                                          
319 United States Air Force, Historical Summary, Directorate 
of Data Automation, 1 Jan - 30 June 1964 (Washington: 
United States Air Force, 1964), 42. 
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evaluations.  Making matters worse were site survey visits 
like one at Holloman AFB in Nevada that revealed not all 
sites were ready for an immediate computer install.  In 
short, there was still much to do in preparing Air Force 
bases and their personnel for this system.  For Sperry 
Rand, matters went from bad to worse as the Air Force 
reduced its order quantity from 154 systems to 141 due to 
service-wide base realignments and closures.  As 1964 came 
to a close, the program management of SBSS was more 
important than ever, and the weight of such importance fell 
squarely on the shoulders of General Helton and his 
staff.320 
     Although the operational tests at Andrews eventually 
worked to the Department’s satisfaction, the need for 
program improvement was everywhere.  Halfway through 1965, 
the Air Force and UNIVAC officials remained well behind 
previous installation projections laid out by the SSDO and 
implementation staff.  Only sixteen of the originally 
estimated 100 1050-IIs had made it onto their sites by mid-
year.  Worse yet, while these sixteen units stayed busy 
facilitating conversions and operator training, only two 
were actually fully operational, putting the Air Force 
                                                          
320 Ibid, 42, 92.  
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nearly a year behind its original schedule.  All of this 
occurred as the Data Automation Directorate underwent yet 
another leadership change that spring.  After just a single 
year at the helm of Air Force data automation, General 
Helton left to be the logistics (J-4) director at 
Headquarters U.S. European Command in Paris, France.  While 
Helton’s brief tenure was not unusual for well-regarded 
aviators, it was an extremely unfortunate move given the 
state of the SBSS project.  Moreover, the Air Force’s 
choice of replacement – a Colonel – gives some insight into 
the decreasing prestige such a position had in the service 
at the time.321   
     Although changing leadership was a frequent occurrence 
at Headquarters, doing so with a significant rank reduction 
in the middle of programmatic issues was certainly 
problematic in the competitive halls of the Pentagon.  
Undaunted, Colonel William Pratt and his new staff went to 
work immediately to correct the “numerous difficulties” 
faced throughout the Directorate’s multiple divisions and 
branches.  Pratt and the Data Automation Directorate fought 
                                                          
321 United States Air Force, Historical Summary, Directorate 
of Data Automation, 1 Jan – 30 Jun 1965 (Washington: United 
States Air Force, 1965), 52;  United States Air Force, 
Historical Summary, Directorate of Data Automation, 1 Jul – 




hard to stay focused as Air Force organizations continued 
to inundate the unit with even more grandiose automation 
plans that called for replacing all Air Force punched card 
machines, standardizing all non-Supply data systems, and 
upgrading existing major command systems.  In addition, a 
joint headquarters and major command evaluation team was 
about to complete a milestone assessment of the program as 
a whole.  If SBSS was to remain a beacon of hope for Air 
Force automation, the Director understood that making 
significant progress over the next several quarters was 
vital.322   
     That spring, the joint evaluation team completed their 
assessment of the SBSS and recommended the system was 
finally ready for implementation . . . once the Air Force 
and the UNIVAC team agreed to specific improvements.  Pratt 
and his unit ensured that more than 50 bases received their 
UNIVAC configurations with 31 of them reaching full 
implementation status by the end of December.  During the 
Colonel’s tenure, the system underwent considerable 
optimization with more deliveries projected for the 
upcoming year.  Significant workload increases at a number 
of bases additionally raised the amount of system equipment 
                                                          
322 United States Air Force, Historical Summary, Directorate 
of Data Automation, 1 Jan – 30 Jun 1965, 12.   
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configurations to five (up from three in the original 
equipment approval) to better facilitate site requirements.  
The rebirth of the program over the last half of 1965 
impressed Pratt’s Equipment Review Branch enough for it to 
theorize that all bases could complete their SBSS 
conversion before the end of 1966.  This was made even more 
realistic by the Air Force once again reducing the number 
of required installations to 132 due to additional base 
closures and mission changes.323  The Air Force, of course, 
had bigger and faster-growing concerns.  The escalating war 
in Vietnam and an increase in even loftier data programs 
had Directorate planners readjusting their SBSS 
expectations, especially since they knew it was responsible 
for only a portion of the service’s mounting automation 
issues.324 
     The Vietnam War added a new priority level as 
logistics requirements picked up overseas.  The escalation 
in Vietnam in the mid-1960s required the Air Force to build 
up additional bases overseas, both in-theater and at 
                                                          
323 There were 154 originally allocated in the Univac 
contract. 
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supporting locations.  Therefore, by the end of 1966, 
planners began adding additional systems to the contract 
and thereby returning installation figures to near-original 
projections of 148 systems.  The major issue with Sperry’s 
UNIVAC and the SBSS was nonetheless the excessive downtime 
involved in both installation and (computer) operation that 
was causing unsatisfactory systems performance and a 
significant modification of the remaining installation 
schedule.  Only 126 systems actually met the end-of-year 
deadline.  To rectify the slowdown, the Air Force scheduled 
the installation of the remaining 19 systems for 1967, but 
at half the originally projected monthly installation rate 
in light of ongoing issues.  There was still much work to 
be done by the Directorate in order to put the program back 
on track.  Doing so required a substantial effort from not 
only the Pentagon staff, but also the UNIVAC program 
office, the SSBO, and SSBS sites around the world.325 
     The extra work began immediately and continued 
throughout 1967.  First, additional challenges with 
computer maintenance procedures, especially the 1050-II 
                                                          
325 United States Air Force, Historical Summary, Directorate 
of Data Automation, 1 Jan - 30 June 1966 (Washington: 
United States Air Force, 1966); United States Air 
Force, Historical Summary, Directorate of Data Automation, 
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systems installed in Southeast Asia, forced the 
Directorate’s Plans, Policy, and Technology Division and 
Sperry Rand to hold monthly meetings throughout the year to 
work on improvements.  These maintenance issues 
necessitated the creation of traveling military computer 
maintenance personnel teams to service SBSS systems 
worldwide, especially in Southeast Asia.  Next, when a fire 
in the UNIVAC installation at Westover AFB caused severe 
damage to the central processor, installation experts used 
the experience to highlight the need to review requirements 
for proper housing facilities and personnel training.  
Finally, as dictated in the acquisition specifications, the 
UNIVAC configurations accommodated the many smaller supply 
accounts not connected to a base system by connecting these 
accounts to a host 1050-II using a separate communications 
link.  Between 1966 and 1968, the Air Force and Sperry Rand 
spent a tremendous amount of effort trying to improve the 
SBSS systems instead of merely trying to fix individual 
issues.  Given the frequency of technological changes, 
implementation sites, and the war in Vietnam, nearly 
everything the Air Force could do to stay ahead was a 
positive step in the future of SBSS.326        
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Air Force, Historical Summary, Directorate of Data 
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     Between October 1967 and February 1968, two major 
incidents highlighted both the significance of the SBSS and 
the unity of the teams operating and maintaining it.  
First, as previously mentioned, a fire in the central 
processor at Westover AFB that October destroyed the base’s 
UNIVAC 1050-II.  The base, located just outside of 
Springfield, Massachusetts, was the center of numerous 
missions critical to both the Cold War and the war in 
Vietnam.  One of Westover’s major missions was to operate 
and support the 99th Bombardment Wing (Heavy), home to the 
B-52D Stratofortress bomber, the KC-135 Stratotanker air 
refueler, and the EC-135 Looking Glass Post-Attack Command 
Control System aircraft.  With flying squadrons, 
maintenance squadrons, and a whole host of support units 
(civil engineering, communications, security forces, etc.), 
the need for rapid and ever-present control over the supply 
system was crucial.  Hence, when the fire erupted in the 
data processing building on 25 October, individuals from 
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the Pentagon’s Directorate of Data Automation (Program 
Management Division) and the Sperry Rand UNIVAC Division 
got to work within hours to replace the damaged components.  
Miraculously, in just over two weeks’ time, Air Force and 
contracted professionals received, readied, and made 
operational a replacement UNIVAC system at the base.  An 
investigation into the fire’s causes reported there were no 
indications of any faulty environmental conditions, misuse, 
inexperienced personnel, accidental discharge, or neglect.  
Therefore, both the rapid operational return of the UNIVAC 
system and an error-free accident report proved all the 
training and effort at Westover was extraordinarily 
effective.  To the Air Force, Westover became an example of 
what could go right even when something went horribly 
wrong.327               
                                                          
327 See United States Air Force, Historical Summary, 
Directorate of Data Automation, 1 July – 31 December 
1967 (Washington: United States Air Force, 1968), 50-56; 
and United States Air Force, Historical Summary, 
Directorate of Data Automation, 1 Jan - 30 June 
1968 (Washington: United States Air Force, 1968), 24. The 
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http://www.westoverafbhistory.com/).  Finally, oral history 
interviews with Bill Stevenson and Robert Neibling in 
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     The second incident occurred thousands of miles in 
South Vietnam on a Saturday morning in early February 1968.  
With the Tet Offensive well underway, base personnel at Da 
Nang Air Base, South Vietnam watched in horror as their 
former safe haven far from the front lines became a 
battleground for North Vietnamese insurgents.  Personnel 
and equipment casualties, uncommon for a base so far south, 
instantly spiked as 27 Viet Cong mortar shells exploded 
across the base.  Moments later, the warehouse housing 
approximately 16,000 items of armament and electronics 
supplies for F-4 Phantom aircraft was gone and with it, the 
base’s SBSS UNIVAC computer system and the capability of 
supporting Da Nang’s strike aircraft.  Of all the training 
scenarios developed by the Data Automation Directorate, 
this was among the most catastrophic imaginable.  Pentagon 
leaders had only hours to prove that all the system 
training and redundancy was worth the effort.328 
     Just a few hours after the attack, the Directorate got 
its opportunity.  By midday, thanks to a pre-attack 
transmission by the 1050-II in Da Nang, another SBSS system 
began a selective readout of every equipment item lost to 
                                                          
328 John C. Ford and Howard E. Wilson, "UNIVAC's Role in the 
Pacific: Autodin and Base Level Supply Systems," Signal 
Magazine, 1970, 25-26.    
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mortar fire.  Simultaneously, Supply officials at 
Headquarters 7th Air Force in Saigon, Headquarters Pacific 
Air Forces in Hawaii and Headquarters Air Force Logistics 
Command at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio laid the 
foundation to establish replacement materiel to support the 
base at Da Nang.  Just five days later, 78 percent of all 
stock requisitions were entering the supply receiving line 
in South Vietnam, which would have been an absolute 
impossibility had it not been for the up-channeled supply 
information sent from base-to-base by the SBSS UNIVACs.  
After the case in Westover displayed the level of Air Force 
disaster preparation, the case in Vietnam confirmed that 
the rapid recovery had been no fluke.  The Air Force showed 
it had implemented a system with both operational and 
contingency conditions in mind.  Moreover, it proved that 
the SBSS worked as advertised as a central repository for 
supply data.329   
     By the end of 1968, the implementation of the Standard 
Base Supply System had essentially reached its initial 
completion point.  The Air Force and the UNIVAC team 
completed their 167th 1050 Model II installation that 
December and had installed machines at a total of 144 bases 
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across the air arm, including 20 in the Southeast Asia 
region – overall, an unprecedented feat in data automation 
to date.  Despite delays, computer downtime, and larger-
than-expected account sizes, more than four years of base 
implementation experience helped reduce the average 
installation time by approximately 60% compared to original 
estimates.  In addition to the 167 computer installs, the 
Directorate brought on 45 additional “satellite” sites 
where supply accounts were too small to earn a full-scale 
installation.  Seven years after General LeMay approved the 
standard supply system concept, SBSS had finally reached 
fruition.  The Air Force quickly reaped the benefits of 
data automation and its applicability to nearly all Service 
operations.330 
Aftermath 
     In his 1970 article “The Logistics Challenge of the 
Seventies” for the Air University Review, former bomber 
pilot and sitting Deputy Chief of Staff for Systems and 
                                                          
330 Final tallies of total systems and bases derives from 
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Logistics Lieutenant General Harry E. Goldsworthy touted 
the impact of the computer on Air Force operations as well 
as the “revolution in automatic data processing.”  
Goldsworthy praised the “marked improvement in resource 
accounting and control, in accuracy and speed of reporting, 
and in improved logistics reaction time” thanks to the SBSS 
and the UNIVAC 1050-II computer.331  The General gave credit 
to the system for delivering on its promise: giving the Air 
Force its first real-time requisitioning and inventory 
status capabilities.  However, he went much further by 
elaborating on how the Directorate’s insistence of 
standardizing computer hardware, data systems, and supply 
procedures resulted in significant improvements in 
inventory reduction, customer support, and manpower 
reduction efforts.  In fact, he strongly emphasized the 
improvement to the logistics system in general.  These 
second- and third-order effects made the SBSS not only 
successful in achieving officially projected intentions, 
but also in achieving the outcomes promised by the data 
automation community as a whole.  Fortunately, General 
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Goldsworthy was not alone in comprehending the benefits of 
the system and the precedent it created.332 
      In 1970, after the full integration of all satellite 
bases and several years of operation at the main bases, the 
Air Force began to review the post-implementation effects 
of the Standard Base Supply System.  After all, feedback 
from the SBSS experience would prove critical if the Air 
Force wanted to further standardize data automation systems 
throughout the service.  In summarizing his experience with 
SBSS, Brigadier General A. A. Riemondy highlighted the 
major advantages earned by the system’s implementation:  
 The power of centralized development:  Having the 
ability to make a single program modification and 
having it immediately impact every location in the 
system.  The Air Force, and the Logistics community 
especially, benefited greatly from their control over 
system design, implementation, and operation. 
 
 The benefit of having a single, standardized supply 
organization:  In the early 1960s, the supply data 
systems were as diverse as the major commands they 
served.  With SBSS, there was now an Air Force 
standard for operations, system products, forms, and 
training at all bases.  
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 The profits of efficiency:  From Supply’s first 
conversion from manual to “interim” computers in 
1957, the automation of data systems consistently 
paid manpower dividends.  That first conversion 
allowed Supply to alter their own unit manning 
documents and eliminate nearly 2500 manpower spaces.  
When the SBSS program began acquiring the UNIVAC 
1050-II system, Headquarters cut another 862 base 
supply personnel.  After another cut of 290 billets 
thanks to system improvement, the benefits of having 
a standardized supply organization blossomed once 
again.  This time, such an organizational move 
allowed the reengineering of manning standards for 39 
base work centers and resulted in an Air Force-wide 
elimination of another 3020 positions. 
  
 The effectiveness of unified training:  As SBSS came 
online, the need for separate and distinct training 
courses quickly vanished.  This allowed Air Training 
Command (ATC) to develop a more effective instruction 
model for the Service.  SBSS allowed ATC to 
completely assume total system training 
responsibility.  As such, by 1970, 38,000 of the Air 
Force’s 49,000 supply personnel received formal 
training in the Standard Base Level System…a feat 
unheard of just seven years prior. 333  
 
General Riemondy’s comments added significant depth to 
those of Goldsworthy, leaving the Air Force tremendously 
optimistic about data automation’s future in the air arm.  
While the SBSS was not the perfect system and significant 
issues were omitted from Air Force leader evaluations, the 
impact of this first service-wide automation system was 
undeniable across the organization. 
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     In retrospect, General Lemay’s original 1962 decision 
to update and standardize Air Force data automation proved 
even more monumental than anticipated.  The general’s edict 
acted as the catalyst for SBSS and spawned dozens of major 
and minor data automation programs that completely changed 
service operations.  In fact, managing the addition of data 
processing systems (including several in logistics 
automation) became one of the primary concerns of the 
Directorate of Data Automation in the latter half of the 
1960s.  Much of this was a function of two additional major 
data automation programs pursued in the Air Force at that 
time, Phase II and Phase III.  Phase II was the Air Force 
program to automate as many non-Supply functions as 
possible while Phase III focused on automating systems 
above base-level (i.e. major air command, higher 
headquarters).  The intent was to use SBSS, now also known 
as Phase I, as a springboard for further data automation 
efforts.  As an element of these programs, the Air Force 
automated specific components of base maintenance, 
transportation, and procurement in an effort to eliminate 
the routine and tedious functions performed by thousands of 
clerical and technical personnel.  However, the continuous 
rise in data automation requests ensured Air Force leaders 
understood this was not a permanent, long-term solution.  
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From 1968 until 1975, the service grappled with new ideas 
and directions in an effort to solve the data automation 
issue once and for all.334 
     After numerous programmatic iterations, the final 
answer came in April 1976 when the Air Force officially 
eliminated all individual automation efforts and christened 
one single program to govern all data processing in the Air 
Force. It was known to some as the Base-Level Computer 
Modernization Program.  Program managers simply knew it as 
Phase IV.335  Phase IV established a single data processing 
center at each major Air Force location and would 
eventually lead the way for both “regionalized” processing 
(data centered at a regional, or command-centered, 
location), followed by centralized processing (data 
centered at a single Air Force location) in the age of the 
Internet.  Francis Hughes, Assistant Secretary of the Air 
Force for Financial Management, summarized the direction 
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for Phase IV by saying, “[t]he most appropriate solution to 
these problems (equipment age, increasing cost of existing 
systems, and the forecasted growth of the standard base 
supply system)--and the policy of this office--is 
replacement of base level computers with equipment from a 
single vendor.”336  With Phase IV, the Air Force achieved 
yet another milestone in their “information age,” all made 
possible through the efforts of the data automators and 
logistician pioneers who had helped develop the SBSS 
decades earlier.337 
     Reviewing the history of logistics-centered data 
automation helps illuminate how United States Air Force 
leaders thought about the future performance of their 
organizational functions, especially given the success of 
Base Supply automation in the 1960s.  Nearly two decades 
after the Supply automation conversation began in earnest, 
the addition of automatic data processing functions to 
base-level logistics operations was universal.  This soon 
became the catalyst for even larger programs and projects 
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that led to the Phase IV initiative and the automation 
phases that preceded it.  Were it not for the dialogue and 
experimentation of the 1950s and the early automation 
programs in the 1960s it is quite likely the history of Air 
Force data automation would look considerably different 
today.  Thanks to the achievements of dozens of logistician 
visionaries, paired with their partners in the Air Force 
Comptroller’s Directorate of Data Automation (and its 
organizational predecessors), it is difficult to conceive 
an Air Force data automation environment in the 1980s and 
1990s without the innovations of the Standard Base Supply 
System.   
     In the end, the deceptively obvious decision to choose 
Supply as the test bed for service-wide automation turned 
out to be an incredibly intelligent selection.  As a 
system, it delivered data automation for requirements 
computation, inventory control, fund control, 
requisitioning, issuing, receiving, and records maintenance 
for an entire Air Force.  The SBSS proved once and for all 
that data automation, despite its large initial expenditure 
of money, manpower, and time, could save the Air Force 
valuable resources in the long run.  The Air Force, as 
General Goldsworthy claimed, definitely took advantage of 
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the automatic data processing revolution…and it was the 
Standard Base Supply System that led the way.338 
  
                                                          
338 Many sources list the total billets saved by SBSS.  
Although the number often varies between 4,000 and 4,200, 
the variation does not change the overall impact 
whatsoever.  See Kenneth B. Heitkamp, Air Force Base-Level 
Information Systems (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, 
1987); and Goldsworthy, "The Logistics Challenge of the 












     This dissertation has examined service information 
operations dating back to the Civil War and continuing well 
into the 1960s and Vietnam.  It reveals that while the USAF 
did not exist independently until 1947, it inherited an 
emerging culture of information dependence formed through a 
series of methodological and technological advances.  These 
advances grew out of initiatives most often generated from 
the ground-up – at the individual and unit level – and 
helped develop the service’s information environment for 
what became the most information-dominant organization in 
the federal government.  This dissertation also illustrates 
the extent to which Air Force information developed in the 
context of particular periods rather than as part of a 
monolithic “Information Age”.339 
It thereby challenges service perceptions that have 
prevailed for decades.  At the same time it makes clear the 
                                                          
339 This theory derives from Hobart and Schiffman’s work 
regarding multiple information ages.  However, the theory 
and its relationship to this argument is better found in 
Cox’s analysis of Hobart and Schiffman’s theory and its 
application.  See Richard J. Cox, "The Information Age and 
History: Looking Backward to See Us," accessed March 03, 
2013, http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/2698/1/ r_cox_1.html. 
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extent to which the service and its predecessors grew 
increasingly reliant on access to statistical information. 
     Such dependence began building in earnest as far back 
as the Civil War.  By the time the war ended, the average 
Union Army field commander had grown accustomed to an 
operating environment that included more access to, and 
requirements for, operational and intelligence information 
than ever before.  Thanks to the creation of the Signal 
Corps, the Military Telegraph Corps, and the Government 
Printing Office (all organizations founded on growing 
information requirements), information transmission and 
reproduction capabilities became greater than in any 
previous conflict.  The next half-century witnessed further 
service developments shaped by three factors:  a reluctance 
to appear retrograde in information capability, a drive to 
improve on existing information standards, and a budding 
interest in the information technology of the private 
sector.  The regulatory and technological improvements in 
this fifty-year period suggest an Army coming to understand 
its information needs and exploring new solutions to 
improve the service information environment.  Therefore, by 
the time the Army established the Aeronautical Division in 




     The four decades that preceded Air Force independence 
in 1947 witnessed the emergence of air-specific information 
needs.  While the Army sought to improve its data 
management methods and technologies, airmen separately 
looked for ways to modify such tools to best suit the 
aeronautical environment.  The period prior to and during 
World War I became a catalyst for such modifications, 
especially as the air arm came into its own as a formidable 
military entity.  Information became an important commodity 
as personnel, equipment, and maintenance needs ballooned in 
the context of the service’s sudden exponential growth.  
The later interwar manual- and punched-card accountability 
systems were indicative of the increasing demand for data 
and the unique purposes for which it was used.  By the time 
World War II began, the Army and its air forces became so 
reliant on information for operational sustainment and 
decision-making that internal units (MRUs and SCUs) were 
created which were specially designed to collect, exploit, 
and transmit data throughout the entire service.  
Information was now not only an aspect of mission 
capability; it was essential to it.  The formation and 
proliferation of statistical control in the Army Air 
Service is indicative of a service wholly dependent on 
information to accomplish its mission.   
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     By the time the Air Force gained its independence 
following the war, it was an organization with decades of 
experience with aeronautical and logistical information 
requirements that had themselves emerged from the Army’s 
general operational and administrative data environment.  
The subsequent rise of computers became the focus of a 
number of projects and programs designed to improve service 
decision-making and administrative statistical control.  
Finally, as the air arm launched its first service-wide 
data processing system in the 1960s, the organization 
became inextricably tied to the systemic electronic 
collection, exploitation, and distribution of huge 
quantities of information for its everyday activities. This 
was a significant achievement: but this new “information 
age” was in key respects the latest iteration of a process, 
or series of “information ages”, that had been underway for 
a hundred years.  
     This process, however, is not a simple matter of 
technological determinism; of one clearly delineated age – 
that of the bound ledger, mechanical device, and automated 
system – succeeding another.  As the preceding chapters 
have shown, there was rarely an instance where one way of 
doing things was suddenly and universally replaced by 
another via command fiat.  Change occurred more commonly as 
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the result of limited and often localized initiatives, some 
of which were deemed failures and not pursued further by 
those in overall charge.  In the latter part of the 
nineteenth century unit- or base-specific initiatives 
produced local variations on standard practice.  In the 
first half of the twentieth century, to be sure, overall 
and urgent necessity in the form massive wartime service 
expansion forced more widespread and top-down change in the 
way information was gathered, processed, and used.  Even 
then, however, a new age did not dawn at the single stroke 
of a pen in Washington in either 1917 or 1941.  As for the 
decades after World War II, it was the actions of certain 
key individuals that determined how the Air Force would 
react and adapt its information environment to the 
computer.  Even SBSS, as the final chapter shows, had a far 
from straightforward, top-down development history.  
     The tendency in certain circles to imply that Air 
Force information operations arrived along with the term 
“cyberspace” in the early twenty-first century, or perhaps 
with the flowering of the internet in the 1990s, or – for 
those with a sense of history – the adoption of computers 
after World War II,  is misleading.340  The amassing, 
                                                          
340 See “Letter to Airmen”, Secretary of the Air Force 
Michael Wynne and Chief of Staff General T. Michael 
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processing, interpretation, and utilization of large 
quantities of data by the military have a background in 
relation to the air service in its various early guises 
that predates both the computer and the formation of the US 
Air Force.  Moreover, though intertwined with the emergence 
and development of new technologies, that history was not 
simply driven by an unspoken and universally accepted 
assumption by those in uniform that “new” automatically 
denoted “better” and therefore required universal adoption 
by the service. The actions and initiative of groups and 
individuals – not always those close to the seats of power 
– in combination with external events, were what defined 
perceived needs and the means of meeting them that were (or 
were not) adopted at least until the 1960s.  The 
informational “Wild New Yonder” of today, therefore, has a 
long and often far from simple history behind it. 
.  
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